From Look East to Indo-Pacific

INDIA has been looking towards the east since the 1990s. Now, there is a renewed emphasis on this in India owing to recent developments in Southeast Asia along with growing international interest in the Asia Pacific. In the changing context, how far should India look east? Should it look only towards Southeast Asia, or extend up to East Asia and Australia as well? Does the renewed international interest in this region demand an Indian pivot towards Southeast Asia and East Asia? Should India redefine this region as Indo-Pacific and pursue its interests accordingly?

The US has already taken the lead on the two above crucial aspectsin terms of its return to the Asia-Pacific along with its new strategiesthe pivot and rebalancing. More importantly, Washington's emphasis is on redefining the region starting from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific as Indo-Pacific. From an Indian perspective, it will be imperative to expand the focus from "looking east" to "Indo-Pacific" for the following reasons. First, in terms of international interests, this region is likely to become strategic, especially as the US and the International Security Assitance Force are winding up their operations in Afghanistan. The Indo-Pacific is becoming the next international theatre and is likely to witness a substantial attention, investment and development. Recent happenings already hint this shift, with tensions building in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. North Korea's nuclear tests and Japan's likely political direction in the next few years will substantially shape global interests in this region.

Second, in economic terms, given the presence of organisations and structures such as ASEAN, the ARF and the EAS, this region will become the global economic power-house. With the economic crises in the US and the EU, the strength of these organizations and the trade potential will make this region as the driver of the global economic architecture.

Third, the maritime expanse of this region along with the oceanic trading routes cutting across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific has already made the Indo-Pacific perhaps even more important than the European Union. In the next decade, the sheer volume of trade and movement of goods across these two oceans will also increase the vulnerability of this region. The imperative to protect the sea-lanes across the two oceans and the need to secure maritime traffic will make not only the Malacca Straits but also the entire Indo-Pacific the most important area.

Fourth, the rise of China peaceful or otherwise will be felt more acutely in this region, starting from East Asia to South Asia. In fact, the pangs of China's rise are being already felt both in East Asia and Southeast Asia in two maritime disputes involving Japan (East China Sea), Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan (in the South China Sea). The recent developments within ASEAN, especially its failure to arrive at a code of conduct, and Cambodia's role in playing spoilsport highlight the growing Chinese influence and Beijing's ability to manipulate the regional consensus. As the region gets integrated with China more, the ability of Beijing to influence the political outcomes in Southeast Asia will become substantial; Currently, China is building a north-south rail network and a road network linking its Sichuan and Yunnan provinces to Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Singapore. Once these two projects are finalised, along with Mekong which China shares with Southeast Asia, the economies of ASEAN and China will be even more integrated, giving more political space to Beijing to manoeuvre.

While this economic integration between China and Southeast Asia is inevitable, given the geographical proximity, how will Beijing use this influence vis-a-vis the rest, especially India? And what will that mean for India's Lookeast policy? If Beijing's reservations and objections to India's presence in Vietnam have to be measured as a yardstick, the rise of China is unlikely to be peaceful and beneficial to the interests of everyone. And given its recent responses in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and using Cambodia to scuttle the political consensus within ASEAN, there is not much scope to believe that a rising China will play by international norms and rules.

The above four aspects will have to considered while looking east in the third decade. Like the US, India also needs a new strategy in the Asia Pacific. And like the US, India also needs to have its own pivot in the region. Re-visioning the Asia Pacific as the Indo-Pacific and pursuing a strategy to increase India's economic and political presence in the region will provide more space to New Delhi to manoeuvre.

But the crucial question is: is there a space for India in the Indo-Pacific? There could be two answers. First, irrespective of its availability, New Delhi should reorient its strategies to find political and economic space. Second, and more importantly, New Delhi should make use of the space that already exists for India to play a greater role. While many Indian analysts are highly critical of the American pivot and rebalancing, what is not sufficiently explored is the window that is opened for India as a result of American pivoting and rebalancing. For example, in Myanmar, the increased American attention towards Naypidaw provides a substantial space. As a part of its rebalancing, the US is likely to work with partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and ASEAN. This provides an opportunity for New Delhi to work with other countries.

There is also an increased interest among the other countries to work with India; the visit of Australian Prime Minister in 2012 and the agreements signed clearly show that Canberra is reworking its strategy and opening up to India. South Korea and Japan should become the second pillar of India's approach towards finding more space in the region. New Delhi should forge a strong economic and strategic partnership with these two countries, and take the existing relationship to the next level.

To realise the Indian pivot and operationalise the Indo-Pacific idea, New Delhi should forge long-term partnerships with the countries concenred. Within that larger pivot to the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi should also consider a special pivot to Myanmar, and convert into a land bridge to Southeast Asia. This will provide geographic proximity and a land bridge to Southeast Asia. Though New Delhi has been working on this, such a strategy towards making Myanmar as a land bridge should include Bangladesh and India's Northeast; only by conceiving these three as an integrated region, India will be able to achieve its long-term goals in the Indo-Pacific. One of the primary problems in India's Lookeast policy has been our failure to integrate this region, and get Bangladesh and India's Northeaster on board. Instead, India's Lookeast policy positioned itself in New Delhi, jump-starting from Bangkok and Singapore while operationalising. A special pivot to Myanmar along with India's Northeast and Bangladesh will rebalance and provide the land bridge that India has been looking for.

Finally, to make the Indo-Pacific a reality, India should perceive the Indian Ocean as India's Ocean, and pursue a strategy that will increase its political clout. A strong Indian Navy is imperative along with an extended maritime doctrine up to the Pacific Ocean. During this decade and the next, the region starting from Indian Ocean to the Pacific is likely to become the primary international focus, and the shift from the EU and the Middle East has already started taking place. India should ensure that its interests are addressed.

An Indian pivot to the region and the Indo-Pacific as a strategy may provide the space to achieve India's interests.

The writer is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

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