Militant proxies
THE may be justifiably criticised for many things, but one of Pervez Musharraf's better moves during his rule was to restart the composite dialogue with India, through the Islamabad Declaration of 2004.
The decision to do so came at the end of a long and gruelling learning curve for the now retired general. The journey to the declaration can be traced through the Kargil fiasco and the failed Agra summit.
But by 2004, Mr. Musharraf appeared to have learned some lessons from his years in power. Pakistan's use of militant proxies as a tool to pressure India to negotiate on Kashmir was no secret, and the cost of this policy had become unbearably high.
It is no propaganda to say that militant proxies were encouraged by official quarters to use Pakistani soil to support an armed insurgency on the other side of the Line of Control, which some militant groups later decided to extend to the Indian heartland as well.
There were no surprises when the Islamabad Declaration announced that Pakistani soil would not be allowed to be used for waging militant campaigns in neighbouring countries. Any ruler with sense would have gladly signed off on this commitment, and it is to Mr. Musharraf's credit that he did.
But what is surprising, and discreditable, is the attempt on the part of former foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed, to suggest that the decision to sign off on the declaration was a private one, made by the leadership at the time without input from the Foreign Office.
First, it is the leadership's prerogative to decide the line in strategic matters. Second, the decision itself was a positive one, and every effort should be made to abide by its letter and spirit especially in these days of Indo-Pak tension. It makes no sense whatsoever to try and find a way out of that Declaration at this point in time when a commitment to a peaceful foreign policy is more important than ever before.
©Dawn. All rights reserved. Reprinted by arrangement with Asia News Network.
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