The nuclear deal and India's emergence

WHEN the history of modern India is written, the nuclear deal with the US in 2008 will be considered at par with India's economic liberalization of 1991. The first liberated India from the self imposed shackles of a socialist economy. The second frees India from the bonds of technological isolation. The process also acknowledged India's emergence as an emerging nation with potential and capabilities.
Yet, objections by the 'naysers' raises questions whether India's polity is indeed 'free' and empowered enough to decide what is good for the nation. Nothing else could be expected from the Left parties with their outdated ideologies and extra territorial loyalties, determined to keep India poor and weak. China's ultimately showing its hand at the NSG on 5 September 2008 after all the back door manipulations had failed to stop the deal, made this abundantly clear. But, the more surprising stand was that of India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Its leaders had initiated the process of legitimization through Jaswant Singh's and Brajesh Mishra's untiring efforts. Yet, when the deal led to an outcome even beyond their expectation, they acted as spoil sports. Serious doubts will now be cast on the BJP's ability to lead the country forward in the future.
The achievements in the deal have to be assessed in the backdrop of the past - India's non-nuclear status under the NPT and its isolation from nuclear commerce after the ill conceived nuclear tests at Pokharan in 1974. The non-availability of high grade uranium as a consequence was the principal cause why the existing nuclear energy reactors are today operating at 40 per cent capacity, instead of 90. This also impedes India's move towards the third stage of thorium based reactors, which promises to assure India both autonomy and security in the energy sector sometime in the future.
India's own emergence as a world power depends on maintaining rapid economic growth, which is impossible without access to adequate energy from every commercially and ecologically viable source. In the next two to three decades at least, energy security for India will have to come substantially from nuclear energy. It is also a "clean" form of energy and therefore, both acceptable and cost effective. Yet, India was unable to do this with all the restrictions imposed on it by the discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime. Presently nuclear energy constitutes merely 3 per cent of India's total energy mix. Provided follow up measures are taken in domestic legislation and others, the deal is likely to change this to 8 per cent by 2020 and to 20 per cent by 2030.
The deal tacitly recognizes India's position as a nuclear weapon power and lifts nearly all curbs imposed on it under the discriminatory NPT regime and does not require signing or adhering to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It liberates Indian nuclear technology and promises Indian scientists, long suffering under sanctions, an opportunity to emerge as leading players in the world. It also promises to empower major Indian power companies, to imbibe new technologies and compete in tomorrow's nuclear power production and make huge profits both at home and abroad. No wonder that their shares surged by about 8 per cent in the Mumbai Sensex on the first working day.
But, what about the objections voiced at different quarters? The question of nuclear testing is patently a non-issue. Indeed Brajesh Misra, the interlocutor of the BJP with the US after the nuclear tests strongly supports the deal. It was his hard work that laid the foundations for this offer from the US, through cooperation in space, 'Next Steps in Strategic Partnership' (NSSP) and other strategic issues. In truth the deal has gone beyond what was envisaged under the earlier dialogue. The reality is that nuclear testing today is beyond the pale of international norm and no country, even the US, can ignore this reality. Within the deal India has given no guarantee and is in no way prevented from testing. Should India need to test in supreme national interests, India will do so, no matter the consequences. In reality such a situation is only in the realm of conjecture. India's nuclear arsenal is well tested and guaranteed by our scientists and we need to have confidence in them. This deal in no way circumscribes India's strategic weapons potential. All the fissile material that may conceivably be required lies outside of IAEA safeguards. Our 'minimum credible nuclear deterrence' doctrine can be well served with the uranium and fissile material that we already possess and can produce indigenously.
The final touches to the deal require US Congressional approval, but the current reality is likely to pose no major difficulty. What this deal provides is very substantive. It has given India supreme confidence. Its diplomats have delivered in spite of enormous odds. The world has recognized and accepted, even if reluctantly by some, India's right to emerge at par with other countries and assume its rightful position in the comity of leading nations of the world. If internal political bickering can be addressed, this deal may well become the precursor of a resurgent India.

By arrangement with IPCS, New Delhi.