From the pen of an enigmatic person

Politics, Ethnicity and Security
Bangladesh and South Asian Perspectives
Aftab Ahmed
Riverside Press

In life, Professor Aftab Ahmed was quite controversial, by his actions, it is true, but far more by what he said. He was outspoken, sometimes outrageously so, and, in a society of highly emotionally-charged people and an appalling political culture that breeds political intolerance, as is the case in Bangladesh, that could spell disaster. And it did for Aftab Ahmed. He was roundly condemned for some of the things he proposed and spoke about, driving large sections of the population to absolute frenzy, and, in the end, whether tangentially or directly related to his controversial statements or not, or simply because he was so inconveniently contentious to not a few, he met a violent end at the hand of assassins in 2006. By that time, his tenure as Vice Chancellor of National University had already ended.

The book's editor brings out the centrality of Ahmed's political controversy (read: topsy-turvy) by citing two instances in his Foreword to the book: "He was the one who coined the phrase Joy Bangla." Yet, "(i)n the late 1990s…he got involved in the controversy relating to the National Anthem." The author's own life story as a political activist and scholar is probably more interesting than the book under review. Let the editor pick up the tale: "He was the generator of many controversies throughout his life. He was a great student activist in the 1960s, and a shrewd student leader by 1970s…. He had been able to liberate all the captives from Dhaka Central Jail on 16th December 1971 and was also directly involved in the Liberation War." Ahmed also briefly dabbled in journalism as Executive Editor of the (now defunct) daily Gonokontho before settling on the teaching profession at Chittagong and Dhaka Universities, besides being the Vice-Chancellor of National University from 2002-2005. He was one of those rare high caliber students who repeatedly took to the streets as political activists and leaders (Rashed Khan Menon and Mujahidul Islam Selim are two others who come to mind). In the end, he went from one extreme to the other, from being a radical left-leaning activist to a determined right-wing ideologue.

The set of essays that constitute Politics, Ethnicity and Security: Bangladesh and South Asian Perspectives are a compilation of articles he had written at various times between 1985 and 2000, which Khondoker Shakhawat Ali edited before getting them published in an anthology. Eight chapters make up the volume, one of which appeared in the Philippine Journal of Public Administration, while all but one of the rest were papers presented at different academic gatherings. A few of them are rather mediocre in quality, specifically the last five chapters, while the first three are first-rate. Easily the most outstanding of them, in my opinion, is the first chapter, entitled "The Nature and Role of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh during the Mujib Regime". Some of the author's observations in this chapter provide cause for more than a passing thought.

Ahmed starts with, "In the end, Mujib's (Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) failure to control the bureaucracy led to his downfall." This would appear to be a sweeping statement, because certainly there were other factors that contributed to his tragic end, but it was definitely an important cause. The author is alluding to the civil bureaucracy, and he discusses relatively briefly, but with some authority, the theoretical underpinning of the concept and the institution, taking care to point out that the failure of political parties and their leaders to initiate a process of political development would open the door for bureaucrats to intervene in political statecraft, usually with disastrous results (as was the case in Pakistan). The same situation could equally result in the intervention of the military bureaucracy with a gamut of consequences that Bangladesh has experienced.

Ahmed is convinced that the politicians had lost the initiative to the bureaucrats at the very beginning of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh (PGB). "The system that began to emerge was in essence a bureaucratic one, although to all appearance, the politicians were in command. The Awami League, instead of closing its ranks and devoting itself to the task of administering the country, became more interested in the spoils of war and procurement of material gains. This increased the dependence of the PGB on the bureaucracy, many of whose members were of doubtful loyalty and integrity." He continues his indictment of the bureaucrats, emphasizing their self-serving character: The Bengali CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) officers "had articulated Bengali demands when the formal process of politics was banned during the early years of Ayub's rule…. Thus, it may seem baffling that although the overwhelming number of bureaucrats fully supported the unprecedented non-cooperation movement in March 1971, so few of them later joined the PGB. This can be explained…by…the 'qualified support' to Bengali nationalism by those 'who hoped to rise to senior positions in the bureaucracy'. These men profited from the pressures of nationalist politics, but after the crackdown of the Pakistan army, their timidity was exposed. They did not dare take the risk of joining the PGB whose future was uncertain…." However, the bureaucrats closed ranks and presented a united front soon after liberation to the point where, "Beginning (in) 1974, Mujib began to rely more on the bureaucrats…. When Mujib introduced the one-party system in Bangladesh in 1975, the bureaucrats were not only dominant in the administration but in…the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL)."

In another important chapter, "Civilian Control of Military vis-à-vis Politicization of Military: A Developing Country's Perspective" (Chapter 2), the author looks at a frustrating phenomenon that has afflicted, and is still causing problems for, political development and meaningful institutionalization in developing countries. Very often it takes the form of a vicious cycle: political failures leading to military intervention, and, military takeover leading to retarded political institutionalization and unhealthy political culture. Ahmed looks at the phenomenon this way: "The propensity to intervene is not pathological. This propensity correlates with the cohesion of the relevant political strata. The propensity is high when civilian cohesion is low, low when the civilian cohesion is high. The success of the coups is related to the degree of public legitimacy ascribed to the executive and the military."

Chapter 3, "Ethnic Turmoil in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Region of Bangladesh: Modalities for the Resolution of a Conflict", is another carefully constructed, deeply thought out article. Ahmed fleshes out the self-explanatory title of the chapter by introducing a number of aspects relating to the region, and the problems that have given rise to protracted dissatisfaction and armed conflict. His theoretical premise is noteworthy: "…in multi-ethnic societies the nationalism of any one/dominant group may lead to discrimination against the other groups. Because nationalism is a sentiment, it has psychological overtones."

Aftab Ahmed offers an interesting perspective on the discontent of the CHT indigenous/adivasi people. He believes that, in the early 1970s, the Hill Tracts people, or pahadees as he calls them in the book, felt humiliated at their implied elevation to the rank of Bangalees by Article 6 of Bangladesh's Constitution, and by Bangabandhu's public statement to the same effect in Rangamati, and that "sealed all possibilities of a rapprochement between the pahadees and Bangalees." However, he understands why Mujib said what he said. He explains: "Mujib who took an active part in the Sylhet referendum for its inclusion in Pakistan in 1947 was also aware of the political moves of a section of the then pahadee leadership and the Indian Congress. Thus he was more concerned about the territorial integrity of Bangladesh. In pursuing his government's policies in the CHT, Mujib therefore gave top priority to the question of political integration."

That included, with the enthusiastic advocacy of a section of the army, the large-scale settlement of plain Bengalis in parts of CHT, an act that, as Ahmed observes, has contributed to the protracted insurgency in the region. The author suggests that, "…unless there is a more generous response from the government and the ethos of a hurt ethnic sentiment is honourably accommodated within the constitutional framework of Bangladesh, the CHT will ever remain a potential breeding ground for national discord. The problem is a political one and it cannot be solved by development programmes alone which aim to bring the pahadees 'into the mainstream'." He then gives vent to a philosophical lament: "Thus the history of ethnic minorities in 'national' states is full of tragedy, because they suffer forced assimilation."

Following the high degree of scholarship displayed in the first three chapters, the rest are generally pedestrian, in places, superficial and dogmatic. The book is further marred by appalling proofreading. Politics, Ethnicity and Security: Bangladesh and South Asian Perspectives, although dealing with some important topics with admirable insight, creditable analysis, and unique perspectives, is not of a consistently high standard. But it is worthwhile going through, particularly the enlightening chapters singled out, to get familiar with the thoughts of an enigmatic person.

Shahid Alam is an academic.