Chittagong arms haul and our intelligence agencies

THE trial and sentencing of top bosses of the country's apex intelligence agencies in the arms haul case has brought into focus the issue of the role of the intelligence agencies in pursuit of tasks commanded by the government. The country had never witnessed so many senior operatives of the administration and the government hauled to court and meted out death sentences.
The general opinion is that the accused have got their due because of the imponderable but dangerous potential, given the likely destination of the consignment that their action (of supplying arms to a dissident group of neighbouring country) had for the security of the country. However, given the seriousness of the issue and the many unanswered questions, and the various comments regarding the matter, one is constrained to say that the matter merits more robust discussion on the use (or misuse) of the specialised agencies of the state as well as the need to establish a mechanism of formulating state policies, particularly those that impact national security, and safety of the people.
Let us recall the significant aspect of the case. First, the size of the lot was enough to equip several infantry brigades. Secondly, it is the first time such a clandestine transfer has been anticipated. Thirdly, it is the first time that such a matter has been taken to court and, fourthly, the main accused are, among others, heads of two prime intelligence agencies.
There are basically two important aspects of the matter. First issue relates to the supply of weapons to a dissident element of a neighbouring country. Secondly, the handling of the matter post discovery of the consignment. The latter would need to be gone into in more depth, given that the matter straddled three regimes and several reinvestigations.
The issue of supply of weapons clandestinely must certainly prompt several questions. First, whether it was being done in pursuit of the policy of the government of the day. Secondly, whether the intelligence agencies were working to implement government policy. Thirdly, whether it was being done skirting the highest decision making echelon and without executive authority.  
We have dealt with the first and second points in last week's column. As for the third, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the intelligence agencies were indulging in clandestine support of fissiparous forces of a neighbouring country unbeknownst to the political authority, at least in Bangladesh. But such a situation is not unique. Look at the Iran-Contra Affair. Some senior US government officials secretly facilitated the sale of arms to Iran which was under arms embargo. They had also hoped that the arms sales would secure the release of several US hostages (in Lebanon) and allow U.S. intelligence agencies to fund the Nicaraguan Contras to fight against Nicaragua's Sandinista government. When the story broke, President Reagan was quick to assert that the arms-for-cash deal was done without the knowledge of the executive authority. And those who were involved in it went beyond their remit. Of the 13 that were indicted subsequently were the US Secretary of State, Head of the CIA, National Security Adviser, and the Assistant Secretary of State.
The Chittagong arms haul is not only the issue of ten truckloads of arms that were accidentally hauled up on April 1, 2004, nor is the sentencing to death the people involved in the clandestine shipment of weapons to an insurgent group of a neighbouring country. It involves a larger question, which we the common people are not privy to but exposed to the likely negative consequences of that policy. And that is who formulates these policies and what advice do the intelligence agencies provide regarding the possible consequence of such policies? The arms haul is a painful example of the absence of a defined mechanism for formulating national security polices. And one can suggest too that this was extremely ill-advised.
One of the lessons that we should draw from this is that policies, both security and foreign, must not stem from personal predilections or knee jerk reactions. Those policies must be formulated by committees and owned up by the government if they happen to stumble or go wrong.
Another lesson is that the intelligence agencies must remain obligated to the state and not to the party that runs the government of the day, and should therefore proffer accurate and objective analysis of various issues. And they must be prepared to face the music should things go wrong because carrying out orders of higher authorities cannot be a mitigating factor in their defence, although the government of the day should have a lot to answer for.

The writer is Editor, Op-Ed and Defense & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.