The sale of Awami League nomination forms for the upcoming national election dropped by nearly 17 percent compared to the last national election.

The ruling party sold a total of 3,362 nomination forms for Tk 16.81 crore, AL Office Secretary Biplab Barua told reporters after concluding the sale today.

A total of 4,037 AL aspirants collected party nomination forms for the 11th parliamentary election held on December 30, 2018.

So far, we have written a lot about the general election and how the ruling party and the present government have miserably failed (in fact, they never really tried) to create an appropriate atmosphere for a free and fair election. We have also written highly critical pieces regarding the way in which they have treated the main opposition, BNP, with hundreds sentenced, thousands arrested, and many thousands more on the run to stay out of the police's clutches. Our legal system stands weaponised to punish the dissenters, with the police having been given full immunity to misuse their powers to punish, harass and intimidate political opponents, terrorising them beyond belief.

But what about the other side? Did BNP play its part in living up to the wishes of its workers, leave alone the wishes of the people who are dissatisfied with the government and disillusioned with the Awami League? Was BNP's decision to boycott the election taken in any consultative manner, or was it simply imposed on the party workers?

Read more

Column by Mahfuz Anam: Is Awami League heading towards a Pyrrhic victory?

Given the tradition of anti-incumbency among our voters, the unending stories of misuse of power, corruption, and the nepotism in AL, it is not unreasonable to think that people may have wanted a change. Did BNP build on that? Our own reporters' briefings, the studies that remain unpublished for fear of reprisal, and the rumoured intelligence reports all suggest that support for the opposition was considerable, if not overwhelming. What did BNP do with that support?

Immediately after the 2018 election, BNP declared that it would not participate in any future election under the AL regime, and demanded a caretaker government. Its division-level mobilisation late last year resulted in massive rallies despite severe obstacles, such as transport strikes and various impediments imposed by the government. It gave the BNP and its sympathisers the impression that the party's campaign was bearing fruit.

This election boycott would be the BNP's second one. There are no instances in our region—perhaps none in other democracies either—of a political party surviving after boycotting two elections over a span of one decade. Could this situation present an existential problem for the BNP?

However, perhaps missing in its calculation was how overwhelming the governmental response would be, and when it came, how BNP would tackle it. Alarmed by the public support for BNP, the ruling party unleashed all sorts of undemocratic and extralegal measures to curb the opposition. The actions post-October 28—most oppressive, by any standard—severely affected the BNP's capacity to continue its programmes. The arrest of the party's secretary general, followed by arrests of many top BNP leaders (and with the rest being kept on the run), literally incapacitated this massive party.

To put it simply: BNP launched a movement to oust AL from power—demanding a caretaker government amounts to that—without adequate preparation, and this is now becoming more and more evident. The BNP failed to reap anything effective from the huge public support that it was able to garner late last year.

BNP also made the fatal mistake of not having a Plan B. Demanding Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's removal from power was bound to trigger retaliation. There seems to have been no clear thinking on how to survive that. If the purpose was to loosen the incumbents' hold on the election mechanism, there could have been proposals for power-sharing during elections, or select portfolios being given to the opposition or neutral people under some constitutional arrangement agreed to by both sides. Since the role of police is the key during elections, there could have been special proposals for reducing the ruling party's hold on them. Alternative views would have shown voters that BNP was flexible and open to negotiations. Shutting down all prospects of this was another vital mistake on the BNP's part. This is where the "external pressure" that the BNP was counting on felt completely let down. In all the talks that the BNP had with ambassadors, none supported the idea of an election under a caretaker government, while all insisted on the need for a free and fair election, for Bangladesh's own democratic future. BNP did not absorb this message.

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Placing dummies as alternatives disenfranchises voters

It can be argued that AL never really wanted BNP in the poll contest in the first place, and that BNP never realised that its boycott was actually serving the AL's goal of keeping it out of the political process as a whole.

It appears that the biggest opposition party never really conducted any in-depth analysis as to whether a boycott would really serve its long-term interests. One wonders what lessons the BNP learnt from its boycott of the 2014 election, if any. Among many other issues, it can be argued that, had the BNP not boycotted the 2014 election, Khaleda Zia would not have lost her position as the leader of the opposition and perhaps would not have faced persecution and incarceration. Even if that had happened, Begum Khaleda Zia would have been far better placed to fight those cases as the leader of the opposition than as just a political leader. Her eclipse from having an active role in leading the party has had a devastating impact on the BNP. Could this have happened if the party hadn't boycotted the election in 2014? Did it take any of this into account?

This election boycott would be the BNP's second one. There are no instances in our region—perhaps none in other democracies either—of a political party surviving after boycotting two elections over a span of one decade. Could this situation present an existential problem for the BNP?

