China searches for a new Asean paradigm

SINCE 1995, they have worked in tandem on almost every issue, much to the chagrin, or perhaps wonder, of non-Asean members. Now, with new strategic environments emerging, both sides are groping for a new paradigm that they hope will sustain their relations and mutual interests. It is a tall order as they increasingly are realising that cooperation these days is becoming increasingly difficult.
At the moment China is focusing on hosting the Olympics and managing a series of natural disasters, which have beset the country in the past months. Deep down, the world's largest country is quite worried about its relations with Southeast Asia.
The Chinese leaders have continuously contemplated what course their country should take over the next decade or two to gain further confidence and trust in this part of the world. They need assurances that a rising China will not ignite new tensions or stir up old fears.
The whole world over, including Asean, has recognised and addressed myriad strategic issues related to a stronger China and subsequently has come out with various scenarios and policy recommendations. Strange as it may seem, Beijing has not yet pondered its appropriate role in the region as a responsible international player.
Earlier attempts in 2005 to draw up a comprehensive strategic blueprint towards Asia as a whole by China's Foreign Affairs Ministry have been shelved. Since then, China has been struggling to initiate policies that would maintain its diplomatic foothold in the region.
China-Asean ties, while still cordial, lack the kind of enthusiasm that used to fire up their friendship and cooperation. For the past three years, little or no progress has been made in the disputed South China Sea.
In 1992, Asean agreed on the land-marked Declaration on Code of Conducts on the South China Sea to avoid further conflicts and to call for self-restraint in the mineral-rich region. In 2002, China signed the amended declaration, which was called the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. But Asean wants more from China.
Continued attempts by Asean to get China on board for the proposed legally binding Code of Conduct on South China Sea remain elusive. Obviously, Beijing prefers to deal with the Asean claimant countries (Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia) separately, rather than the grouping as a whole.
This difference has already become a real albatross hampering future discussions and plans for joint development of the disputed areas. Of late, negotiations on a China-Asean free-trade agreement have been slow due to Beijing's toughening positions on goods and services. Earlier they expected the historical free-trade deal to be completed before the scheduled 2010.
Strange as it may seem, from 1995-2005, China used to follow the Asean consensus whether it was under the Asean Regional Forum framework or Asean Plus Three process.
It was part of China's rhetoric and diplomacy to win the grouping's trust. Before the September crackdown on the monks in Burma by the Rangoon junta last year, China continued to back the grouping's handling of its pariah member, considering it a family matter. Despite Beijing's influence over the junta, it carefully choreographed diplomatic moves in support of Asean.
However, China's patience ran out when Singapore suggested Ibrahim Gambari, the UN special envoy for Burma, brief the leaders of Asean Plus Three on the situation inside Burma last November.
Beijing, which strongly opposed the idea, literally forged a new consensus for Asean on Burma by cancelling the briefing. Fortunately, none of the Asean nations made a scandal of the chair's diplomatic faux pas.
From Beijing's viewpoint, future engagement with Asean is becoming increasingly delicate and more complex. Without well thought out future strategic thinking, China-Asean ties could be tied up with other issues, especially those related to the role of the US and its ally Japan.
Asean continues to view the US presence as a much-needed stabilising force underwriting continued regional development and progress. Interestingly, while China also shares a similar assessment by Asean, Beijing is quite worried about the long-term impact of the US presence in the region.
After all, this will be the first time in history that rising major powers in the region occur almost at the same time. For instance, how can a stronger China cope with the US and Japan?
Japan, as a close ally of the US, remains a big challenge for China. Even though Japan-China relations have improved dramatically in the past two years, they need further consolidation. Their joint cooperation agreement over the disputed area in the East China Sea last week could serve as model in the troubled South China Sea disputes.
The Asean summit in Bangkok in December will allow China to spell out new strategies towards Asean that are more comprehensive with long-term objectives. Beijing is planning to announce a huge multi-billion dollar development fund for Asean.
China hopes the new fund can be used to develop infrastructure and public works projects in the Asean and sub-Mekong region. Beijing is ready to set up the Asean-China Centre in Beijing and name its first Asean envoy with a fully-fledged bureau in the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Another key strategy is to strengthen defence and security ties with Asean that would envisage joint military exercises and regular training. To fulfil this objective, China has recently proposed a defence ministerial meeting with the grouping.

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