What future for the Third Front?
WHATEVER its outcome, India's general election will be remembered for many peculiarities. First, there are no major issues at stake, no ideological contentions, and no political fault-lines.
The election's outcome will affect the economy and the prospect of secularism and coalition politics. But these issues haven't entered the electoral arena.
By contrast, the 2004 election was a referendum against the Bharatiya Janata Party's communal sectarianism and its celebration of an India it wrongly claimed was "shining." The BJP lost in 23 of 28 states.
Even in the 1991, 1996 and 1998 elections, there were major issues; the decline of the Congress, the future of the rising regional parties and the viability of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance.
Second, this is India's first election where a prime minister who has completed his full term is not leading his party's campaign. Dr. Manmohan Singh isn't even a candidate in these elections.
If the Congress forms the next government, he'll be the first prime minister to be re-elected as a Rajya Sabha MP, which will be worse than H.D. Deve Gowda's brief prime ministerial tenure in 1996-97.
Third, the number of crorepati candidates has risen astoundingly. Candidates with assets over Rs 1 crore make up 14 percent of the total, compared to 9 percent in 2004, according to National Election Watch.
Of Mumbai's 36 contestants, 34 are crorepatis. In Andhra Pradesh, every fifth candidate is a crorepati!
Tragically, crorepatis are especially numerous in the poorest regions and tribal Orissa. This speaks of a big gap between procedural and substantive democracy, which involves social and economic equality.
This, like the growing criminalisation of politics -- 16 percent of candidates have criminal records -- doesn't bode well for participatory democracy.
Fourthly, there's a breakdown of established party alliances and unprecedented promiscuity. Parties are wooing one another irrespective of ideology and political affiliation.
The NDA stands reduced to one-third its original strength. The BJP is wooing Jayalalithaa, who's in the Third Front. She has rebuffed the BJP, but kept her post-poll options open.
Some UPA parties are seeking outside allies. There's an embryonic Fourth Front -- between the Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal and Lok Janashakti Party which continue to support the UPA.
Besides opportunism and immorality, this reflects growing de-crystallisation of the party system. Clear party lines indicate different social bases, political identities and programmes --and a mature democracy. The party system must re-crystallise itself.It's futile to bemoan the rise of state-level parties. Their vote-share has risen from 11 percent in 1984 to 36 in 2004. Political differentiation can be empowering if it reflects grassroots-level self-assertion of underprivileged strata.
Inter-state differences in culture, economic development and political traditions are so great that a system of "national" parties cannot work.
Such parties typically either have an "umbrella" character (Congress), or are deeply conservative like the BJP, which combines Hindu nationalism and elitist social-political agendas.
Smaller parties can counterweigh to an extent the centralised and unified conception of nationalism of the Congress and the BJP. There exist two other forces in Indian politics, the Left, and low-caste-based formations like the Bahujan Samaj Party.
This has led some analysts to theorise the rationale of a Third Front. The Third Front (TF), born last July when the Left withdrew support to the UPA, has gathered momentum and is still evolving.
But it may be wrong to see the present combination -- four Left parties and a clutch of regional parties, with the BSP hovering around them -- as a cohesive force which can make a convincing bid for power.
Even if the Congress and BJP win under half of Lok Sabha seats, and the TF wins 120-130 seats with the BSP joining it, the Front may not come to power or hold it for a length of time.
No ideological cement binds the Front's parties. Their twin planks of "secularism" and opposition to the Congress, aren't strong or convincing.
The Left alone has demonstrated a consistent commitment to secularism by identifying Hindutva as the principal danger. All other Front constituents have bestowed respectability on the BJP, or helped it overcome political isolation.
The NDA couldn't have retained power beyond a few weeks in 1998 had the Telugu Desam not extended support to it in exchange for the speaker's position.
Jayalalithaa is probably the most communal politician outside the sangh pariwar. She justified the Babri demolition and endorsed the Gujarat pogrom. She even sanctified Narendra Modi with a 48-course meal last year.
The Left parties derive their policy positions from a well-defined, consistent worldview. Most TF constituents lack any worldview.
On economic policy, they aren't progressive enough or sharply demarcated from free-market neoliberalism. They often go along with bigger parties in foreign or security policy matters.
True, the Left can give them some direction, but the primary motivation for change must come from them. This isn't happening.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, many non-Congress non-BJP parties represented rising Dalit and OBC forces. That momentum may have run out. Unless they renew their political capital by building links with grassroots movements and civil society organisations, their identities will remain fuzzy.
Many of them cannot ally with one another despite being unaffiliated to the Congress or BJP. There are strong antagonisms between the SP and BSP, the DMK and AIADMK, Trinamool Congress and the Left, the RJD and the JD(U).
This raises a question-mark over the Front's longevity even if it forms a government with external support. Perhaps these elections are India's semi-finals, not the finals.
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