War against the phenomenon of IS

US president Barack Obama in his 15-minute speech on September 10 outlined his strategy of expanding the ongoing US campaign against the phenomenon of Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or in short, Islamic State (IS), assuring, in particular, his home audience that the US will meet the enemy  "with strength and resolve."   

Evidently, Obama's latest announcement marks a significant departure from his earlier policy of disengaging the US militarily from Iraq as he had promised in his election campaign trail in 2008. And true to his promise, on October 21, 2011, he declared that all US forces would leave Iraq in time to be "home for the holidays".

This apparent shift in Obama's stance is a corollary of his falling popularity at home over his handling of issues ranging from economy, immigration, health care to foreign policy. Small wonder his critics blame the recent mess in Iraq and Syria, especially the phenomenal rise of IS, largely on his poor handling of Middle East crisis arising mainly out of the Syrian civil war.     

So, to take the IS bull by the horns, Obama has conceived of  a broader alliance with friendly nations. Some 10 Arab as well as  other nations will be part of this alliance, it is learnt. However, the US  has not yet committed any ground troops other than the ongoing air strikes against ISIS militants. Neither have the allies in this war committed any.

With no foot soldiers on the ground either from the US or from its alliance partners, one wonders how  the expanded campaign against the IS will be fought.  Seemingly, it is all depending on the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces as well as the moderate rebel fighters of Syria. But given their present state of organisation, firepower and morale vis-à-vis those of the IS fighters, each of these armies will  have miles to go before  they become an effective force against the battle-hardened and highly motivated IS army. It is understood from Obama speech that the US and its allies will provide the needed guidance, training and weapons to the Iraqi and Peshmerga forces. And it is also understood that the moderate Syrian rebels will be sufficiently equipped along with extended air coverage within Syria to fight the IS effectively. These are undoubtedly nice ideas, but there's snag. How, for example, will the moderate Syrian rebels in their present state of disarray regroup and fight on two fronts---Syrian government forces on the one hand and the ISIS, on the other—when the US  or its allies are yet not decided what they are going to do with president Asad of Syria? It is worthwhile to note that Asad has skillfully cornered the Syrian rebels with financial,  military  and moral support that he has been receiving from Iran and Russia. And to the Syrian rebels' dismay, combatants of Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah have also been fighting shoulder to shoulder with Syrian troops against the rebels.

 On the Iraqi front it is being expected that the Sunni population along with their rebel fighters will eagerly join the new Iraqi premier's national reconciliation efforts. But what is the guarantee that they (Sunnis) will instantly respond to the initiative of Haider al-Abadi's, who is also another Shia leader from present ruling coterie representing  the Islamic Dawa Party? Will not the Sunnis rather choose to wait and see what Abadi can really deliver towards national unity, especially through sharing of power with them? One should not forget that  the IS thrives on the support of minority Sunni community which has been marginalized by the  highly sectarian Shia-led former government of Nouri al-Maliki.

But why is it proving so hard to encounter the IS? Who are they?

Disparate Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups drawn mainly from various al-Qaeda factions  formed IS in April 2013 under a new leadership that distanced itself from al-Qaeda central command. The leader of this new jihadist group is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, popularly called Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The method the IS uses to terrorise and subjugate its adversaries, mainly Shia's and non-Muslim minorities, is so ruthless that even al-Qaeda disapproves of it.  

Imbued with an extremely puritan interpretation Islam, the IS, since its creation has emerged as a formidable force taking advantage of the festering civil war in Syria and sectarianism-ridden vicious political atmosphere in Iraq. From its battle victories against demoralized Iraqi army and poorly equipped Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, IS now rules a large land area (between 40, 000 to 90, 000 square kilometers) spanning north and northwestern Iraq and   northeastern Syria. Basically a ragtag fighting force of a few hundred fighters in the beginning, the IS now now commands a fully-fledged army of some 31,000 jihadist fighters, who have been streaming from across the globe into the region over the last three years and a half that the Syrian civil war has been raging. With every passing moment they are growing in strength, thanks to the prevailing political chaos in Syria and Iraq.

The US-led Western powers consider the IS as military problem and as such seeking a military solution to it. Unfortunately, there is no such solution. One has to get to the political roots of the insurgency that lie in Damascus and Baghdad. So, towards finding an answer to the IS problem, the US and the West must prevail upon Syria to end the civil war as well as install a government in Baghdad that enjoys the trust of all Iraqi communities--Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, Yezidis and all. Once these two political problems are resolved the IS will automatically lose the ground on which it stands.

The writer is Editor, Science & Life, The Daily Star.
E-mail: sfalim.ds@gmail.com