The dilemma remains
PAKISTAN-American relations are more important than any other story, except Pakistan economy's straits. President Asif Ali Zardari went to New York supposedly to impress upon the American president that the US should not take unilateral military action on Pakistan territory because of its supposed right of hot pursuit. The outcome is known.
The US president side-stepped the issue and said that America was aware of the strong concerns of the Pakistan government regarding its sovereignty. Just that. Read with voluminous speeches of senior American officials and generals, it is a no-go for Pakistan. The Americans have, in effect, refused to promise not to take unilateral military action on Pakistan territory.
True, the second biggest worry of Pakistan is about its economy. Despite America's own well-known economic difficulties, Zardari inaugurated a Friends of Pakistan Conference on September 26 with a view to finding the means of a bailout for Pakistan. To G8 were added China, Saudi Arabia and UAE, Pakistan's particular friends. While its precise outcome is not known, a lifeline of cash would probably be made available sometime -- apparently political hitches have been removed -- though the group will meet in October in UAE. One supposes that the Americans will be willing enough to help so long as Pakistan stays in its rather subordinate-ally role in the War on Terror and does not change the globalisation paradigm.
While economic bailout is a vital necessity, politics, too, is pressing. It is, however, doubtful that foreign friends can come up with adequate funds required to keep the imports free regime going, that are now over twice the exports of Pakistan. That creates a very big hole in Pakistan's current account. Given the earlier cushion of some inflows of foreign investments, the law and order situation in the country has now blocked much of the FDIs. Thus, Pakistan has to do something drastic about its imports -- they cannot remain double of exports. This is over-consumption, pure and simple, of what Pakistan does not produce or earn.
The second devil eating into the economy's innards is the runaway inflation. It is killing the exports because they require many imported inputs. Imports become more expensive during inflation, increasing the costs of exports. With inflation at the current rates, Pakistan would require a minimum of $15 to 20 billion a year. This is an impossible demand; no one can keep on feeding Pakistan's elites, including the army that requires at least $ 500-600 million a year to keep going. Pakistan has to come up with an alternative recovery plan. It is a difficult task for Pakistani economists, a majority of whom appear to be totally sold on globalisation; they think there is no alternative to this paradigm.
American inroads into Pakistan have created a big dilemma. It cannot be over-emphasised that Americans are not particularly liked in this country. Public opinion is intensely opposed to American boot on Pakistan's soil, independently of what the Islamic extremists and Taliban say. This is an automatic nationalistic reaction by Pakistanis in general. Doubtless there is a thin slice of liberal, secular opinion that is horrified by Taliban-like Islamic extremism. While this is view well represented in the media, its impact on the society remains small. Superficially, the march of Islamic extremism now seems irresistible.
While it is established that most Pakistanis do not approve of the violence of the Taliban and other Islamic militant groups, the fight against it requires mobilisation of the masses by political parties, particularly the ruling one, so as to isolate extremist elements. They have to win over the hearts and minds of not only those who are not directly in love with Taliban ideas but also of those who are supporting the militants.
No one should forget that the Pushtoon voters in Pukhtoonkhawa, the new name of NWFP, voted for a secular nationalist party, Awami National Party, rejecting the alliance of six religious parties, MMA, in last February's elections. If there is a political strategy of the right kind, the majority population can be mobilised against the Islamic extremists in general and those claiming to be Taliban in particular. This is doable. There is no need to be too pessimistic.
Unfortunately, everyone is inflexible vis-à-vis the tribal areas of Pukhtoonkhawa. The army and a part of the civil service that administers and controls the purse strings do not want a change in the system; they want to go on ruling it through the traditional instrumentality of pro-government Maliks -- elders whose are supposedly respected by tribesmen -- all paid or bribed.
There is much corruption involved, and the army also does not want to relax its grip; it has, in fact, usurped many of the functions and privileges of the Political Service that nominally controls the tribal areas. The government has no new ideas. The tragedy of Pakistan is not so much the poverty of the masses as the poverty of ideas in the elite groups that govern it.
Americans are dead set on "hot pursuit." They have employed it in extended form in various parts of the world. They think that Pakistan's military intelligence agencies are either corrupt or include sympathisers of Taliban groups, or both. Therefore, they think that it is necessary for them to take direct action and not operate through unreliable Pakistanis. Most of their experts believe that Pakistanis are playing a double game. Which is why there is the likelihood of more incursions by ISAF (Nato) troops led by Americans.
The issue of issues is: what more American incursions in Pakistan will do to Pakistani public opinion, given the woodenness of its ruling elites and their insistence on traditional practices? Strong reactions would be no surprise to any intelligent foreigner, let alone Pakistanis. However, a new idea has been floated in Washington, perhaps to appease Pakistanis. It is joint patrolling by Nato forces, Pakistanis and the Afghan army; they will be tasked to patrol the Afghan-Pakistan border and take military action, presumably on both sides of the border. This looks like a face-saving device for letting Americans into Pakistan, along with a few Afghans and Pakistanis, but it will run the risk of strong public disapproval in Pakistan.
The state of the country is none too satisfactory. Law and order is virtually breaking down, with the Islamic extremists trying to bomb as many widely different places as possible but concentrating on Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. The administration is on red alert virtually all the time. The extremists have shown that they can attack any city at any time, and appear to have enough sympathisers in various large cities in the country.
Among the cities, Karachi occupies an important place; it is the largest Pushtoon city, having more Pushtoons than either Peshawar or Kabul. Through tribal linkages, Islamic extremists have penetrated it and have found friends, relatives and sympathisers to protect them. This is true in Punjab cities as well, where it has become fashionable to profess extremist ideas on Islam. Many people are now becoming born again Muslims.
Pakistanis are now required to discharge a historic obligation: they have used Islam for political purposes for far too long. It is becoming fashionable to profess extremist Islam and some elite ideas: they (Islamic zealots) are the more suitable rulers of the Islamic country. Extremists have already wrested control of most of the tribal areas in Pukhtoonkhawa and, indeed, many parts of province itself.
The writ of the government does run, but erratically, and the Taliban can hit any place at any time, including Peshawar. Pakistan's greatest vulnerability is the authority's political illiteracy, with no new idea or cognizance of true norms of democracy, despite their invocation of democracy day in and day out. The combination of these factors is extremely worrying. No one knows what will happen when.
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