Implementation of the CHT Accord

GIVEN that the major component of the ruling alliance was made up by the Awami League (AL), under whose leadership the CHT Accord of 1997 was negotiated and signed in 1997, the current status of implementation of the Accord is very disappointing indeed.
Several crucial aspects of the Accord remain totally unimplemented. Others have been only partially implemented.
The totally unimplemented provisions are rehabilitation of internally displaced hill people and resolution of land disputes.

Rehabilitation of the internally displaced hill people (IDPS)
Let alone being rehabilitated in their original homes and lands, the Jumma IDPs have not even received primary healthcare, drinking water, food security and livelihood security from the state. The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Task Force on Refugees and Displaced People (TFRDP) may need to be amended, and the budget enhanced. The activities of MSF on healthcare and the few UNDP projects in the Sajek Valley (predominantly inhabited now by Jumma IDPs) have stopped.
The development interventions in Sajek have reportedly been halted for "security" reasons, which to me is a concocted excuse, rather than a genuine reason.
I suspect that the indigenous communities concerned are being punished for resisting violent land-grabbing by outsiders and for boycotting Baghaihat Bazaar on account of racist attacks against them. They are totally justified in doing both.

Resolution of land disputes: Amendment of the land commission law
Barring a few exceptions, the situation of land alienation of the hill people has actually deteriorated between 1997 to today, on account of discriminatory role of government security forces.
The most important loophole here is the refusal/failure to amend the Land Commission Act of 2001, despite the consent of the Accord Implementation Committee headed by Begum Sajeda Chowdhury and the verbal understanding of Jumma leaders with Law Minister, Barrister Shafique Ahmed (in my presence).
The role of the ministry of land in this process has been totally against the spirit of the Constitution of Bangladesh and the letter and spirit of the 1997 Accord. Some suggest that powerful lobbies within the state bureaucracy and military are crucial factors for the freezing of the draft law, even after approval by cabinet. I have no hesitation in believing that there is truth in this; to what extent, I do not know.

Resolution of land disputes: Cancellation of land leases granted to outsiders
This too has not happened at all. Although some initial steps have been taken, actual cancellation of the leases has not happened. Obviously, the lessees -- irrespective of their party affiliation -- have more clout than the displaced hill people. This is particularly acute in Bandarban district. And ironically, Bandarban was less affected by the pre-1997 conflict and unrest than the other two districts.
Does this mean that the hill people of Bandarban are being been punished for having a lesser level of political and other unrest than Rangamati and Khagrachari?
Partially implemented provisions
These include (a) de-militarisation; and (b) devolution to the CHTRC and HDCs.

Demilitarisation
Since so-called "insurgency" against the state has ceased, there is no justification for keeping mobilised security forces as in a war zone. That the overwhelming presence of security forces has had no visible impact in decreasing intra-Jumma political conflicts and killings and other violence, is quite clear to CHT residents.
Except where there is conflict involving large organised warfare against state security forces and acts of insurgency, law and order is regarded as a policing, rather than as a military, matter.
Yes, several military and para-military camps have been removed elsewhere from the CHT since 1997. But many hundreds still remain.
Even if the accord provisions were to be fully implemented, six cantonments would remain in the CHT, an average of two per district, far higher than in any comparable district or region in Bangladesh!

Devolution to CHTRC and HDCS
The role of the CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) in supervising general administration, HDCs and local government bodies (DCs, UNOs, UZs, UPs, Municipalities, etc.) is totally invisible. The government should consider issuing administrative guidelines on this. Same is the case of the functions of the CHT Development Board.
Land, forest, local police, law and order, secondary education, etc. remain un-transferred to HDCs. The HDCs have insufficient jurisdiction over the development planning and projects of the transferred subjects, which often bypass them.

