The National Human Rights Commission has fundamental flaws

That the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Bangladesh has come second-to-last in South Asia—as per an evaluation by the Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI)—does not come as a surprise. The NHRC is riddled with many issues that prevent it from executing its mandated duty of upholding human rights in the country. The commission is an independent, statutory body on paper, authorised to monitor and investigate violations of human rights—no matter who the perpetrators may be. But in reality, it is far from being independent. Its recruitment process is heavily influenced by the government.

The founding principles of the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) are known as the Paris Principles. These principles are regarded as the guiding principles for the formation and functioning of the commissions. They direct that the legal status of a commission has to be strong enough for it to be able to exercise its power independently. Secondly, the selection procedure of its commissioners will have to be open and credible.

In Bangladesh, the seven-member selection committee for the selection of human rights commissioners is headed by the Speaker, whereas most of the other members are appointed from the bureaucracy. This itself lowers the credibility of the NHRC to a considerable extent. Not only that, procedurally, according to the Paris Principles, to recruit the chairperson, the full-time member as well as the other members of the selection committee are directed to send two credible names from among the civil society against each position to the president. It is also said in the Principles that one member should be selected from the opposition political parties. The president will then appoint the commissioners from the recommended names.

So far, we have never seen this procedure being followed. Rather, we have witnessed former bureaucrats in the leading position at the NHRC, with rare exceptions. Given their previous affiliations with the government, it is hardly a shocker that they won't take actions that could displease government high-ups. When this is the case, how is the commission supposed to do its job? This is a fundamental flaw that weakens the NHRC's authority as the advocate and protector of human rights in Bangladesh.

The commission also lacks independence in dealing with its own finances as the budget for its expenditures are allocated to the Ministry of Law and not directly to the NHRC itself. This too creates an opportunity for the Executive to control the activities of the Commission. The NHRC also suffers from serious weakness in its mandate, specifically regarding its power to investigate certain bodies such the armed forces and other law enforcement agencies. The text related to the commission's jurisdiction on the above is full of ambiguity, which allows the concerned NHRC officers to interpret their responsibility as they see fit. This is why, even though it is not obligated to the government and has the legal grounds to do its work independently, the NHRC cannot toe certain lines.

The assessment by ANNI does not reveal anything new. And it is unlikely to change for the better unless the NHRC is given the independence guaranteed by the Paris Principles, in order to do its job properly.

Sultana Kamal is a human rights activist.