Controlling the police
A near acrimonious exchange between members of the so-called administrative service and the police service has surfaced over the issue of effective maintenance of law and order. The executive magistracy has reportedly accused the police of peddling in illicit drugs and narcotics and has demanded the creation of a separate police wing under its command.
The police service has reacted sharply to such finger pointing and retorted by saying that the district police be vested with magisterial powers as in the metropolitan area. They have accused the administrative service of slackness and negligence in land administration that has reportedly been largely responsible for the increase in criminal offences.
Admittedly, the accusations and counter accusations do not speak well of our administrative ethos. The cynics say that we have retained the colonial vices without having a grip over the colonial virtues of loyalty, efficiency and accountability. Public servants of all descriptions have been unseemly garrulous before the media without being mindful of the directives of the statutory conduct rules.
The colonial concept of directing and controlling the police still engages many in the 21st century. Such minds are forgetting that the overriding objective of the police organisation in 1861 was to maintain the stability of the "British Raj." This was admirably achieved by placing the district superintendent of police under the direction and control of the district magistrate, who acted as the agent of the imperial government.
What was meant by the general control and direction by the district magistrate was not explicitly defined anywhere. Consequently, from the very beginning, an unending debate has continued on both the conceptual and the administrative/operational levels.
In the colonial dispensation the higher police hierarchy was practically excluded from effective supervision of police in the sphere of law and order. More seriously, the authority of the district superintendent was routinely interfered with even in matters of internal administration of the force. Such retrograde steps had a crippling effect on the ill-conceived police organisation and greatly exacerbated the bitter complaints of police oppression and extortion.
The Sir Andrew Fraser Commission of 1902-3 observed that "the undue interference of the district magistrate, besides being unsound in principle, has led to practical elimination of the deputy inspector general and the reduction of his position to that of an inspecting and reporting officer, which has greatly impaired his usefulness."
In fact, the interference emanating from the lateral control of the district magistrate was both unnecessary and undesirable. Interference was the cause of the incapacity and recklessness of some superintendents.
One has to remember that the police organisation was designed not to attract better talent to ensure built-in subservience of the police to the executive administration regardless of the resulting corruption, lack of professional excellence, police high-handedness and police-public estrangement.
What people saw during the four decades of the twentieth century was a hardening of the attitude of British rulers, the enactment of Draconian legislation and police responding to the national struggle with fury and unbridled violence.
Controlling police functions through another executive branch of the government is definitely not in tune with the aspirations of a democratic polity, not to speak of the demands of a forward-looking professional police service. The superintendence of police should be so affected that it ensures police performance in an efficient and lawful manner.
For better control, it is time to replace the ruler-driven police with a community-based police through the institutional mechanism of public safety commissions at appropriate levels. Such bodies, being statutorily empowered and enjoying oversight powers, should be composed of politicians across the divide, members of civil society and women having a pre-determined quota. Such a body is likely to foster credible accountability, gender-sensitive policing and operational neutrality.
To effectively control ubiquitous police misbehaviour, there has to be a provision for an independent police complaint authority at the national level, to start with.
The core problem is to insulate the police from illegitimate political, bureaucratic or other extraneous interference. The goal should be to secure professional independence to function truly and efficiently as an impartial agent of the law and, at the same time, to enable the government to oversee the police performance to ensure its conformity to law.
Paradoxically, in our experience, calls for more accountability have been used to gain greater operational control over police, thereby debilitating the internal command and control structures, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle. The solution lies in doing away with the illogical concept of "dual control" introduced under the Police Act of 1861 and allowing necessary operational autonomy to the police command, and then holding it effectively accountable when things go wrong.
A culture of looking outside the organiaation for patronage is part of a deepening crisis. It is not in public interest to promote and sustain a police practice of playing a second fiddle to their "bosses" outside the organisation.
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