BNP's approach appears to be that, unless assured of victory, the party deems it of no use to participate in the election—a fatal mistake, in our view. The advantage of being a powerful opposition never seems to have appealed to BNP. It did not consider that the parliament would provide a powerful forum through which to propagate its own policies and visions for the future, and thereby create an image of it as a viable alternative.

The truth is, however sad and damaging it may have been for the growth of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, neither of our two big parties ever took the role of being the opposition seriously. Both AL and BNP always wanted power, and never the role of a responsible critic to keep the government in check.

As said earlier, anti-incumbency, a government's failures, widespread corruption, and arrogance have all contributed to a feeling for a need for change, which the BNP failed to build on. It might not have gotten the majority votes to form the next government, but it definitely could have formed a powerful opposition, giving it an effective stage to strive for power in 2029. But such a strategy does not appear to have interested BNP at all. It was an "all or nothing" gambit that led BNP to opt for boycotting the election, for which the country and democracy will have to pay a high price.

Read more

Column by Mahfuz Anam: Towards a 'free and fair' election, indeed

If BNP had decided to participate in the election, there would have been 300 BNP (or, in partnership with others) nominees in every nook and corner of the country campaigning for themselves and exposing AL's corruption, power abuse, and misdeeds. The campaign itself would have held the ruling party to some account and significantly strengthened BNP's hold on the public mind. If nothing else, BNP's campaign itself would have had some sobering effect on the ruling party. Its participation would have encouraged foreign observers to take notice, which definitely would have helped to make our election better.

Today, BNP supporters are nothing more than mere onlookers as village after village prepares for the polls, now buoyed by the participation of AL's "rebel" candidates.

Today, all BNP can do is call hartals that nobody follows, enforce blockades which are nowhere to be seen, and declare mass protests that are practically non-existent. All that the opposition on the streets are able to do is create disruptions, which further raise questions about its success.

What a pitiable state to be in for our second-largest political party.

Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star.

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BNP will form a judicial commission to reform the judiciary, the party promised in the election manifesto unveiled today. 

It will place the control of the lower judiciary on the Supreme Court instead of the president through amendment of the constitution.

It will put in place a institutional system to appoint efficient judges to remove the current case backlog, the party said in its manifesto.

The necessity that was felt a few days after the Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh was that of a Government which could take upon itself the burden of directing the liberation struggle. Because of the sudden attack and the resultant disorganisation, the Awami League leaders could not get together and work out the formation of such a government. Obviously, as the Awami League had received the mandate from the people, it was the party that could form the government. The necessity of the formation of the government was felt by everybody. The readers are aware that in its first broadcast over Swadhin Bangla Beter Kendra, Major Zia announced himself to be the President of the Revolutionary Government. Later on, he modified his announcement and declared that he was leading the armed struggle in the name and on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Mr. Zia's announcement only asserted the necessity of the formation of a government, but he and his colleagues did not obviously constitute the government.

I always had this belief that such a liberation struggle could not proceed in an organised manner if a top body like a government at the top did not guide the movement in a proper way. This is why I became extremely happy to know that a civilian government had been formed for Bangladesh.

We were sitting at Kishoreganj, like many others eagerly awaiting the formation of a government by the Awami League. Awami League leaders at Kishoreganj were quite vocal about it, and some of them even grew impatient over the issue. All of us were anxious since the movement could not be guided if political forces did not take the lead for proper organisation and confrontation. The directives could only come from the elected representatives. Moreover, the formation of a national government could enhance the prestige of the struggle and raise altogether different hopes in the minds of the people. The foreign powers could then be persuaded better. We felt all these and eagerly waited for the formation of the government.

When Major Safiullah reached Mymensingh and Kishoreganj, he also agreed with us that a government should immediately be formed. There was, at that time, a frantic search for some elderly politicians of the Awami League. Since nobody was sure about the fate of Sheikh, it became obvious that the only man who would be more suitable for the formation of a government was Syed Nazrul Islam, Vice President of the Awami League and the man next in command to the Sheikh. Syed Nazrul Islam happened to be from Kishoreganj P.S. itself and this is why Major Safiullah and all others put pressure on me to locate him so that he could take the initiative for forming a government. I must praise him for the foresight of Major Safiullah and others who rightly foresaw that the job of the armed personnel was simply to fight according to given directions. The directions could only come from a civilian government consisting of the elected representatives of the people.

Cover of the author’s book ‘The Turbulent 1971: My Diary’. It was published by Agamee Prakashani in 2020.

