IMAGINE a hypothetical situation: a few thousand candidates are appearing in an examination conducted by the Pubic Service Commission to select a suitable candidate for the post of the chief executive of the country, the prime minister or the president. The successful candidates appear for the viva voce examination and the best candidate is selected for the post of the president or the prime minister, the chief executive. The scenario is ludicrous, not because it is illogical but because it is not seen anywhere in the world.
There is a wide spectrum of mechanisms for assuming the office of the chief executive of the country, such as inheritance (in monarchy), elections in democracy, a consensus choice in the wake of mass upsurge, sanguinary or bloodless coup by a military junta, palace coup by members of the ruling caucus, vanquishing by the armed cadre of a militant political group, conquering by a foreign occupation force, constitutional formula for selecting an interim non-party caretaker government, and so on. Selection through a well-designed examination system never featured in the list.
The chief executive's is a management intensive job. Management expertise is, however, never considered as the prime criterion for selection of the country's chief executive. The prime criterion is the power content embodied in the person. The chief executive has to be the most powerful person, either by him/herself or through the stolid support of a sufficiently powerful group in the country.
In a democratic polity, people's mandate, manifest through acceptable elections, confers moral and physical power on the chief executive to assume his/her office and rule the country with the cabinet colleagues selected by him/her.
The cabinet colleagues who are called ministers in most countries, are selected by the chief executive, and they do not have to face any written or viva voce tests. The chief executive's preference and trust, or his/her political compulsions, are the key criteria for selection to these positions.
As the head of the ministry, the minister finds his/her job no less management oriented than politically involved. He or she is not selected on management consideration nor is he or she much concerned about this aspect of his/her job. He or she works at the pleasure of the chief executive and, therefore, his/her main job is to keep him/herself trustworthy of the chief executive.
The post down that line is that of permanent secretary. He or she works as the principal staff officer to the minister and also as the administrative head of the ministry. Tasks of the government are comprehensively distributed among the ministries, which constitute the apex executive organ of the government, short of the cabinet. The permanent secretary is usually a professional who has climbed to the peak through promotion within the structure.
There is also a provision for lateral entry to high positions of government, though such entry is widely resented by the rank and file of the bureaucracy. Top positions of the directorates and autonomous bodies are filled up through appointment by the government from among civil servants or lateral entrants picked by the chief executive, mostly without formal reference to any committee or agency. Heads of the local bodies are either appointed by the government or elected by the constituents of the area. There is no hard and fast rule as to how these posts will be filled up.
There are certain other senior positions of the government, which are filled up by persons selected or recommended by selection or search committees. The selection/search committees follow their own procedure for selecting the preferred nominees. The government is required by law to honour the panel, however restrictive that may be. For some institutions the eligible voters constitute the panel through elections; the appointing authority has the latitude of selecting one of the elected persons from the panel -- it cannot go beyond the panel.
One can therefore catalogue the following methods for recruitment at the top:
* Elections, inheritance, constitutional provision for filling the vacuum, or application of sheer force.
* Open competitive examinations.
* Regular promotion system.
* Selection through a search committee.
* Arbitrary selection by the appointing authority.
The appointment procedure of topmost executive and his/her cabinet colleagues is more or less standardised. Though election is the most commended procedure to enter the office of the chief executive of the country, other procedures are not rare in the world.
The selection procedure for the cabinet colleagues is almost the same everywhere: exclusively the chief executive selects them, in some countries their appointment is confirmed by the senate or the parliamentary committee.
The constituents, in many cases they are also appointed by the higher authorities, including the central government, often elect heads of local bodies. The Bangladesh constitution specifically provides for elected heads of local governments at each tier of administration, though it was never fully complied with.
Local governments, including city corporations, saw executive heads appointed by the central government without referring to any selection committee or any other formal body in this respect. They were handpicked by the chief executive or by the small caucus around him/her. This is true for governors of the provinces in many federal countries of the world, including those in the sub-continent.
Permanent secretaries (called by other names in different countries) and heads of directorates/bureaus, including the chief of the armed forces, are usually promoted from among the service holders, except in countries, which follow a "spoils system." They are supposed to be promoted on seniority-cum-merit basis in line with transparently framed and widely published rules. Same is the case for senior officers. In the "spoils system," officers in a few higher echelons are handpicked by the chief executive (and the inner caucus), though in some cases the committees of parliament or a similar institution confirm their appointments.
The argument for the "spoils system" is that party members who are trusted and committed to such programs, which will be carried out through the government machinery, can best accomplish the ruling party's programs. The commitment of neutral bureaucracy to party-originated programs is suspect in this system.
The job of the senior bureaucrats is tenurial, usually coterminous with the tenure of the party government. Countries following parliamentary democracy do not follow this system because they believe that a neutral bureaucracy is an essential component of the parliamentary system of government.
Despite this golden rule, lateral entry in government service and handpicking for some important non-ministerial positions including constitutional ones are not uncommon in a parliamentary democratic system. For selecting lateral entrants three procedures are followed -- open competition, selection through a search committee, and discretionary selection by the appointing authority.
Open competition is theoretically sound and good for selecting consultants and not-too-important non-executive experts. It is not suitable for highly exalted positions, which call for high profile persons of outstanding calibre. Such people would not apply for a job in response to government advertisement.
If the government or any organisation intends to appoint or give any specific assignment to such people it has to find some other way to recruit them for the job. A search committee could do the job. The formation of a search committee is very important in this case. The members of the committee have to be fair, firm and conversant about their job.
The best way for the committee to go about its job is to get a list of preferred persons from each member in a sealed cover. Through intense discussion the combined list may be pared to a recommended panel with or without rank order. The appointing authority will have no option but to follow the panel, the way it is prepared. This will be a fair and effective method to recruit for strategic positions in higher echelons.
The last option, discretionary selection, is appropriate for positions which demand professionally competent people commanding absolute trust of the chief executive or the appointing authority. The posts of security advisor, special assistants or advisors, principal secretary to the chief executive, and staff in the personal outfit fall in this category. For the sake of transparency, such positions may be announced through formal notification. That will keep the things in order.
In Bangladesh, we have heard lot of complaints about recruitments at the top. To redress the flawed system that has bred so much controversy and corruption, the system which we intend to follow for recruitment should be formally announced well in advance, and the minimum qualifications for each job be specified. If some jobs do not require any special qualifications other than the trust of the chief executive that may also be mentioned clearly without hesitation.
Once the system is in position, deviation from it should not be allowed in any case, though it may be reviewed occasionally in compelling circumstances. The amended system must also be widely publicised, and followed in letter and spirit. Whatever be the system, it must be implemented in a corruption-free environment such that the system's credibility is not comprised in any manner.
In short, there should not be any room for misunderstanding, suspicion, clandestine maneuvering, and rule bending to accommodate corrupt intention. If this can be maintained we will have competent people recruited at the top.
Dr. Saadat Husain is Chairman, Public Service Commission.