COP 16 Conference: What options does Bangladesh have?
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005. In 2012, the first phase of the commitment period of this protocol comes to an end. The first commitment period imposed quantitative limits on developed countries' greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Is there going to be a second commitment period? While India and China would like the continuation of the Protocol, the European Union would like to see a protocol under a global comprehensive framework including China and the United States. On the other hand, Japan, Canada and Russia would like to have the Kyoto Protocol replaced by a more comprehensive new agreement with commitments, both by developed and developing countries.
What is the Bangladesh position in all this? While we are fully justified in clamouring for more and more funds, we must also now be prepared with a set of mega-projects ready and waiting to be funded. Bangladesh must also realise that while the Kyoto emissions targets are time-limited, the Kyoto Protocol as a whole is not, so the agreement would continue to remain in force.
After 2012, in the absence of emission targets, emission allowances would not remain operative. But other provisions of the Protocol such as Article 5 remain in place, requiring developed countries to have "national systems" for estimating the developed countries' GHG. Similarly, Article 7 requires developed countries to include in the National Communications whatever supplementary information is necessary to demonstrate compliance to the Protocol.
Similarly, Article 10 and Article 11, dealing with general obligations and financial obligations, would continue. The Meeting of the Parties (Article 13), the Secretariat (Article 14), the subsidiary body For Scientific and Technical Advice, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (Article 15), the Adaptation Fund and the Compliance Committee (Article 18) are not tied to the commitment periods under the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, Article 8 and Article 9 dealing with reviews of national inventories and periodic reviews of the Protocol will serve their purpose even in the absence of targets.
Most importantly, we should remember that CDM would continue even after the first expiration period because this too is not dependent on emission targets. Article 12 states that one of the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol would be to assist developed countries to achieve compliance with their quantified emission limitations and reduction commitments under Article 3. So the Protocol, as well as Article 12, would not be preventing the CDM's modalities, procedures and infrastructure from continuing. But one has to remember that while CDM modalities may continue as permitted by the rules the problem will arise when carbon credits are not bought by Annex One countries since they no longer have targets in the second commitment period. It is, therefore, important that some adjustments to the CDM modalities should be made. For example afforestation and reforestation projects would appear to apply only to the first commitment period ending in 2012.
Should we go for a new commitment period or no new commitment period, but simply a "political" second commitment period, or no new political commitment period.
There is hardly a year left before the Kyoto Protocol comes to an end. It would be Utopian to expect that a second commitment period could be agreed to at the Durban conference, implying that a sufficient number of countries would ratify the amendment in time before the end of 2012. So, if a more comprehensive new agreement cannot be reached before the end of 2012, could we examine the possibility of a legally binding second commitment period which could be considered as a "political" commitment period?
Kyoto's quantitative emission targets are defined as percentage reductions from a base year emission level (generally 1990 emissions), and apply to a basket of six greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol establishes legally binding commitments, consisting of quantitative and national performance standards, whereas the UNFCCC talks about a bottom-up approach in which national policies and measures have to be undertaken to mitigate climate change. So, what is likely to be the difference between the Kyoto Protocol and the future agreement to limit GHG emission?
The Kyoto Protocol focused on developed countries' emissions, whereas the post-2012 climate change regime would also have to address developing country mitigation options and actions. The post-2012 negotiations were supposed to be concluded at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, but the bottom-up Copenhagen Accord, a political agreement based on national pledges, was not accepted by the Conference. Subsequently, however, the following year at the Cancun Conference the Copenhagen decisions were elaborated upon and anchored in the Convention. So it seems that the arguments will continue in Durban, with regard to a battle over policy, and is also most likely to continue on to the Qatar 2012 Conference.
Insofar as Bangladesh is concerned, we have to look at several options with regard to the likely outcomes of the Durban conference. Supposing there is no commitment, no decisions and minimal progress. At the other extreme, we could imagine a scenario where, suddenly, all the parties to the Convention in Durban agree to a second commitment period and negotiate a legally binding agreement that addresses the emissions of countries without Kyoto targets.
Another middle-ground scenario with intermediate outcomes could aim at setting up a transitional regime for the development of legally binding agreement, or agreements. From what we can see with regard to the various scenarios outlined above, Bangladesh will have to prepare its own strategy and tactics and move into Durban with a serious set of proposals, and not simply go there to listen to speeches and ask for money. If Bangladesh asks for money, it should be well prepared ahead of time with concrete mega-projects covering entire sectors, if need be, or entire regions of the country which are likely to be affected adversely by climate change.
What will be reaffirmed in Durban would be a reaffirmation and continuation of the Copenhagen/Cancun pledges and accords. What Bangladesh has to realise is that in future a second commitment period would require reciprocal commitments by all states, including the United States and China.
No matter how quickly we try to close the gap between the first commitment period in the second commitment period, it is very difficult to see a situation whereby 143 countries would agree to the second commitment period by October 3, 2012 -- the date by which the Kyoto Protocol expires. The answer would seem to lie in establishing a provisional application pending entry into force. While this provisional application concept has been used mainly in the area of arms control talks and in GATT it was also brought into effect in the environmental area, such as during the 1964 European Fisheries Convention, the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty etc.
Bangladesh has to decide whether it should agree to new Kyoto targets, or agree to the Copenhagen/ Cancun framework. Even as the second commitment period concept is accepted under the Kyoto protocol, the accounting systems, land use change and forestry credits under the CDM would need revision.
Given the scenario in the world today, where even agreements are not accepted, how does one expect a political second commitment period to be enforceable?
Alternative 1 would be for the parties to work according to the Kyoto/Marrakesh rules, in which the targets would be specified as a single fixed number applicable on an economy- wide basis that would generate Assigned Amount Units (AAU), which would be deposited in the state treasury and traded. Sinks could be handled under the Marrakesh rules, compliance would be addressed by the Compliance Committee.
Alternative 2 would require having a second commitment period, incorporating elements of the Copenhagen/Cancun processes. Conditional targets could be specified, as has been suggested in many of the Copenhagen pledges, rather than a single fixed number like the existing Kyoto targets. In this case, instead of depositing the credits in the state treasury trading would be on an ad hoc basis through bilateral arrangements between countries that mutually recognise each other's allowances. States could also apply bilaterally acceptable rules on accounting, sinks and project-based credits rather than the strict international rules now defined.
It has become quite obvious that the Kyoto Protocol is not only stringent but also complex, suggesting the setting up of a transitional regime that would be political in nature, leading ultimately to a legally binding regime. This could be the way out and the process has already begun via the Copenhagen/Cancun processes where bottom-up processes have already begun with national pledges coupled with significant financial assistance. By setting up this via media of the political commitment process another parallel process could then be begun along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol, thus keeping the process of the Kyoto Protocol alive.
Comments