Throughout the beginning of the liberation struggle, one of my aims has thus been the location of Syed Nazrul Islam. The scanty news we used to get from Dhaka implied that Syed Nazrul Islam had fled from Dhaka. But nobody could give details about where he could be. On many occasions, Major Safiullah and Major Nazrul Islam used to inquire about it from Brahmanbaria over wireless. When a few days had passed they became very anxious and repeatedly requested me to locate Mr. Nazrul Islam.

Since Mr. Nazrul Islam's hometown was Kishoreganj, I was confident that he would have to come this way, even in hiding. This is what actually happened. It was possibly on the 6th or 7th of April that Mr. Mustafizur Rahman Khan had secretly approached me and told that Mr. Nazrul Islam was in hiding at the village home of his wife. Mr. Khan came to me with the request for transport and sufficient [sic] to cover Nazrul Islam's journey from Kishoreganj to Durgapur. Mr. Khan told me that Mr. Nazrul Islam was aware that all of us were in the freedom movement, he hesitated to come out in public because that could have many implications. From that day on, I knew the whereabouts and movements of Syed Nazrul Islam but I kept my promises in keeping this as top secret. The only information I gave was to Major Safiullah telling him that I had knowledge Mr. Nazrul Islam had proceeded towards the free zone. I told Major Safiullah that things were gradually broadening up and the formation of a national government was eminent.

Khashruzzaman Choudhury, 1967.

How Mr. Syed Nazrul Islam fled from Dhaka was an interesting story. While proceeding from Kishoreganj towards Durgapur, he was located 10 miles outside the town by my S.I., another Mr. Nazrul Islam. The S.I. was coming back after a survey of the area in the evening. From a distance, he could see that another jeep was coming from the opposite direction. As soon as Mr. Nazrul Islam's jeep saw the other jeep, its travel stopped and Mr. Nazrul Islam tried to hide to avoid identification. S. I. Nazrul disclosed the story to me on his return to Kishoreganj. He told me that soon he could understand that it was possibly Mr. Nazrul Islam who was in the other jeep. So, he cried out, giving his identity and requested them to come out from hiding. After repeated assurance, all of the passengers of the other jeep came out and Syed Nazrul Islam soon left towards Netrokona and Durgapur. He sent a message through S. I. Nazrul to me, thanking me for the cooperation I had extended to him. When I heard the story from Nazrul, I requested him to keep it as a secret and not to disclose it to anyone.

When Mr. Nazrul Islam could reach the free zone, the government was formed. It was possibly on the 10th of April that the All India Radio gave the news of the formation of a civilian government, announcing the names of the Ministers. I was sitting at the local police station when the Awami League Leaders rushed to that place with sweets even in those circumstances of trials and tribulations. All of us were really happy that after all, a government had been formed. I always had this belief that such a liberation struggle could not proceed in an organised manner if a top body like a government at the top did not guide the movement in a proper way. This is why I became extremely happy to know that a civilian government had been formed for Bangladesh.

The identity card of Khashruzzaman Choudhury, Deputy Secretary at the Home Ministry of the Mujibnagar Government, 1971.

The announcement of a government on the 10th of April was after consultation among different leaders of the Awami League. Later on, I came to know the whole story about the background of the government. Mr. Mustafizur Rahman Siddiqui and Zahur Ahmad Choudhury both from Chittagong Awami League escaped to Agartala. At Agartala, they used to sit in meetings discussing the formation of the government. It was after the arrival of Mr. Tajuddin that the talks were finalized and a tentative government was fixed up. Mr. Nazrul Islam's arrival was later, and even though he was absent, he was tipped as Vice President and Acting President in the absence of Sheikh Mujib.

Incidentally, it would be of interest to know that the parleys in this connection used to be held in the residence of one Mr. K. P. Datta, a Deputy Director of Education in the Tripura Government. I later met Mr. K. P. Datta at Agartala. Mr. K. P. Datta was originally from Sylhet District of Bangladesh. During my stay at Agartala, I had come in close contact with him. Mr. Datta used to narrate how all these began and how the ultimate decision of the formation of the government was taken up. Since I myself was from Sylhet, Mr. Datta and I could communicate in our native dialogue, and possibly because of this, we were very close to each other. Mr. Datta is an intelligent man whose wife is also in the education line. I had seldom come across such a nice man during that period. Mr. Datta used to tell me the story about the government. He told me that in his house there used to be sessions which used to last longer than midnight. It was after a lot of discussions, the final decision for the formation of the government was taken up.

