Failed policies

Actually Pakistan's earlier Taliban adventure had completed its isolation; only some US oil interests, possibly the coterie around Bush and perhaps CIA were thick with Pakistan's master strategists. The latter should have known that as and when domestically feasible, the US would benefit from Taliban -- or if that did not happen, the opposite would be the case: the US would destroy their regime.

AMERICAN attitude toward Pakistanis and their conduct vis-à-vis this country are subjects that make many unhappy. Leaked reports in the US media about Pakistan's unreliability in keeping its nuclear secrets and of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan are ominous. American military's assertions that it has a right to pursue into Pakistan fugitives from Afghanistan have concentrated the minds here. Later the agreement(?) that such issues will be resolved quietly does not wash out the significance of a Pakistani paramilitary trooper having felt obliged to shoot at an American soldier and that American air force dropped a 500 lbs. bomb on a target in Pakistan.

Plane loads of Pakistanis have been deported from the US; Pakistani visitors to the US are required to be finger printed and to register with INS. Pakistanis are living in fear in America, the once land of liberty, because of the hysteria of fear sweeping through it about Muslims and people from South Asia and Middle East. American media and officials are making, or upholding, accusations about Islamabad's commitment to non-proliferation is uncertain. All this is perplexing in view of the evidence that Pakistan government appears to have given privileges to Americans that smack of extra-territoriality rights. Are US and Pakistan friends or are they foes?

On the other side, India continues to make bellicose statements, refuses to countenance resumption of normal communication links, dialogue and sees little prospect of normal ties in near future. Although the bulk of Indian Army appears to have withdrawn from the international borders, the deployment along LOC in Kashmir is said to be still threatening. Sangh parivar in India made Pakistan, among anti-Muslim tirades, an election issue in the recent Gujarat polls and it is expected to repeat the Gujarat methods in the next 10 state elections this year. Pakistan's pleas for talks are disregarded and arrogant bellicosity is all that is emanating from Indian leadership, ostensibly because of "cross border terrorism".

Islamabad denies this "cross border terrorism". But India's 10-month long expensive massing of troops was to threaten a punitive war for just this and has refused to accept Pakistan's denials. Exact truth is not known, of course. Doubtless the background of 50 years of adversarial relations provided incentives to do down each other. That was the policy number one and friendship with us was consequential and stood at number two.

One thing remains certain: Pakistan's Kashmir policy, indeed almost all of its India policy, and the consequent cold war, arms race and five big and small wars have not succeeded in their aim. India's possession of Kashmir Valley -- the only part that interests Pakistan -- is as firmly under Indian control as ever; the 10 years of Jihad have made no difference. India will either go to a supposedly final war or go on frustrating all that Pakistanis and the Kashmiris can do; it has the resources, will and ability for the purpose.

Few can doubt that this Jihad-promoting policy has been counterproductive on two counts: it was sure to result in a war and India was ready to go to a war last year that did not suit Pakistan: there is no certainty Pakistan would win a war and Kashmir Valley would be its, despite the predictable costs and other uncertainties. Secondly Jihad-promotion could not but have a domestic cost; Jihadis, when and if done with Kashmir, would retrain their guns on targets in Pakistan. And this they partially did. The rampant sectarianism, attacks on the American or other foreign targets resulted, not to mention other conspiracies. Why pursue a policy that results that are unwanted? The Americans too assess that Pakistan is a weak and uncertain friend. While India has been able to win American affections, Pakistan can end up as an additional member of Bush's axis of evil. Isn't it another major failure?

Let's examine: relations with India went into a tailspin without any compensatory advantage. The economy is so much the worse for the still accelerating arms race. Over emphasis on national security, meaning mainly military defence, has led to the rise of militarism, collapse of democracy and provincialism. Power was cornered by a civil and military bureaucracy and it is the foreigners whose purposes were mainly served by Pakistan's armed forces. Apart from the initial loss of Kashmir due to the propensity of using force, the record of armed conflicts with India, Kargil included, is not too uplifting. The conclusive defeat in 1971 led to Pakistan's dismemberment while all other wars can at best be called inconclusive draws. The same approach promises similar results, for India is able to keep several jumps ahead.

