Reforming omnipotent police and omniscient politicians

HISTORICALLY speaking, we have acquired omnipotent police, who largely serve only those in power. Laws have been promulgated which give police wide powers to deny human rights, in some cases even the most basic civil liberties to the citizens. Our police, in such an unwholesome environment, have been corrupted, and are permitted to indulge in arbitrary conduct including torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.
Police authority has been abused in our democracy. Consequently, it has become more the master and less the servant. In the process, it has snuffed out more freedom than it has protected. The problem lies in control.
Abuse of authority has flourished on account of official negligence and acquiescence. Such a state of affairs places considerable moral burdens on upright police officials and well meaning politicians, whose actions to check drifts of this kind are of paramount importance to the preservation of human rights.
We, unfortunately, have relied on punitive policing, which, in reality, has meant control through suspended terror. It works on the assumption that if the penalties, or police severities, are sufficiently horrible, people will be deterred from committing crimes.
Not many people realise that police reform needs more than just a facelift; it requires in-depth examination of the police organisation, its mandate, and its functional dynamics. It also underpins the need to put in place effective structures, both to oversee the police performance and to ensure realisation of the organisational mission.
The reform process has to touch all ranks and has to be all-inclusive, calling for commitment and a sense of purpose from the political executive, since what is involved is basically a re-determination of the whole governance paradigm.
Every organisation, whether public or private, can only perform well if founded on valid organisational principles. In the case of police force of Bangladesh, these principles were ruthlessly violated over the years, resulting in corrupt, inefficient and a highly politicised police force. Increasingly, the police were made to act as agents of the political executive rather than instruments of a democratic state.
The selective application of the law against opponents, whether political or personal, at the behest of persons of influence became the norm rather than the exception. People perceived the police as agents of the party in power, not as members of an organisation publicly maintained to enforce rule of law.
As the ground conditions that made the 1861 Police Act expedient have long seized to exist, the police force of Bangladesh needs to be urgently transformed from its colonial mould and organised on the basis of principles that govern standard, modern, contemporary police forces meant to police free societies, not natives.
The key questions relevant to the subject under discussion are: What kind of organisation will the police of Bangladesh need to meet the 21st century law and order challenges? Which model can be most efficient in bringing about a fruitful change in the existing intolerably high level of police-public estrangement? How can the police force be effectively brought under democratic control while ensuring its political neutrality?
As a first step, the responsibility of maintenance of law and order will need to rest unambiguously with the police. The police hierarchy will have to be made responsible, not merely for the organisation and the internal administration of the force, but also for all matters connected with maintenance of law and order. In short, policing operations will no longer have to be subjected to general control and direction from outside the police department.
Steps will also be required for rendering the police professionally competent, operationally neutral, functionally cohesive and organisationally responsible for all their actions, which, in turn will lead to efficient police operations, better decision-making, improved discipline, and revamping of police accountability mechanisms.
The role, duties and responsibilities of police will have to be orientated in a manner in which service function gets precedence, and the prevention and detection of crime is seen to have a social purpose. The reform strategy should seek to solicit voluntary support and co-operation of the people of Bangladesh.
Unless the police are enabled to function fairly and independently, there can be neither justice nor viable order. Since the predominant purpose of the police is to enforce the laws of the land, without fear or favour, it is crucial to render it politically neutral. Such neutrality has been achieved in other countries by placing the police under apolitical control, thus creating a cushion between political expediency and law enforcement. In the absence of such a cushion, people of influence simply won't let the police do their mandated duty.
Simultaneously, as no police force can hope to perform its functions efficiently and effectively without enjoying a high degree of public support for the integrity of its operations, it is crucial to bring it under a system of accountability that enjoys public confidence. Once the police are enjoined upon to perform a just and constructive role in the community, their work ethics would start undergoing a radical change.
Being subject to law, they would strive to uphold and promote the cause of public interest, and a jealous safeguarding of democratic norms based on rule of law and due process would be their motto.
Police accountability is a subject of heightened contemporary significance. The increasingly sophisticated range of coercive, scientific and technical apparatus at the command of the police requires stricter accountability controls.
Not only is the existing accountability mechanism ineffective, it also hardly enjoys any public confidence. Its replacement with statutory institutions, like the Independent Police Complaints Authority in Britain or the Public Safety Commission System in Japan, is, thus, an urgent necessity. (The Independent Police Complaints Authority in Britain consists of members of civil society and is mandated to inquire into serious complaints against the police, and one of the most important functions of the Public Safety Commission System in Japan is to ensure that police operations are uninfluenced by the party in power. Being in charge of the administration of the police force in their respective jurisdictions, the apolitical Public Safety Commissions at national and prefecture-level in Japan are meant to ensure that police are insulated from the day to day debilitating influence of political control).
The reform process also requires that the political and police leaderships in Bangladesh realise that the police have to respond to the expectations of their customers if they are to be effective. Historically, there has been reluctance on the part of the senior police hierarchy to recognise the necessity of seeing the police force as an organisation that is fundamentally no different from any other enterprise or business. There has been a tendency to hide behind the complexity of policing as a means of excusing poor management and leadership.
The police organisation of tomorrow will have to evolve a shared vision and understanding of a common mission, which will increasingly be focused on meeting the community's expectations. "Putting the customer first" would certainly improve the confidence of the public, and an overt commitment to enhance the standards of both public safety and police accountability will require the police leadership to lead and manage, not simply "run," the force to get results consistent with the mission.

Muhammad Nurul Huda is a columnist for The Daily Star.