Challenges to the recognition of Bangladesh genocide
While there is a considerable number of international treaties and national legislations to prosecute international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and others, there is no international law or framework on the issue of genocide recognition. Generally, recognition of a genocide depends on the state's geopolitical position vis-à-vis a moral obligation to identify, prevent, and punish the crime. In other words, morality has no space in what we now know as international law—or rather, the European construct of international law. The realist school of international law/relations might argue that diplomatic efforts are imperative to secure the global recognition of any genocide. Perhaps this is the case if we look at how the Rohingya genocide and the genocide in the occupied Palestinian territory have attracted global attention, and because of which cases are now pending in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Half a century on, the Bangladesh genocide is yet to receive as much global notice as similar events have received in recent past.
Multiple political factors are involved with the question of genocide recognition. Among others, the relationship of convenience between the perpetrator state(s) and the geo-strategically powerful states influence the recognition aspect. On a larger canvas, the polarisation on ideological fronts among the UN Security Council (UNSC) members, especially the five permanent members, and their associations with perpetrator state(s) are also key to understanding when, why, and how a genocide is or is not to be recognised. The relationship of convenience is oft moulded by pecuniary concentrations that the concerned states care to keep intact among themselves against their rivals. One could simply recall the US and China's joint stance on the matter of genocide/Liberation War of Bangladesh vis-à-vis that of India and the Soviet Union. The same US is now against China, calling for an international inquiry of the Uyghur persecution, while India and China have been hugely investing in Rakhine's developmental projects following the Rohingya genocide. For states, moral standing is a luxury and is shaped by economic interests, and this is how politics of convenience reigns with regard to the recognition or non-recognition of a genocide.
It is now well-documented that the 1971 genocide was cautiously disregarded by a few superpowers at the time. In the memoir View From the UN (1978), former UN Secretary-General U Thant compellingly delineated that the genocide in Bangladesh and the corresponding humanitarian crisis were politically ignored, owing partly to the war-time ideological differences between the US and Soviet Union and their allies, and partly due to fearing the way Bangladesh was about to emerge as a new state, almost defying one of the European cornerstones of international law—i.e. (Pakistan's so-called) "territorial integrity." Reading "Chapter 20: The Birth of Bangla Desh" of the memoir, what we now could decipher is that: (a) greater importance was given in the UNSC to characterise Bangladesh's Liberation War as an India-Pakistan war/crisis, rather than that Pakistan was committing a genocide against Bangalees; (b) argument and counterargument were made to determine if India and Pakistan had infringed each other's national sovereignty/territorial integrity by engaging in an armed conflict; and (c) all diplomatic energy was put in to end the military conflict by concluding a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Apparently, the question of Bangladesh genocide was not given any deliberation by the UNSC, which met twice in 1971 to discuss "the crisis in East Pakistan" (first on December 3-6, and later December 12-16). Since then, the situation has not changed so much as Pakistan, the US, and other powerful countries are still hesitant to recognise the 1971 genocide. It is nothing but denial, and every denial produces newer impunities.
However, since the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh's liberation, several international non-governmental organisations, namely Lemkin Institute, Genocide Watch, International Coalition of Sites of Conscience (ICSC), and International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), have recognised the Bangladesh genocide. Founded in 1994, the IAGS is an important global institute that extensively promotes "research and teaching about the nature, causes, and consequences of genocide, and advance policy studies on genocide prevention." Its 2023 resolution on Bangladesh's genocide is useful to comprehend the global amnesia about 1971. Proposed by Tawheed Reza Noor (Binghamton University), the resolution received support from Mofidul Hoque (Liberation War Museum), Gregory Stanton (Genocide Watch), Helen Jarvis (Permanent Peoples' Tribunal), Irene Massimino (Lemkin Institute), Elisa Forgey (Lemkin Institute), Shahriar Islam (Binghamton University), and this author.
The 1971 genocide is still not widely recognised by major powers and global institutions, including the UN in general and the government of Pakistan in particular. As I have written elsewhere, this has been the case for so many reasons—one of which is definitely the unfortunate absence of "globally accepted" and "critical" scholarship on the genocide itself, both from inside and outside Bangladesh. With a hope that the 1971 genocide will secure due recognition globally, we must strive to produce more and more scholarly work with a clear conviction of truth-seeking, justice, and reconciliation.
