The Palestinian dimension: Prediction for escalation

Although there has been an increase in Israeli threats of invading Gaza, it appears as though Israel will not invade and occupy Gaza. Rather, it will continue with its current policy attacking targets daily, both facilities and persons from the air. At the same time, Israel will continue the policy of containing Hamas, militarily, politically and economically by continuing the severe civilian and economic closure and siege of the Gaza Strip.
Despite this containment policy, Lt. General Gabi Ashkenazi declared one month ago in HaArtz interview (5 December 2007) that the IDF doctrine is to control Gaza by intelligence and logistics. However, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his deputy, Maj. General Matan Vilnai, pretended that there is an inevitability of a future attack and occupation of Gaza. MK Efraim Sneh went further by claiming that Israel's government has to not only end the firing of the El Qassam rockets on Sderot, but also must terminate the Hamas regime in Gaza.
Ehud Olmert said on the 23rd of December 2007, that Israel's aim is to force Hamas to comply with the Quartet's requirement of recognizing Israel. Olmert rejected any possibility of creating a Hudna (cease fire) with the Hamas.
It is not certain whether Israel is interested in escalating the conflict with Hamas or not. However, according to Barak, the Ministry of Defense, the Army and the Shabaq support the daily attacks against Palestinians in Gaza by planes, helicopters and unmanned aircraft as a better option than a grand, large scale and comprehensive incursion to try to topple the Hamas regime. This arrangement of not attacking, according to the Israeli perspective, is based on different factors:
1. The silence of the international system concerning the daily Israeli attacks, which cause 4-6 fatalities each day.
2. Any grand Israeli military incursion into Gaza would lead to a lot of Israeli casualties in heavily populated areas.
3. In 2005, Israel decided to withdraw. It was called "the disengagement doctrine." It does not seem probable that in 2008 Israel would return to Gaza in order to repeat history.
4. The Second Lebanon War taught Israel and the IDF the limits of force in fighting against guerilla combatants in populated areas.
5. It is quite logical that although you can start a war you do not necessarily know how to stop it. This is what happened to Olmert in Lebanon in 2006, and this is what might happen to Barak in Gaza if he tries to occupy it.
It seems from the last incursions that some special Israeli units are trying to penetrate the northern part of Gaza without any success. The Israeli military establishment has learned the lessons of occupying populated areas, especially such an area as Gaza, which is highly mobilized as a result of the latest Israeli steps of closure, incursions and daily aerial bombardments in civilian areas. In that sense, I can definitely argue that because of these strategic and logistic factors, Israel will not conduct a large scale but rather a daily attack and limited military offensive and collective punishment against the whole civilian population in order to topple the elected Hamas regime.
The casualties that the IDF would suffer if they attack Gaza also are a factor that will prevent Israeli decision makers from taking the risk of trying to occupy Gaza.
As a result of all the logical and serious claims that Barak and Olmert make in order to dispel the idea that they are not irresponsible in taking actions and risks, they will not invade Gaza but will continue targeted killing against Palestinian leaders of Hamas in Gaza. This scenario will be dangerous and very risky for the region, similar to Pakistan after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto by General Pervez Musharraf, as most of the sources indicate.
It is not clear whether the Israeli leadership might take such actions or learn from the lessons of assassinating Rantisi and Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, which created more extremism. It is also uncertain whether they have learned from the US after it targeted Saddam Hussein.
The Israeli security doctrine currently has collapsed in Gaza. Both the Defense Minister and the political establishment have realized that they cannot avoid the El Qassam missile attacks, although these missiles are not effective and do not cause any real damage to Israeli civilians. On the other hand, Israel has a free hand in attacking Gaza daily and causes substantial number of casualties among civilians and Hamas members.
The Israeli government cannot achieve any of its strategic aims in Gaza, neither stopping the El Qassam rockets nor decreasing the Hamas influence using any means. Without any real options, the government is trying to threaten conducting a grand invasion, controlling the Philadelphi Strip, or pushing Egypt to do something positive for Israeli strategic interests. The Israeli military doctrine will escalate after the Bush visit with further targeted killings and assassinations, an element that will help increase the tension and violence.
Consequentially, we can assume that Israel has a confused policy toward Gaza. Its policy is more to contain and to squeeze Hamas in order to keep it in check and under control.
We can say that the Israeli policy on the West Bank is even more confused, although it is being conducted under the American umbrella, in a dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian security forces. We have seen daily incursions into Nablus, Jenin and Bethlehem; however there is no real or substantial dialogue with the Palestinian security forces. The daily Israeli conduct in the West Bank, the arrests, incursions, targeted killings and illegal outposts portray both Abu Mazen and Salam Fayad as irrelevant leaders, and consequently, the Palestinian security forces as collaborators with the Israeli IDF. Currently, the two Palestinian leaders are perceived as Israeli and American puppets who cannot manipulate their own people's situation. Israel today is strengthening this perception by presenting Abu Mazen as a president who rejects the release of Marwan Barghouty from prison. It is quite certain that Israel will not release Barghouty in any case, unless as part of a prisoner's deal.
Abu Mazen and Fayad were forced into the corner and became even weaker when Israel attacked the Gaza Strip on a daily basis. Abu Mazen has no influence on Israel to stop these attacks. What is more, the US supports these attacks and understands only the problematic Olmert coalition.
The Bush visit will not in any way improve the logistic situation on the ground. Israel will try to divert Bush with regional issues.
Olmert is incapable of conducting any policy and might resign after the Vinograd Commission releases its final findings. As a result, policy regarding the West Bank will continue to be the same. The situation may even deteriorate in the near future because there is no vision and no real policy.

The author is a journalist and member of The Arab Council for Foreign Relations.