Although India, South Asia's core constituent had once been the 'Jewel of British Crown' the later day South Asia with its all other constituents remained more of the world's back water and gradually slided into irrelevance for expansionist western powers. Even after the cold war spilled into the region with Pakistan falling into the embrace of Uncle Sam during the fifties and its roller coaster relation with the latter had its ups and downs the region being poor and backward continued to be ignored. The non-alignment being cornerstone of her global policy India stubbornly attempted not to be identified with any power blocs. Later in a major turn-around India with its staunchly rightwing BJP government at the helm courted the US for the first time and seemed to be pitching tent permanently in American camp during the Clinton era.

Yet South Asia did not really figure any prominently in the US' foreign policy calculation until Pakistan's prompt and positive response to the US' post-9/11 'either with or against us' ultimatum and China increasingly emerged as 'other superpower' in an unipolar world. And only then the US couldn't but focus its attention to the region.

In the meantime Pakistan had never been at ease vis-a-vis India with regard to her security and always sought to have a parity of sorts with her arch enemy. And the US somehow charitably treated her in this regard despite stark asymmetry in their overall balance of power. Through its even handed treatment of the both the US always maintained a semblance of parity between the two -- particularly as she bestowed on Pakistan the status of major non-Nato ally and she became the frontline state in the US' war on terror in Afghanistan.

Even in the aftermath of 9/11 the US chose to respond favourably to Pakistan courtship although India was equally prepared to do the bidding for the US. Just why Washington preferred Pakistan's offer to that of India depended on bewilderingly diverse factors -- the most important being Pakistan's strategic utility; whether and to what extent its leaders seemed 'able and willing' to combine Pakistan's national interests with the US' policy imperatives of the day. Pakistan seemed to have fulfilled the requirement. So much so that at the peak of Pakistan's all round compliances Pakistan's military ruler, General Musharraf, was summoned to Camp David -- considered an honour for any third world leader. That too was accompanied by $3.1bn aid package.

On Pakistan's part the country meticulously followed the US anti-terror script not only by ditching Afghanistan's Taliban dispensation it helped creating but also by hunting down fleeing and hiding Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives and handing over terrorist suspects to the Americans as well as allowing the US Marines and FBI agents to walk in and out of Pakistan with impunity.

Despite this and many more concessions made by the Pakistani President, George Bush's approach to South Asia indicates clearly a major shift in the US' policy refracted most sharply by his recent visit to the region. Not only has the US 'policy delinked India and Pakistan as meriting some semblance of parity, India seems to be occupying the centre stage of US' attention and its administration's favour. While Pakistan may well be strategically located it does not translate into any lack of options for the world's sole superpower.

This is as much a reflection of India's pull with world's largest democracy as it is also about attractions of Indian market or about countering the growing weight of China in Asia as well as the global stage. First of all, the Bush administration sees India not only as a functioning democracy, it regards New Delhi as a stable manager of conflict and transition, Delhi's capacity to absorb internal dissent without significant threat to central stability as a key factor attracting the US' state and private investors' confidence. Secondly the scope of new partnership between the US and India is being seen not only at a regional level but as embracing a larger global strategic vision. If there are any doubts about the limits of the military partnership between the two, it has been eliminated by the unusually explicit statement issued by the US defence department hailing the deal as opening a path for more American-Indian military cooperation.

Although some resistance is expected from China against the blatantly anti-Chinese move it is also probable to expect Britain, France, Germany and even possibly Russia in favour because the move would clear the way for them to profitably sell nuclear fuel, reactors and equipment to India.

It was nevertheless clear even before Bush left for South Asia that the fast developing US' strategic partnership with India was deeper in substance and wider in scope than its relationship with Pakistan. The US declaration of March last year regarding its intention to help India become a "major world power in the 21st century", the US-India defence pact of June, 2005 and the US-India nuclear agreement of July 2005 had already laid the foundation for their qualitatively upgraded strategic relationship. Bush's India-visit was the logical culmination of the process set in motion by the two countries earlier and a confirmation of the decision taken by the US to develop special strategic ties with India in pursuance of its global agenda. Nothing stood in the way: neither an unwritten US policy of treating the region's arch rivals with a semblance of parity nor India's time-honoured Nehruvian tradition of shunning alliance politics and maintaining a non-aligned posture.

In the meantime, the left partners of Delhi's UPA government are worried over the developments while the sensible Pakistanis think that they got the right proportion of respect and rewards that they deserved even if Bush's visit to Islamabad was almost non-event as compared with what it was in Delhi. The high profile visitor and his hosts in Delhi displayed a sense of destiny in both regional and global term. Compared to that there was a feeling of betrayal in Islamabad after what services it rendered to Bush's global war on terror.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.