A policy toward India, please

It is high time, after 56 years, that Pakistanis defined their permanent purposes and interests vis-à-vis India. Pakistan's relations with India have so far been driven by an adversarial attitude and the vicissitudes of the Kashmir dispute. Following Kargil operations and 2002 grand confrontation, Islamabad has been desperate about the resumption of dialogue with New Delhi. This has been a second U turn in policy; hitherto, the Kashmir policy was premised on Jihad in the disputed areas forcing India into an acceptable settlement. This has been given up. Politically, it is a big price paid by a military-sponsored regime for resumption of dialogue.

Many questions arise. If only the great strategists in Islamabad could read the situation aright, they should have found it logical to turnaround the Kashmir policy as soon as they were forced into changing their policy of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan. It was necessary to re-assess the nature of US' relations with India -- and Pakistan -- by trying to understand the larger American strategic needs in Asia. Was there any understanding of the changes and commonalties in the American strategy between the Bush and Clinton governments before the famous "either with us or against us" telephone call? It is doubtful. Far too many Pakistanis simply thought that a Republican Administration was pro-Pakistan and a Democratic one was pro-India. There is however much more to American foreign policy than such simplistic notions.

The US strategy now seeks to make India a strategic partner, the way Japan and Britain are. With Pakistan, the US relationship is cynical flirtation or worse; it is all too temporary, if only Islamabad can see clearly. Pakistan's India policy has been flawed: that there is no military solution to the Kashmir imbroglio is a conclusion that was arrived at after 1965 and 1971 wars, though for a time only. As soon as Pakistan acquired the atomic know-how, circa 1984 to 1986, it went on to convert a peaceful and secular protest movement of Kashmiris in the Valley into an Islamic Jihad. The year 2002 crisis showed that Pakistan's nuclear deterrent was not enough to ensure either the success of the Jihad or Pakistan's own security. Circumstances, including the US pressure, have effectively recreated the situation as it obtained between 1971 and 1984. Indeed it is now plain that Islamabad's failure to make true peace with India on the basis of Shimla Accord was a mistake.

It is right and proper that Musharraf regime has seen the need to go back to the Agreements made successively at Shimla, Lahore and the abortive one at Agra and to build on them. That is the only logical course. In terms of old mindsets, Musharraf has already paid a heavy price by conceding on three major issues: First, Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used against either India or Afghanistan; if fully implemented, it will put paid to Kashmir's Jihad insofar as it was Pakistan-sponsored; Taliban's campaign against Afghanistan will be greatly handicapped and reduced.

The second major concession is agreeing to SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Agreement). If it is implemented fully and in its true spirit, it will set off a great expansion of trade in the region, especially if the SAARC goes ahead and makes SAPTA (the proposed South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement) also legally binding and fully operative. That will deepen the economic relationships throughout the region and lay the foundations of closer cooperation among member states and lead to growing political harmonization of the region.

The third major concession is starting to favour the people-to-people contacts and, more unusual and difficult for old mindsets in Islamabad, cultural exchanges with India. It is possible to miss the significance of this decision. Wide-scale people-to-people contacts, i.e. freer travel for common people, and growing cultural cooperation provide the basis of stable peace from a long range viewpoint. Closer and more frequent contacts create friendships and common bonds. If Pakistan were to stay the course and determinedly pursue this objective, the Indians too will be forced to follow suit, though there is a fear that adoption of this old Indian plank by Islamabad may frighten the Indian Right to start disfavouring this idea. But it will not be easy for them.

People talk of a paradigm shift. True, it is a shift away from the old paradigm. What new paradigm has been adopted cannot be answered categorically. It is possible, may be even likely, that this or future governments may not be able to pursue the new paradigm wholeheartedly, the outlines of which are not too difficult to see. But it would be proper if we try and visualise some of the more important features of the new paradigm. Once the old paradigm about Kashmir and the consequent adversarial relations with India has been given up, as has actually happened, it is necessary to replace it with something that is logically coherent and can be expected to meet the emerging situation of India's rise as a big military power in the region.

Pakistanis have to adjust to the US-India strategic partnership. That is to say, Pakistan should not needlessly moan and cry over spilt milk. Nor should it become despondent or less concerned with its freedoms. Pakistanis are, and should remain, dignified human beings, uncowed by others. The purpose of this paradigm shift should not solely be on the basis of weakness, some of which has been obvious because of the mistaken policies of the past. The objective now has to be friendship, friendly cooperation and cultural relations on a wide-scale with India. No one need suppose that the Indians will also want all these things. Their Rightwing can become frightened at some stage. But Pakistan has now no option but to pursue its determination, despite small-minded Hindu communalists.

Kashmir is however not to be forgotten. Far too many people in Pakistan are deeply concerned with the issue. A practical solution of the problem must be sought -- but through peaceful and negotiated means. It involves evoking a lot of positive responses from the Indians. Pakistan can no longer bring to bear the threat of its armed forces. If so, India's responsiveness can only be a function of the strength of friendship that Pakistan can forge, despite many Indians dragging their feet.

Pakistanis have to think hard of how to make India more flexible and make it ready to make some concessions on Kashmir. It will mean, in realpolitik terms, Pakistanis have to offer over time some kind of a deal that will make India relent and relax. A very good beginning has already been made by the three major initiatives that Islamabad has initiated. All that is necessary to be said is: stay the course and pursue the objective, despite even possible lack of responsiveness from other side for a time. After all the adversarial relations with India were a two-way street. There are strong vested interests in India also that prosper on bad relations with Pakistan. It should be in the minds of policy-makers in Pakistan that this Indian resistance has to be overcome by totally non-military means and with the help of friendly Indians. Insofar as military means are concerned, other than a direct threat to the country's physical security, they should have no place in inter-state relations in South Asia.

The purpose of free trade and economic cooperation in South Asia can only be to sustain higher rates of economic growth in all SAARC member states. A single market and closer internal cooperation can make for rapid economic development of all. The pathway to progress lies through regional integration and the region's integration with Asia's and Europe's other regions through better communications to sustain large-scale intercontinental trade. Pakistan being at the tri-junction of West, South and Central Asian regions, can benefit greatly from overland trade -- in addition to the benefits it shall have of much improved transportation facilities.

What it boils down to is to show India the benefits of friendship with Pakistan. One benefit would be common: economic advancement and more wealth creation, if SAFTA, SAPTA and other following steps of economic cooperation are taken and more wealth is created. There will be all round enrichment and India's share will not be less than those of other member states; in fact it will be more. But since all will benefit, that does not matter.

The second major benefit that can accrue to all is cultural enrichment through cultural exchanges and free movement of the people. These should be the major objectives for Pakistan's policy-making in future. In this connection, the importance of free travel, preferably visa free throughout the region, at some stage in future, will be necessary. It will intensify economic cooperation among the member states of SAARC as well as cement the bonds of friendship between Pakistan and India, without ignoring the Bangladesh and other people. Both cultural enrichment and economic progress would be needed for stable peace and for enhancement of regional security.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.