AFD: To have or not to have

Twice in the last four months the Armed Forces Division (AFD) was in the news, primarily because it came in for discussion in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence several times in as many months. The fact that its members chose to discuss the function of the AFD in its last meeting few days ago, belies the criticism that it was something out of their ambit of scrutiny, being directly a part of the Prime Minister's Office. But that is not the point at issue for this piece. Instead, we will dwell on whether or not the AFD merits existence at all in our defence management setup.

The criticism of the AFD was on two counts primarily. Some questioned the very rationale of the AFD under a democratic dispensation, and that too in a parliamentary form of government. The other critique was that, because it was placed under the PM's office it did not come under the scrutiny of any of the Standing Committees of the parliament and thus by implication was not accountable to it, like other elements of the armed forces were. One of the opposition members of the committee opined, without actually expanding on his observation, that there were some flaws in the functioning of the AFD. Yet on another count it is considered a parallel organisation to the ministry of defence with the potential of duplication and therefore wastage of efforts.

In fact in the last several years observers and analysts as well the media have been talking at the same wavelength, calling into question the existence of a supra-ministerial body that merely diluted the function of the ministry of defence, if not side-lined it altogether. Nobody can question the right of the public to bring under scrutiny any institution of the government, and who better to do it than their elected representatives? But the fact that the AFD had existed during the past two democratic regimes without anyone questioning its merit makes one wonder what has gone wrong all of a sudden to compel some of the legislators to call for reviewing the need for the AFD. More so when it had worked in the same vein during the tenure of the past government, whose members are now vocal against it?

If the AFD is considered a legacy of the martial law regimes it seems to have survived well in the democratic times without anybody taking any notice of it until only recently. It may be worth mentioning that in fact it has survived 14 years of democracy as against 13 years of military rule. Not only that, the revised organogram of the AFD was approved in 1998 by a government whose party members are now questioning its very rationale.

There is perhaps a view amongst some that it is better done away with, or that its terms of reference be reduced to make it merely an intermediate headquarters between the services and the ministry of defence. In fact one member of the standing committee did indeed suggest doing away with it altogether. One of the apprehensions is the possibility of friction should the defence minister be anyone else other than the PM. This may not be altogether unfounded.

Any organisational setup must be dynamic, amenable to changes in keeping with the need of the time, all the more so a defence organisation. The organisational setup must relate to the function that it is supposed to perform and must conform to the changing nature of the requirements. It is a good organisation that has inbuilt mechanism for adapting to developments not foreseen at the time of its establishment. And the next best thing is to constantly review and assess its setup and incorporate necessary changes if required. To that extent one cannot question the need for reviewing the existing organisation of the AFD. But one must be very sure of the rationale for doing away with it altogether, without suggesting a viable alternative.

It is therefore pertinent to go into the background of the AFD to put the matter in perspective. The AFD mutated over the last 27 years from the initial C-in-C's Secretariat to Supreme Commander's Headquarter to the present Armed Forces Division. The primary compulsion of setting up the C-in-C's Secretariat was operational, which was, to evolve such an arrangement that would cater for tri-service training and operational command and control that was totally absent at that time. It is very important to keep in mind that for a cash strapped country, where military expenditure is considered 'wasteful' by some, the more 'jointly' one can ensure the more will it be cost effective in both operational and logistic terms. A typical example of joint effort is the Defence Services Command & Staff College where tri-service training is conducted under one roof. The gut feeling is that given half a chance, each of the three services would have opted for their own staff college. The present arrangement has economised on the resources of the armed forces. The same philosophy applies to actual operations where the doctrinal emphasis is predominantly on joint operations.

The appellation C-in-C's Secretariat went well with the CMLA, he was also the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. The purpose was not only to coordinate the peacetime activities of the three services, the C-in-C's Secretariat was also responsible for tri-service operation and formulating a joint service operation plan. In fact it was intended to act as a joint service headquarters, and the purpose remains the same today. After the martial law the president as the supreme commander had the C-in-C's Secretariat renamed as the Supreme Commander's HQ, primarily as an expedient to retain his control over the armed forces. It eventually became a division in 1988 with enhanced tasks and increased responsibility. In 1991 it became the AFD under the PM's secretariat. Interestingly, since the formation of this virtual tri-service headquarters, it has remained directly under the chief executive.

To say that no such arrangements exist in other countries would be like comparing apples and lemons. Indeed Bangladesh is an exception, to quote the present Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, where the AFD is performing the tasks of the ministry. In fact the responsibility of higher defense planning now rests with the AFD. But then there are several things in Bangladesh that are unique to it, not found anywhere in the world, for example the 'Caretaker' system.

Of course there can be other arrangements than what we have today in managing our military affairs. One could argue whether or not a joint services headquarters under the ministry of defence would serve the purpose better. It would, perhaps. But what we must see is whether the existing arrangement is serving the purpose for what it was set up. The general feeling is that it has proved to be an efficient arrangement, with no unnecessary bureaucratic delays caused by insensitivity and in some cases, ignorance. The fear of duplication is perhaps unfounded too. The division of work is very clearly laid out that brooks no duplication at all. However, none should be beyond scrutiny and accountability or political control. It is for the government to determine how that is to be effected.

There is indeed a need for a structured joint services headquarters which must not only be a forum for strategic military planning, the Services HQ must be an integral part of it and provide necessary input for the ministry of defence and the cabinet for formulation of the defence policy. The AFD is fulfilling this role, but only to a limited extent. Contrary to claims its present manpower does not appear adequate to even fulfil its current charter of duties.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.