Policing, justice and human rights violations
A crucial part of de-militarisation of a post-conflict area is policing by an efficient, multi-ethnic and non-discriminatory police force. Although the present government has transferred some Pahari police personnel to the CHT, their numbers are still too few to make a big impact. Increase in the number of women police, including Pahari and other Adivasi women police, is also required.
Bangladesh can take the example of nearby insurgency-affected and post-conflict states in Northeast India (including Tripura, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur), where predominantly tribal, or ethnically mixed police, are responsible for law and order, except where large conflicts are present.
The CHT police was predominantly Pahari, except for the most senior posts, until the late 1940s or early '50s.
Efficient policing and effective prosecution of racist attackers is required to prevent and deter attacks on innocent indigenous settlements. Mere rumours, usually manufactured, as in the case of Ramu, have led to countless attacks against Pahari settlements, both before and after the 1997 Accord, especially in Rangamati and Khagrachari districts -- including the district headquarters cities/towns.
The sum total of losses, injury and deaths caused thereby is many times greater than that caused in Ramu. Yet, there is insufficient attention to the CHT, including bringing past perpetrators of human rights violations to justice, in comparison to Ramu (although here too, effective detection and prosecution of, and punishment to, the offenders is yet to take place).

Gender and ethnic dimensions
Incidents of rape and sexual violence against indigenous women in the post-Accord years may well be higher than in the pre-Accord years. The alleged offenders in the post-Accord period are generally civilians rather than military personnel, unlike during the conflict.
Special measures for prevention, policing (multi-ethnic police, multi-sex police, including in all thanas or police stations), prosecution of offenders and rehabilitation of victims (both by state and by local communities) is required in the case of rape and sexual violence against women and children.
The three HDCs in the CHT have only one woman member, in Rangamati district. The number of the members of the HDCs needs to be raised from the present five to twenty, as originally envisaged. In any case, the number of women and members of the numerically small peoples needs to be enhanced, even if elections to the councils are further delayed (which it is hoped will not be the case when a new government is elected).
In all major decision-making bodies -- such as in the HDCs, CHT Development Board's Consultative Committee and other bodies -- the role of women and members of the numerically small and otherwise disadvantaged ethnic groups needs to be enhanced.
As regards the Bengali residents of the CHT, those who are descendants of migrants of the 19th century (a very small number then), known as "Purano Bangali," are generally discriminated against. These people helped establish plough cultivation in the CHT in the 19th and early 20th centuries and spread the market system in the CHT against heavy odds of malaria, tribal raids and other vicissitudes.
Their contribution should be rewarded by special development grants and affirmative action in jobs and other opportunities of the state.

Reasons for impasse in implementation
There are several reasons behind this, along with factors that contribute towards it or otherwise help further stagnate it, or even reverse the trend.
Absence of understanding and ownership of CHT Accord among political leaders and government functionaries
Few political leaders and bureaucrats (both civil and military) understand the background of the CHT conflict and its political and constitutional history. The status of the CHT as an autonomous area in British times, and as a virtually independent territory during and before Mughal times, needs to be remembered.
The CHT's status needs to be understood by comparing it to the states in Northeast India, and not to the neighbouring districts of Bangladesh (which were ruled by the Mughals and British when the CHT remained outside such rule, except after 1860).
Because of such a lack of understanding, any move to decentralise authority from the centre is resisted in the name of stability, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political unity. Unfortunately, the CHT peace process has long been held hostage to such supposedly pro-state slogans and phrases that are actually devoid of any substance.
Apart from some civil society leaders at national level, the rest of the country has not taken ownership of the Accord. This has to change. Coordinated measures are needed from all major sections of the national citizens to "de-demonise" the CHT Accord and to realise how it seeks to respect the inherent rights of the CHT people, particularly the indigenous peoples, and yet maintain the stability of the region as an integral part of Bangladesh and respect the political unity and territorial integrity of country.

Regional political conflict
The often violent conflict between the regional political parties of the CHT has added fuel to the fire. It is not the cause of non-implementation, but has certainly acted as a crucial factor in retaining the status quo and, in some cases, in reversing the gains made by the CHT Accord.
It is a difficult and complex issue, but we should not feel that it has to remain as it is for decades.
We should all do what we can to try to stop the fratricidal conflict. My heart bleeds for the widows and children of the slain young men, just as it bleeds for all those who suffered not only violence, but trauma, during the conflict, and still continue to do so.

The writer is the chief of the Chakma Administrative Circle, an official body, and the traditional raja of the ethnic Chakma community.