As per the IAGS rule, any resolution to recognise genocide needs the IAGS members' votes, and the Bangladesh resolution could not make it in the first attempt in 2022 due to a high bar of the quorum (51 percent of all members' vote) necessary to pass the resolution. Later, however, this rule was revised as a result of the aforementioned scholars' tireless efforts to represent the cause of the Global South. The revised rule relaxed the minimum turnout to 21 percent, and in the second attempt last year, out of 626 IAGS members, a total of 218 members cast their votes on the resolution—which is 34.8 percent of overall casting. Of them, 208 voted in favour, four against, and six abstained. So while Bangladesh's genocide resolution finally saw success, the depressing reality is that 65.2 percent of IAGS members did not take part in the voting at all. This makes it evident that there is still a general ignorance among global genocide scholars about the genocide of 1971.
Even in the leading work of global genocide scholars, the Bangladesh case is either sadly missing or ingeniously presented. For example, in 2011, the Journal of Genocide Research published a special issue titled "East Pakistan War, 1971." The tendency to use the name "East Pakistan" even after its bloody death in 1971 does not help supply an honest impression to the publication. Moreover, one of the contributing authors was, unsurprisingly, Sarmila Bose. Titled "The Question of Genocide and the Quest for Justice in the 1971 War," her paper only reproduced what she wrote in her most debated book, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (2011). In the article, she claimed, "The 1971 war in South Asia that ended with the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh has been framed in terms of genocide in popular representations and the nationalist history of Bangladesh. It has been depicted as genocide by the Pakistan army against the linguistically defined ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan, in which three million Bengalis were said to have been killed. This article explores some of the problems with categorizing the killings of 1971; assesses, using detailed information on many incidents of violence during the year, which of them might be termed genocide according to the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; considers how to treat those crimes that do not fit the definition of genocide; and what the implications are for the quest for justice for the crimes of 1971."
Relying on Pakistani military officials' statements, Bose contested the narrative of Bangladesh genocide by presenting the India-Pakistan war as a counternarrative. Then she questioned the number of martyrs. And finally, she opposed to portray what happened in 1971 as a case of genocide with reference to the Genocide Convention ("mass killing" versus "genocide" debate).
Under the sub-heading "Can the Killing of an Individual be Genocide?", she made a selective claim by accepting the killing of Prof Jyotirmoy Guhathakurta on the night of March 25 at the Dhaka University campus as genocide, while denying the killing of Prof ANM Muniruzzaman, his son, brother and nephew, on the very same night and site, as acts of genocide.
Regarding their killings, her conclusion was as follows, "The killer of Professor Guhathakurta […] appears to have been on a killing spree of all the adult men he could find on campus, regardless of whether they were Hindu or Muslim, Bengali or non-Bengali." Bose further wrote, "His killing cannot simply be ascribed to his being a Bengali, not only because virtually the whole population of East Pakistan was Bengali, but also because the same army unit killed non-Bengali staff at the university during the same operation. As Professor Guhathakurta was asked his religion before being shot, and he was a Hindu, it might seem that his killing could be termed genocide on the basis of religion."
Even though she conceded that the killing of Prof Guhathakurta was genocide as he belonged to the Hindu religious community, the killing of Prof Muniruzzaman and his relatives were not a part of genocide, according to her. This means, at least in her understanding, religious identity is a big factor for constituting genocide. While it is partially understandable, the Genocide Convention goes a step further and clearly states that genocide can take place based on national, ethnical, or racial identities, too. In this sense, there is no reason to repudiate the killing of Prof Muniruzzaman and his relatives as acts of genocide. Before making an arbitrary imposition of religious identity to the victims, Bose should have considered their Bengaliness as they embraced it anthropologically thorough language, lifestyle, culture, and political consciousness. Without an iota of doubt, all of them belonged to the Bengali national/ethnic group. By making the religious identity a core point, Bose tells a half-truth and undermines what the Genocide Convention postulated even before 1971, "Genocide [is committed with] an intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group," by undertaking several acts outlined by the convention itself.
The 1971 genocide is still not widely recognised by major powers and global institutions, including the UN in general and the government of Pakistan in particular. As I have written elsewhere, this has been the case for so many reasons—one of which is definitely the unfortunate absence of "globally accepted" and "critical" scholarship on the genocide itself, both from inside and outside Bangladesh. With a hope that the 1971 genocide will secure due recognition globally, we must strive to produce more and more scholarly work with a clear conviction of truth-seeking, justice, and reconciliation.
Emraan Azad teaches law at Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP) and coordinates research at the Center for the Study of Genocide and Justice, Liberation War Museum.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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