Russia emerges from the cold
Former Russian spy Aleksander Litvinenko's recent death from radiation poisoning in London and assassination of prominent Kremlin opponents have reinforced a growing Western perception that President Putin's Russia is abandoning the West. The USA in particular, is also beginning to consider that, as in the days of the Cold War, Russia is setting itself up as a serious rival to its agenda of spreading its version of 'freedom and democracy' around the world. This view has also been reinforced by the manner in which Russia has been using its control over natural resources to convey its viewpoint. Examples of this have been seen during the crisis over Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine in early 2006 and in its decision to challenge western participation in several major oil and gas exploration projects, notably Sakhalin-2, and its prominent support for separatist rebels in Georgia and Moldova.
It is now generally agreed in the West that relations with Russia are in a difficult phase at the moment. It is also felt that unlike five years ago, Kremlin strategy is now willing to challenge Western influence to safeguard its version of national interests. It can be best encapsulated by former Russian Prime Minister Primakov's comment that Russia today desires and 'seeks equal relations of partnership' and areas of 'coinciding interests'.
Jeffery Mankoff in his article on Russia and the West published in 'The Washington Quarterly' in Spring 2007 has correctly observed that 'the centralisation of foreign policymaking in the Kremlin has allowed Putin to impose a fairly coherent vision of the national interest in a way that was not consistently possible during the Yeltsin-Primakov years, when regional and sectoral interests often predominated'. In other words, Putin appears to have refined and changed the basic orientation of Russian foreign policy.
Russia today believes in a multipolar world order (as opposed to the unipolar) in which Russia will be one of the principal poles, alongside the USA, the European Union and China. They consider such a scenario to be acceptable given their gradual recovery and acquisition of power both in relative and absolute terms. It is this awareness that is being considered as a newfound aggressive impulse by the West.
Energy self-sufficiency and higher oil and gas prices have freed Russia from economic dependence. It has also given it greater economic leverage over its neighbours, particularly within the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States. This, and the containment of the situation in Chechnya, has helped Russia to acquire geopolitical significance again. Whereas Putin and a weak Russia had easily accepted Western initiatives before (inclusion of the Baltic States in the NATO in 2004 and the US decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002), that no longer appears to be the case now. Hardlines are now becoming evident over the questions of Ukraine and Georgia and their membership in NATO.
Russia desires to be recognized again as an indispensable world power and a significant stakeholder in the effort to uphold global order. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in one of his recent comments has described this process as 'rapid revival'. Like Putin, he has also made it clear that Russia is a sovereign state whose goals and methods, at home and abroad, are made solely on the basis of calculations of national interest rather than because of external pressure to conform to behavioural norms. This has best been exemplified in the nature of response to the process of cooperation related to nuclear technology with Iran.
Putin's recent visit to Iran has reaffirmed Russia's recognition of the potential of an energy axis between the two countries that could eventually lead to the establishment of a gas OPEC. Vladimir Radyuhin, Russian analyst, has correctly observed that this will have a profound impact on strategic equations in the region. China, interested in Iranian gas, has also been quick to grasp the implications. The latent possibilities for the entire Caspian region has also led Russia to strongly support Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia has also agreed to supply Iran with deadly S-300 anti-missile systems. This will dramatically enhance its ability to repulse air or missile attacks by the USA or Israel or any Arab State.
Russia recognizes that the nature of power has changed since the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, it is now making a special effort to re-establish the attributes of power-military, economic and institutional. They consider that enhancement of this profile will greatly strengthen their security as a State and also uphold their strategic interests. Consequently, massive state funds have been spent over the last two years, in a conscious manner to uphold central strategic objectives like-reduction of Russia's foreign debt (to the IMF and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors) and modernizing of its armed forces through greater expenditure on research and development of new weapons systems. It was felt that paying-off Russia's international debt burden early would also reduce foreign leverage over Russian policy.
Russia under Putin initially joined the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative and backed US efforts to pressure Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons programmes. However, recent postures by Russian officials in the United Nations Security Council have made it clear that such international cooperation did not emerge from a feeling of compulsion or weakness. It would appear that it was motivated by Russia's desire to be recognized as an indispensable pillar in the post 9/11 world order.
President Yeltsin's flirtation with the West in the early 1990s might have led some in the West to consider that Russia was gradually integrating with Western strategic objectives. Such a supposition was obviously wrong. Many have termed this also as a myth.
Recent Russian international behaviour reiterates that it does not probably have a desire to actively confront the West collectively or the USA individually. However, such a non-confrontational approach should not be interpreted as a scenario where Russia might not be unpredictable in its response to Western demands and Western values. As a consequence, the United States and its other partners will need to continue their engagement with Russia by trying to identify as a first step, problems of mutual interest. Then, keeping their expectations limited in scale, they should try to find solutions to these problems.
Russia's political system is becoming increasingly authoritarian. This was particularly evident in the manner in which Russia's Central Election Commission recently barred opposition candidate Mikhail Kasyanov, former Russian Prime Minister, from running for president.
One should not expect great changes in the dynamics of Russian polities after their Presidential election in 2008. Putin, the architect of modern, assertive Russia, will be around in the immediate future and will continue to influence Russia's gradual emergence from the cold even though he will no longer be President. In this context, he and his immediate successors will continue to promote Russia's role as a great power in a way that is not overtly anti-Western or anti-US. They will also take all necessary action that might be required to safeguard and consolidate Russia's perceived strategic interests in the immediate region and beyond.
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