Iran, the region and the United States
The regional security landscape and Tehran's security outlook has dramatically changed since 11 September 2001. In 2000, at the beginning of this decade, Iran had two sworn enemies on either flank -- the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the east and Saddam Hussein in Iraq on the west. After the terrorist attacks on the USA on 9/11, the dynamics started evolving first in Afghanistan and then later in Iraq. Soon after the attacks on New York and Washington came the American-led international coalition invasion in Afghanistan that overthrew the Talibans. Then, less than two years later came the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime.
These developments were seen by Tehran as a 'mixed blessing'. It brought unease with the deployment of US troops on either side of Iran and also a feeling of vulnerability that Tehran itself might be the next target. The consolidation of the US presence in Central Asia on a parallel track also helped to create a belief of encirclement within the Iranian psyche.
This atmosphere of uncertainty has led Iranian policy planners to seek pre-emptive protection through a dual pronged policy--closer ties with the emerging energy giant Russia and energy hungry China on the one hand (for ensuring immediate security for its infrastructure and within the UN Security Council) and exhibiting a degree of willingness to conduct talks with the United States on a number of issues, including their nuclear programme and alleged support for organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, on the other. At the same time Iran has embarked on the strategy of developing an indigenous military industry and relying on missiles to overcome any weakness in conventional capability. This approach has been best reflected in Iran's launching of a domestically built research rocket in February and unveiling of its first major space centre. Through such action, Iran is trying to demonstrate that it has similar technological capacity as 11 other countries (possessing sufficient space technology to be able to launch satellites into space).
The continuation of such an approach has slowly generated more confidence within Iran in recent months. This change was apparent most recently in the mini-confrontation between Iranian naval vessels and US naval crafts in the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. The newfound strength of Iran also appears to have been bolstered by the recent revelation that Iran, after all, is not involved in enriching uranium for the purpose of nuclear weapons. This has gained for Iran more credibility and sympathy on the international scene. This has been reflected in the context of the latest efforts to approve another Resolution against Iran in the UN Security Council. One might also describe this, as a much needed breathing space.
This subtle change has been reflected in Iran following a two-pronged policy--becoming more assertive in its claim for regional leadership and also maintaining a strategic initiative by offering greater rapprochement to its immediate Arab neighbours in the west. This policy has however also contributed to Hezbollah, an ally of Iran, becoming more inflexible in Lebanon and for Hamas to be more aggressive in the Gaza Strip in Palestine.
The Gulf countries have received such Iranian attention with mixed feelings of concern. At the same time, they have been careful to retain the option to turn to the United States as the foremost element in their defence posture. Iran has tried to counter this trend of thought by repeatedly calling for a regional security system based on the active contribution of regional states and free from foreign influence. GCC members have however been particularly careful not to get involved too much in political rhetoric. They have maintained straightforward cultural, religious and commercial ties with Iran without too much of an overt friendliness.
Their attitude in this regard has been partially the result of President Ahmadinejad's controversial foreign policy rhetoric. Recent statements by the Gulf Arab leaderships have also indicated their desire to see a relative detente between Iran and the United States along with reduced tensions with Israel. They believe that this would go a long way in promoting greater regional stability.
It would be important to identify here Iran's regional-strategic goals. They seek to expand Iran's economic and cultural ties with neighbouring States (except Israel), enlarge its sphere of influence and resist US military and political presence and policies. The driving force behind such a policy is largely due to the interaction of some of its interest groups, personalities and institutions. The most important among them is the Supreme National Security Council that controls major foreign policy and military decisions. Then come important members of the political and religious hierarchies and the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations (created in June 2006 by Ayatullah Ali Khamenei). All these elements act as an effective balance in the equation with the rather mercurial President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The prospect of an Iran eventually armed with long distance capacity missiles and probable nuclear warheads has been a source of major concern for both regional Arab oil producing countries as well as the consumers of this commodity -- the USA and the European Union.
The equation has also become that much more complex with Iran seeking an indigenous nuclear capability to reaffirm its regional leadership role. Iran has seen both India and then Pakistan achieving such a status and do not feel that it should be denied such an opportunity. Iran has also repeatedly tried to support its claim by pointing out that its effort are civilian in nature and that it is a party to all international agreements on the control of weapons of mass destruction.
Nevertheless, Israel, important sections of the political leaderships in the USA and in Europe continue to believe that a nuclear-Iran would intimidate its neighbours, challenge a US-based regional security system and possibly at a later date be a clandestine provider of nuclear weapons/technology to terrorist organisations. They are also carefully monitoring Tehran's building of a broad infrastructure of influence in Iraq, its growing close relations with major Iraq-Shia political parties and their leadership, particularly the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Dawa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army and Grand Ayatullah Ali al-Sistani. There is also a possibility that the Iranian president will shortly be visiting Iraq to strengthen the Shia axis. This latter development is under US scrutiny. They are carefully watching as to whether this Iranian initiative brings some stability to war-torn Iraq or whether it contributes to a more extreme Shiite Iraq similar to the Iranian model of Velayet e-Faqih (guardianship of the jurist) with direct clerical control of the government.
Washington, quite understandably is wary of Iran's overtures in Iraq. It might want Iran's involvement in helping to settle the dust in Iraq but is not willing to acknowledge Iran as an important stakeholder in the region.
The USA and its partners in Europe have steadfastly tried to contain Iran through growing forms of economic sanctions and hints that armed confrontations (limited military strikes) had not been ruled out. This was the situation till the end of the third quarter of last year. The belligerent vocabulary has however slightly reduced in recent weeks.
US President George Bush, during his recent visit to the region aimed at lobbying Arab support to contain Iran repeatedly reminded Iran that it must play a more responsible role for the stability of the region. There was however no upping the ante over possible military strikes. This was probably the result of the steadfast support received by Iran from Russia and China. The revelation by a recent US intelligence estimate that Iran did not have a nuclear weapons programme in place, also appears to have indirectly forced the USA to reduce its threatening posture in a presidential election year. This has led some analysts in the USA to suggest that Washington should now try out a more constructive engagement with Tehran to consolidate gains in Iraq and stabilise the situation in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and Afghanistan.
President George W Bush reaffirmed the strengthening of its longstanding security commitments in the Gulf but also realised that the Gulf states are determined to avoid further conflict in the region. The Gulf leadership has listened to Bush about the dangers of a resurgent Iran and agreed to further modernise their arsenal. At the same time, the Gulf states also indirectly indicated the need to establish better ties of understanding by themselves with Iran.
The US must have taken note of the invitation extended to the Iranian President to attend a summit of the GCC States in Doha, Qatar, in December 2007, a few weeks before Bush's visit to the area. Such an unprecedented gesture could not have been considered even five years ago. The Arab League Secretary General Amr Musa has also openly questioned the validity of Iran being isolated and punished now that it is evident that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. This approach by the Arab world has also probably been evoked from questions about the 'efficacy' of Bush's visit to the area. Arab analysts have noted that the value of the visit was limited given the fact that 2008 is Bush's last year in office and also because there is no incumbent President or Vice President running for office in the next US presidential election.
It is a complex equation but the Iran question in terms of regional interests will have to be addressed sooner than later by the next US President in 2009. One can only hope that this is done with care and that it is a constructive engagement.
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