BDR incident -- an acid test for the government

WHILE one goes about assessing the government's performance in its one hundred days in office, no single issue with the potential of having grave impact on the country's integrity than the sad and despicable events of February 25 and 26 catches one's imagination more.
No government could have expected to be confronted with a situation like the BDR killings so very soon after it assumed the reins of the government, and nobody could have wished for a worst denouement, it ended with the death of sixty eight people, including fifty eight army officers seconded to the paramilitary force.
The jury, one feels, is still out on whether the outcome would have been less costly, in terms of lives, or more, had more aggressive action been resorted to. But there are certainly grounds for conjecture, and many feel that saying we got off "lightly" (with sixty eight lives) is a very cynical position to take and does no credit at all to those that are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the safety and security of the people under their command. There are also those who consider the government action a credit to its cool headedness and the triumph of peaceful approach to a crisis.
However, even while giving the benefit of doubt to the government that what it did was the only option available under the circumstances, there are a few things that one feels should be highlighted so that lessons may be drawn and lapses corrected so that actions and reactions are done more skillfully in crises situations in future than what we have seen in the case of the Pilkhana tragedy.
The government's role, insofar as the negotiation phase is concerned, has created some reservations in the minds of the people that could have been avoided. Even if the strategy was to solve the issue peacefully, nay politically, what we have found in this case is that politicians are not necessarily the ones best suited for the role of negotiators, although they may form part of the team.
There are also grounds to assume that those given the responsibility to negotiate, neither knew, nor had the benefit of expert advice, as to how to go about dealing with a group of wanton killers who had used the so called grievances of the BDR jawans only to perpetrate a most heinous crime.
The very rudimentary principle of negotiation was disregarded. No one in his correct senses would have allowed the last resort to a final decision to be the first for the killers to meet. It was most unwise to acceded to the rebels' demand of meeting the prime minister in the very first instant. What if the talks between the PM and the killers had failed? Would the authorities have gone to any supranational body for mediation in that case?
It must be kept in mind too that utterances and statements of people holding public office need to be made after careful consideration. To refer to the killers as "my children," as was done by the home minister at a time when most people knew that these "children" had perpetrated the worst carnage since 1971, not only lacked in sophistication it was also utterly incongruous under the circumstances.
There is concern too about the investigation. Giving the inquiry committee seven days initially, to complete the task, gives one the impression that that the government had very little idea as to what was involved in the process of investigation of an incident like that of February 25. And every seven days time was extended by seven till it dawned on the authorities to make a "bold correction" and gave it an extra month to finish -- which is a very realistic step.
The country is waiting eagerly to hear the findings of the committee. Given that our experience with such committees in the past has not been pleasant because people did not get to know the findings of these committees, the BDR incident is too important for the people to be kept in the dark about its major conclusions.
It is good that the process of reorganising of the BDR is underway. Officers down to the lowest possible tactical level must man the border force. All the talk about having only persons organic to the force to command it is only to avoid the strict oversight exercised by the army officers, which for reasons everyone is aware of, the BDR jawans on the ground resent.
There is need to address the genuine grievances of the BDR troops, as also the need for the authorities responsible for tasking it to avoid using it in any and every manner and situation that it feels. The BDR is supposed to man the borders; it has no business selling rice and daal in the cities and towns, nor controlling traffic in the metropolis.

Brig. Gen. (retd.) Shahedul Anam Khan ndc. psc. is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.