Election That Chandrika Won

The 1999 election was not the first occasion when the Tigers intervened to change the course of Sri Lankan history.

THE cassandras were proved wrong. The false prophets painted a dismal scenario. The Sri Lankan Army would suffer serious reverses in Elephant Pass; there would be a blood bath in Colombo following the LTTE's attacks on Chandrika Kumaratunga and the UNP rally at Ja Ela; and the new President would be forced to follow a Sinhala chauvinist line, exacerbating the ethnic conflict.

Except for a few incidents, the election, in the unanimous view of the International Observer Group, was "free and fair". The LTTE leader, V. Prabakaran, expected the Army to desert its positions in the Jaffna peninsula, but that did not happen. It was adequately prepared for defence and counter attack. It is a signal tribute to the people of Sri Lanka that the island remained peaceful. In her first statement, Kumaratunga assured the people that the election "will be held as scheduled"; she made a special plea against any attacks on or harming of any member of the Tamil community or political rivals. What is more, in her first policy statement soon after assuming office for a second term, Kumaratunga called upon the people "to unite and fight against the forces of hatred and terror", reaffirmed her determination to usher in "peace and reconciliation" and made a special appeal to the leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremesinghe, to "cooperate" with her and play a major role in the common effort "to forge a new Sri Lanka of tranquillity and tremendous opportunity".

The 1999 election was not the first occasion when the Tigers intervened to change the course of history. In May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber. Prior to the Sri Lankan Provincial Council election in May 1993, Lalith Athulathmudali was killed. A few days later, President Premadasa was annihilated at a May Day rally. On October 24, 1994, Gamini Dissanayake, UNP presidential candidate, was killed in a bomb blast. The attack on Kumaratunga on December 18, 1999, in which two Cabinet Ministers were injured and 13 persons killed, was definitely an act of terrorism perpetrated by the LTTE.

Why did the Tigers attack the UNP rally and kill Major General Lucky Alagama? Controversy surrounds the incident; some reports maintain that it was a grenade attack and others speak of the involvement of a male suicide bomber. Maj. Gen. Alagama was a controversial figure. During the JVP (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) insurrection, he was in charge of Ratnapura district. Later he was transferred to Galle. In both places, he put down the revolt with a heavy hand. He was promoted in 1989 and entrusted with the task of dealing with the JVP throughout the island. The JVP leadership, including Rohana Wijeeweera, was eliminated within a few months. During the second Eelam war, Maj. Gen. Alagama became the Commander of the Armed Forces in the East; under army pressure, the Tigers were forced to withdraw from that region and concentrate on the Jaffna peninsula. Had the UNP won the election, Maj. Gen. Alagama would have become one of the principal advisers to Wickremesinghe. By killing Maj. Gen. Alagama, Prabakaran simultaneously sent two messages: (1) The LTTE would never forgive anyone who tried to tame the Tigers; and (2) A warning to Wickremesinghe that he would meet the same fate if, after becoming President, he tried to cross swords with the LTTE.

The cumulative effect was a sympathy wave which enabled Kumaratunga to establish a big lead over Wickremesinghe. She polled 43,12,157 votes (51.12 per cent), while Wickremesinghe could get only 36,02,748 (42.72 per cent), a lead of 7,09,409 votes. The UNP election machinery was in a state of paralysis on the last two days before the poll. The leadership was not sure whether the election would be held as scheduled or postponed. What was a close race between the two contestants, with some observers maintaining that the second preference votes might have to be taken into account, turned out to be a one-sided affair. The sympathy factor led many Sinhalese, at the last moment, to switch their loyalty from the JVP and the Left Democratic Alliance to Kumaratunga's People's Alliance. In Ratnapura, considered a bastion of the Left Democratic Alliance, Vasudeva Nanayakkara polled only 202 votes (0.28 per cent). Fearing violence, many UNP supporters did not exercise their franchise. Even in the UNP strongholds such as Colombo, Wickremesinghe's tally was far below the party's expectations. The Tigers, unwittingly, helped Kumaratunga establish a mammoth lead over her UNP rival.

The results in Hambantota district bear testimony to the above factors. As a member of the International Observer Group, I spent three days there. Located in the southern part, Hambantota is one of the least developed areas. Predominantly Sinhalese, with a sprinkling of Muslims, the district is one of the JVP strongholds. My gut feeling was the JVP would receive about 20 per cent of the vote in the district. The postal votes (cast earlier) lent credence to my assumption. For, 18.43 per cent of the postal ballots were for the JVP; 38.93 per cent were in favour of the UNP and 40.74 per went to the PA. After the attempt on Kumaratunga's life, many JVP followers voted for her.

Another interesting aspect deserves to be highlighted. I asked Mahinda Rajapakshe, Minister for Fisheries, who was in charge of the election campaign for the ruling party, about the fallout of the Tigers' abortive attempt on Kumaratunga's life. He pointed out that the Sinhalese were deeply concerned over the incident. However, he channelled their energy, arranging for a large number of meetings in Devalayas where they prayed for her speedy recovery. The meetings were well attended and had a salutary effect on the overall situation.

Thirteen candidates contested. Except Abdul Rasool, an independent, all were Sinhalese. A few independents were fronting for the UNP and the PA, obviously to split the vote. Kumar Ponnambalam, president of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress, wanted to contest. But, according to informed sources, he did not get the green signal from the LTTE. A clear indicator that the Tigers wanted the Tamils to vote for Wickremesinghe.

The LTTE strategy was obvious from the beginning. In his Heroes Day message, Prabakaran singled out Kumaratunga for a vitriolic attack and characterised her five-year rule as "the worst form of tyrannical oppression" and "curse on the Tamil people." The LTTE ideologue, Anton Balasingham, was more explicit: "If Chandrika comes to power again, it can only mean that the problems and hardships will continue... We take no sides but the Tamil people know what to do." The LTTE support enabled the UNP to mobilise more votes than the PA in Vanni, Batticaloa and Trincomalee. To the surprise of many observers, in Jaffna, Kumaratunga got more votes than Wickremesinghe.

The majority of the Tamils preferred to vote for the UNP. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, they extended wholehearted support to Kumaratunga. Now they were disenchanted that the promise of peace with honour which she held forth was not fulfilled. What is more, because of security regulations, many of them had to undergo a lot of hardship and indignities. The Tamil preference for Wickremesinghe is a clear illustration of a protest vote.

The need of the hour is statesmanship. The UNP and the PA must give up confrontationist politics and adopt a common stance, at least on the issue of finding a solution to the ethnic conflict. After the LTTE massacre at Ja Ela, Wickremesinghe would have realised the dangers of riding the tiger. It will be a great tragedy if the two gifted leaders do not see the writing on the wall. Those who do not learn from history will be condemned to relive it.

Courtesy: The Hindu of India

The writer is a former Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras. He was a member of the International Observer Group. These are his views and should not be construed as those of the International Observer Group.