The dilemma of defining terrorism

There are credible reports to understand that an appropriate legislation to fight the menace of terrorism may see the light of the day in the not-too-distant future. The advisory council has reportedly made some observations on the draft legislation and the law ministry is expected to come up with a revised version shortly. According to media reports, one element of such observations relates to the phrasing of an acceptable and workable definition of terrorism. This writer wishes to take the opportunity to share his thoughts on ideas and some concepts on the subject.
Defining terrorism is, without doubt, an exacting task, particularly when there is as yet no universally accepted definition of the subject. One has to remember that such a law affects every single citizen, provides the executive a permanent alternative to the existing penal and criminal procedure and shall invariably infringe on the right to information. However, on account of objective conditions, it is no longer a question of whether we at all need an anti-terrorism legislation but actually the details of what shape such a law should take.
In the sub-continent the terrorism laws have tried to be all-inclusive in their definitions of terrorism often including a wide range of acts that qualify as terrorism and factors that contribute to terrorism. In the west, however, the definitions have been far narrower. It needs to be mentioned that the problem of defining terrorism remains fundamentally unresolved even in the United States.
One would perhaps be right to say that a great deal of ambiguity stems from the use of ideology to justify acts of terror. Experienced observers say that the use of ideology has often been an alibi. Some would say that acts of terror should be divorced from context. Enforcement veterans would argue that terrorism should be viewed as any act that tries to disrupt attempts at reconciliation. One has to perhaps admit that in the absence of a global framework, domestic legislation is an effective legal remedy against terrorism.
One may have good reason to pinpoint the double-edged nature of terrorism laws and express premonition about the abuse of such laws. However, the fear that a law is liable to be misused cannot be a justification for not having legislation at all.
For our proposed legislation to be acceptable from a definitional point of view, the understanding of terrorism must not be kept so loose that it becomes an instrument of government abuse. This is so because in our situation the authority is quite often under pressure to produce results in anti-militancy drives. A sense of desperation creates the urge to bypass the law itself.
Definitions of terrorism in the sub-continent have been "maximalist" in its coverage. The rather cumbersome definition of a terrorist according to the Indian "Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act 1984" is "any person who indulges in wanton killing of persons or in violence or in the disruption of services or means of communications essential to the community or in damaging property with a view to
(a) putting the public or any section of the public in fear
(b) adversely affecting the harmony between various religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities
(c) coercing or overawing the government established by law
(d) endangering the sovereignty and integrity of India"
The above definition is definitely maximalist in intent. Such definition is loose thereby allowing its indiscriminate use by security forces.
The basic thrust of the definition of terrorism as laid down in the "Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 2001" India, is motive
"In this controversial law, "Whoever
(a) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people does any act or thing..... in such a manner as to cause or likely to cause both death or injury... or detains any person or threatens to kill any person.....
(b) or is or continues to be a member of an association declared unlawful under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act... commits a terrorist act."
So from a focus on the 'act' itself, the definition of terrorism is expanded to 'an act of association' with a terrorist group. The idea again is simple, to include patrons and harbourers of terrorist groups, and fringe supporters in the ambit of the anti-terrorist law. This has been directly lifted from the British Law which draws up a list of 'proscribed organizations' to which membership, funding or open support within the territory of the UK is banned. This list is periodically reviewed, with an intention of making the fight against terrorism in line with threats to internal security.
The way in which the British Home Office expanded the concept of a Proscribed Organization to make it applicable across the broadest spectrum is interesting. On the one hand, it is precise and unambiguous. It even attempts to measure and list what acts would constitute 'support' to a banned organization, something which had been left to law enforcers to interpret so far. In all, while broadening its applicability, it narrows the definition of terrorism itself.
The terrorism law, in order to serve the avowed purpose must not allow a situation to develop wherein its interpretation becomes the turf of politicians and subject to their personal prejudices and opinion. At the same time the bigger concern as to whether and to what extent, activism - religious, political or ideological - be set aside from terrorism. The core question is: should motive define terrorism?
One cannot be oblivious of the very real possibility that an anti-terrorism law might be used by unscrupulous or vindictive governments to neutralize opponents. This is not intended to ignore the difficult task of removing the possibility of subversive activity cloaking itself as 'conflicting ideology'.
The Washington based RAND foundation lays down a few indices on the basis of which terrorism can be defined:
(1) Political Motive: RAND talks of "an act of terrorism as a crime in the classic sense such as murder or kidnapping, albeit for political motive"
(2) Attention grabbing Motive: RAND argues in its presentation before the US administration that "terrorism contains a psychological component-it is aimed at people watching." The identities of the actual victims or targets of attack, RAND says, are secondary or irrelevant to the terrorists' objective of spreading fear or alarm or gaining concessions.
One has to remember that while every terrorist may be a criminal, every criminal cannot be given the label of a terrorist. The enforcement authority must not be allowed to circumvent the criminal law while applying terrorism legislation. There is, however, a pressing need to draw tougher law to discriminate between terrorists and ordinary criminals.
The law against terrorism in USA has traditionally looked at the act, the motive as well as the persons or audience the act is directed at. The Indian and British laws do not quite reflect the American discreteness, as shown in RAND definition mentioned hereinbefore.
One may have to admit that there is an inherent subjective element in the implementation of even the most precise, narrow, definition of terrorism. At the international level, there is no legislation, no convention which can be used as a tool for global cooperation against terrorism. Such cooperation in the form of legislation would require the elimination of all ideology, motive, compulsion, or long-term goal from such a definition. One has to remember that the blurring of the definition would give rise to unnecessary debate. Bridging the ideological divide between nations could help in finding an acceptable definition of terrorism.

Muhammad Nurul Huda is a columnist for The Daily Star.