Though the announcement of the government was on the 10th of April, it was on the 17th of April that the actual government was placed to the journalists, both foreign and Indian. Few people know that the 16th of April was fixed for the ceremony of swearing in of the government at Chuadanga. This could not be done because of heavy bombing from Pakistani planes and attacks on the towns by the Pakistan army. It is in this context that Baidyanathtala was selected for the ceremony on the 17th of April. I came to know about all of this from my friend Tawfiq-e-Elahi Chaudhury who was then SDO of Kushtia District, within the jurisdiction of which this Baidyanathtala was situated. The place was only a few miles from the Indian border. The journalists were taken there without any notice. The ceremony was simple but impressive. The Ministers were sworn in on the 17th of April, and the actual government started from that day.

Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam addressing attendees at the oath-taking ceremony of the Mujibnagar Government on April 17, 1971.

Captain Murari Ram of BSF told me a story about Syed Nazrul Islam. He told me that his friend Baljit Singh, another adjutant of BSF, one day received information that Syed Nazrul Islam was coming. None of them had seen Syed Nazrul Islam, but they had heard lots about him. They knew that he was an elderly man. Ultimately, the man who landed at Haluaghat was a young man who introduced himself as Nazrul Islam. Baljit Singh was the first, not in confusion, had told everybody Syed Nazrul Islam had come. When other officers of BSF went to meet him, after some time, they would find out that this was not Syed Nazrul Islam, but Professor Nazrul Islam Choudhury, an elected representative from Mymensingh District. The confusion was soon cleared. Captain Murari joked with me that when Syed Nazrul Islam actually arrived this time, Baljit Singh took precaution and started asking him a number of questions. This time the gentleman was none other than Syed Nazrul Islam himself, and possibly he became very confused at such a reaction from the BSF. When Baljit Singh became satisfied after a long time, he sent the message up to his senior officers that Syed Nazrul Islam had come. Captain Murari Ram jokingly told me that Baljit Singh had not first believed, even this time. There were queries from above about how this gentleman looked like and poor Baljit Singh had to talk to so many people, attempting to convince them that this time he had made no mistake and that the gentleman was really Syed Nazrul Islam. When all went to meet Syed Nazrul Islam, they found that he was really Syed Nazrul Islam, and quick arrangements were made for his movement from the border areas to another place where he could meet his other colleagues.

The S.P. Garo Hills, whom we met after coming over to Tura, was from Bihar. We had an interesting story to tell about Maulana Bhasani. As everybody knows, Maulana Bhasani had been hospitalized for bad health. On the 25th of March, Maulana Bhasani was at Mymensingh Medical College itself. Maulana was a clever man and he had his own source of information. This was evident when on the 26th the hospital staff and the doctors found that Maulana had disappeared from the hospital. When Maulana Bhasani entered India through Haluaghat, he was received at the border by the D.C. of Garo Hills, a Khasi gentleman named Mr. Cajee and S. P. Mr. Jha. The Maulana was driven away to Tura. Mr. Jha told me that when Maulana Bhasani sat with them at Tura, he started speaking a lot about massacres. He was all the time speaking against the Biharis who had committed a lot of crimes in Bangladesh. As Mr. Jha himself was from Bihar, he could not possibly join in the discussion in the same manner. When Bhasani saw that Mr. Jha did not sound as enthusiastic, he wondered what might have happened to Mr. Cajee. D.C. had been smiling all through. The Maulana was at his wit's end when Mr. Cajee told him that Bhasani was describing things to a person who was himself a Bihari. Mr. Jha told me later that as long as Maulana Bhasani stayed at Tura, he used to refer to this incident and cut jokes with Mr. Jha telling him that he was a Bihari and thus at the side of the Pakistani.

This article is an excerpt from the author's book "The Turbulent 1971: My Diary" (2020).

Dr. Khashruzzaman Choudhury joined the Liberation War while serving as a Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO). He involved himself with the Mujibnagar Government as Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs. Later, he served as a Professor of Economics in the USA. Khashruzzaman Choudhury was honored with the highest civilian award, the 'Swadhinata Padak,' in 2014 for his contribution to the Liberation War.

BNP today placed promises for the ICT and outsourcing sector of the country in its election manifesto announced today.

Here are some of the significant promises from the party:

• All kinds of "illogical bars" for bringing foreign currency earned through information technology-enabled services (ITES) will be removed.
• Low cost Global Payment Gateway facilities will be provided to those involved with freelancing and outsourcing.
• Nationwide Telecommunication Transmission Network (NTTN), Internet Service Provider (ISP) and International Internet Gateway (IIG) markets will be made open.
• Augmented reality, animation, robotics sectors to be boosted with investment.
• VOIP systems will be made open for all.
• Zero tariff on ICT equipments.
• The metropolitan areas, municipalities and other administrative centres will be gradually turned into smart villages, smart cities and smart municipalities.

BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir today unveiled the election manifesto of the party ahead of the 11th national elections slated to be held on December 30.