Working out an electoral security model
I have, in my previous article, highlighted the rationale for having armed forces on the ground during elections because of the highly tense political climate and the virulent atmosphere of confrontational politics, especially when the next general election is likely to be held without the dissolution of Parliament. It would be a daunting task for the Election Commission, howsoever powerful it may appear theoretically, to conduct a free, fair and all-inclusive election without any violence, which characterised elections in the last few years.
I have also pointed out four factors that were proven to be a drag and observed in the elections between 2014 and 2016, including the last Union Council elections in which more than 100 lives were lost in violence. Security is a factor that remains ignored at the planning stage. The necessity of a proactive, long-term plan is less understood by the relevant quarters.
The nature of an election makes it vulnerable to a range of security threats such as that against the participants, infrastructure, information and materials. Electoral violence has been a matter of concern in Bangladesh since the first general election in 1973. It takes an enormous amount of effort for the Electoral Management Body (EMB), stakeholders and the security apparatus to assess, plan and monitor the election process and handle matters related to resources and deployment. Electoral security requires meticulous planning by the EC with the scale of violence increasing with every election, and this has been the case since the liberation, particularly between the two main political groups. Since 1991, electoral violence has resulted mainly from conflicts between the supporters of Awami League and BNP in the general elections, and the rival groups in local elections. It is generally seen that violence is more intense in all kinds of local elections, especially in rural areas.
Nevertheless, electoral violence in Bangladesh is not the by-product of ethnic clashes unlike in countries in Africa and parts of Asia, yet at times it is directed against a particular political and minority group. Violence often serves as a tool used to skew election results in favour of particular parties or candidates. In the general elections, violence is orchestrated more under the influence of political parties than individual candidates, but the opposite is observed in local body elections, although of late these have also turned into multiparty elections. The reason behind that is, in parliamentary or general elections, what is at stake is 'state power' which is not the case in other elections. According to an election analyst, "a careful observation of the last five parliamentary elections suggests that different motives are behind electoral violence in Bangladesh. The main reason is to influence the electoral process, but it is possible to disaggregate further motives behind the violence".
Election violence is not unique in Bangladesh but here it is more intense than the other three South Asian countries namely India, Nepal and Pakistan. However, the strongest of all reasons for the unabated violence during elections in Bangladesh is the confrontational politics between the two main political parties and the resultant antagonistic bipolar politics. Under such circumstances, a patron-client system casts shadows on all the institutions including the EC.
There are, however, various stages of electoral violence: (i) pre-poll violence, which occurs between the day of the declaration of schedule and the polling; (ii) violence on the election day; and (iii) post-poll violence. Each stage is intended to have different outcomes. Pre-poll violence is to intimidate voters identified as supporters of the opponent, restrict the space for rival party or candidates, and gain ascendency over rival party supporters. Election-day violence is meant to intimidate voters, polling personnel, manipulate ballots and influence vote counting. Post-poll violence is aimed at punishing rival candidates or assumed groups of supporters, mostly minorities. Therefore, the prime objective of the EC, like any other EMB, should be to prevent such violence with the help of a meticulously worked-out proactive plan and by effectively executing it.
A careful analysis of violence in the last five general elections (1991-2014) shows that violence was less frequent during elections held under CTG whereas the scale was higher in elections held under party governments. But the key reason for dispute lies in the incumbent government's attempts to influence the electoral process, resulting in voters' mistrust of the electoral system. Examples include the February 1996 and January 2014 elections; though on both occasions, the major parties did not participate but resorted to violence to prevent the election. The election held on January 5, 2014 "was the bloodiest election in Bangladesh" (The Daily Star, January 6, 2014) in which approximately 400 people died, despite the presence of the largest number of law enforcement agencies.
Little rational thought has gone into the planning for electoral security in Bangladesh, and no concept has been developed either. Electoral security arrangements require systemic planning based on thorough assessment of all the relevant factors. In this regard, every aspect of security has to be taken into consideration. After assessing the situation and the reality on the ground, the entire security planning needs to be made in a way that covers various phases from pre-poll to post-poll.
The need for tighter electoral security has been felt particularly in elections under party governments. Security measures employed were not based on pro-active planning, rather on the massing of security agencies which in many cases have proved to be ineffective. This can be seen from the points of expenditures and outcomes. For example, deployment of all available agencies including the armed forces in 2014 could not prevent the worst violence in the history of parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The same thing happened to local elections held under EC (for example, over 101 people were killed in the Union Council elections in 2016 despite the heaviest-ever deployment of security forces.)
Therefore, it is not the number of forces but how security is planned that matters more. We need to devise a plan based on a template made out of past experiences and future anticipations in this charged political environment—which will also serve us in future elections. Let it be prudently decided by the EC, which is the guarantor of violence-free elections.
M. Sakhawat Hussain is a former Election Commissioner, a columnist and PhD fellow.