Has anyone failed to take notice that all foreign governments -- from Americans to the British, French, Russians, Iranians, Chinese and others -- have asked Pakistan throughout 2002 "to do more". Reference was to President Musharraf's June promise to stop sending Jihadis into India held Kashmir. Pakistan said it has stopped; India said Islamabad was still sending infiltrators. Most others took India's words at face value. Pakistan had no supporters, not even China and Iran, otherwise quite friendly. Pakistan's way of solving Kashmir problem has isolated it completely.

Actually Pakistan's earlier Taliban adventure had completed its isolation; only some US oil interests, possibly the coterie around Bush and perhaps CIA were thick with Pakistan's master strategists. The latter should have known that as and when domestically feasible, the US would benefit from Taliban -- or if that did not happen, the opposite would be the case: the US would destroy their regime. As it turned out, thanks to Taliban's rigidity the US desires were not met and the latter punished them by driving them out of power. In the process Pakistan suffered horribly. Public sentiment in NWFP's and Balochistan's Pushtun belt was deeply hurt. That was the immediate price paid in the shape of MMA's power. There will be other installments when it becomes obvious that MMA is not really compatible with either Pakistan's ruling elites or latter's permanent friendship with, or dependence on, the US. Instead of gaining strategic depth, Pakistan has now no influence on the US-governed Afghanistan.

The US and Pakistan seem to be on a collision course. On present showing Pakistan's stability requires continuing injections of cash help: either credits or debt rescheduling. To some observers the brightest achievement of Musharraf government -- the soon-to-be Monetary Reserves at $ 10 billion -- might be a chimera. Within a few years of American displeasure, much of it might be confiscated: go toward adjusting against unpaid debt servicing obligations. At any rate, no details are known about how much is kept where and on what terms. Pakistan has still to cope with the uncertainties that are to unfold after 2004 when full globalisation would come into being. The Musharraf line that Pakistan would no longer depend on IMF and its associates is still a pie in the sky. So long as the GDP growth rate is not 6 per cent or more -- and Pakistan can pay for all its imports with its exports -- there can be no freedom from the need for cash injections from IFIs. This requires US benevolence. The latter can only be bought with apparently utter subservience.

The recent firing on a US soldier and America's punitive bombing incident was investigated by both sides. What was the upshot? It was a 'misunderstanding' -- an ambiguous statement -- and all such misunderstandings will be amicably settled in future 'quietly'! The really significant part of this news item was this 'quietness'. There is no word that brave statements of Foreign and Defence Ministers won recognition from the US government. It does seem as if Pakistan is promising not to publicise such future 'misunderstandings' while the firm statement by American military about its 'right' to pursue fugitives into Pakistan stands. This compromise on sovereignty hurts more as the other side shows increasing signs of beginning to regard Pakistan as a likely foe.

Seven-eighths of Pakistan's foreign policy comprises relations with India and the US. It has been noted that, except for China's finely-calibrated and one-sided friendship and conditional Saudi munificence (rather than friendship), Pakistan has no friends; it is almost totally isolated. Limits of the success in its India (and Kashmir) policy are not known. The other pillar on which the ruling elites have relied on for survival, the US, seems quite as uncertain. But perhaps the elites appear to believe that a few changed faces might see them through, no matter what the cost to national sentiment or even to the country.

But the situation is intolerable for the people who seem to be genuinely divided about national purposes, priorities and friends. Facts need to be faced with courage and imagination. This writer has drawn flak for (only) pointing out uncomfortable facts and for refraining from recommending solutions to difficult problems. The reply is twofold: commentators are not nation-builders; seeking solutions, elaborating them and seeking popular sanction for them is the rightful job of national leaders. Secondly, one can only throw up a few pointers or solutions in outline form. Which is where one's function ends.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.<./i>