ONE American ground attack inside and frequent aerial attacks from Afghan territory have created a crisis that is worrying Pakistanis. Is it a prelude to a serious American ground action in Federally Administered Tribal Areas or something even bigger?
The consequences of what America is doing vis-à-vis Pakistan need to be considered. It is not just this or that incident. It is the pattern of what the Americans are doing to, and in, Pakistan that is important.
The Americans were worried in 2007 with the rise of political agitations against Musharraf. They had put all their money on Musharraf leading Pakistan in the War on Terror the way it satisfied them. Musharraf had given satisfaction to them, but they realised that his non-democratic antecedents were going to create difficulties.
Therefore, they started talking of a deeper view of problems in Fata; US experts discovered the need for more economic development of the area and, on the other hand, they remembered that Musharraf's anti-democratic actions and his non-democratic status would create more difficulties.
America decided to provide a "democratic face" to Musharraf. It needed a compromise between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, she being the leader of the party that could be expected to win a reasonably fair election. America asked Musharraf to let her participate. The Saudis pleaded the cause of Nawaz Sharif. So Musharraf allowed both to participate in the election.
While PML (N) could participate in the polls, Nawaz Sharif could not because of legal hitches. The election results have shown that Musharraf did need a radical makeover of his image because he was the most hated person in Pakistan, and that all those who supported him earlier were trounced.
The PPP and PML (N) came respectively first and second in the National Assembly. PPP controlled Sindh and PML dominated Punjab.
Musharraf's utility continued to decrease throughout 2007. What made him progressively less effective, despite his uniform and amplitude of constitutional powers, was the growing popular hatred.
Americans fell back on two alternatives. One was when American media, think-tank community and the administration began grooming General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani after his takeover from Musharraf as the next leader of Pakistan. And the other was to work upon the winners to form a coalition government. The US expected them to do what Musharraf could not: conduct the War on Terror more effectively.
The coalition took such a long time coming into being and agreeing to necessary understandings that it required hard labour by America's frequent emissaries from the State Department. The government in Islamabad could be formed in March.
The performance of this PPP-led government has been marked by inertia and lack of will to do anything to tackle the mountainous problems that Pakistan faced. PPP began quarreling with PML (N) from day one over the question of judges' restoration to their jobs, making Pakistan's politics much more volatile than it ever was. Musharraf was still the president with the traditionally powerful establishment in place.
PPP knew its place. It was brought in to provide a democratic face to Musharraf. It, therefore, initially accepted everything Musharraf and bureaucracy said could be done or could not be done. Musharraf, the establishment and powers beyond did not want the strong and assertive judiciary that would result if the sacked judges were restored. On that issue, the first rupture in the coalition took place within two months.
After that, a looser coalition has resulted after PML (N) walked out of the government while it continues to lead the Punjab provincial government with assertive support by the PPP. Even the Punjab government is under stress and the two major parties are engaged in political warfare -- a repeat of what they had done in the 1990s -- and had discredited "democratic" governments as immature and inefficient.
A big crisis is in the making in the Pak-American relations. The Americans are now disenchanted with their own option of giving politicians a chance. They may revert to their older view; only the Pakistan army can run Pakistan.
The Americans have shown that they have confidence in General Kayani, although his reaction to the US ground attack of September 4 contrasted sharply with the government's weak response. The generals won praise from the Fata's militants against whom the Pakistan army is fighting.
The Americans are determined to go on doing what they are doing. Pakistani public opinion is furious. All major parties want the Parliament to meet in a joint session to consider what the Americans are doing and what Pakistan's response should be.
So far, the response from General Kayani and the military has been very strong: "Pakistan will not allow America to conduct any ground operation on Pakistan territory." The government has remained almost tongue-tied for about 48 hours, with different ministers saying different things.
Another September 4 like incident was actually frustrated by ordinary residents of South Waziristan, security forces and, in all publicity, some militants also. After the strong statements and actions by the military, the prime minister endorsed the statement of the army chief as the government's own. But the message has gone abroad that while the military is more patriotic and strong, the government is weak and does not know its own mind or cannot muster the courage to confront the Americans.
Secondly, the Americans do not know what they are doing. They might kill a few more al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant leaders as they claim they are doing, but the one net result of their attacks is to inflame Pakistani opinion further.
Pakistan is known to be the most anti-American country. It will be far more anti-American as result of American actions that are killing civilians.
The situation in the Fata is that Pakistan is receding into itself; it exists only where the Pakistan army is entrenched. The rest of the territory is outside its control. Much of Fata and many settled districts of NWFP are now effectively outside the control of the army and the provincial government.
More civilian casualties will cause faster growth of militant organisations with their ideological differences as well as unity of purpose insofar as resisting the Americans are concerned. The whole situation will go out of the control of Islamabad.

M. B. Naqvi is a leading Pakistani columnist.