Indomitable March: Bhutto’s formula for transfer of power

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, stated at a public meeting in Karachi that if power was to be transferred to the people before any constitutional settlement, as demanded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, it should be transferred to the Awami League in the East and the PPP in the West. He was quoted as saying, "Idhar hum, Udhar tum" (we here, you there).

He added that the rule of the majority for the whole country would become applicable only if the six-point demand was dropped. Since that is not being done, the rationale and logic of this six-point demand necessitates agreement of the majority parties of both the wings, said Bhutto.

Bhutto outright dismissed the Awami League's allegation that the date of the National Assembly's session was set by president General Yahya Khan after consulting him. He swore by the "Kalima" and his children that the president did not consult him about convening the National Assembly session.

On the same day, Bhutto met Yahya in Karachi. Commenting on the incident, Bhutto wrote in his book "The Great Tragedy" that he told Yahya that Mujib's demands for transfer of power and the lifting of martial law were acceptable to his party, but the modalities of these had to be worked out on the basis of a common agreement.

MUJIB'S NEW DIRECTIVES

Bangabandhu, in his new directive issued on March 14, 1971, called upon the people to continue the non-cooperation movement. He further stated that the people showed how to resist the oppressors' conspiracy.

Referring to the new martial law order, Bangabandhu mentioned that the people would persist in their struggle despite such attempts at intimidation, as they knew that no force could withstand the united strength of the people.

Bangabandhu issued 35-point directives on the future course of the non-cooperation movement. He suspended the collection of income taxes by the central government and prohibited the remittance of customs and excise duties and sales taxes, which were usually sent to the central government.

KISSINGER'S ASSESMENT

Henry Kissinger, the US president's assistant for national security affairs, wrote in his memorandum to president Nixon: "It is not necessary for us to shift to a more activist approach now, since Yahya knows we favor unity and is doing everything possible to achieve a political settlement."

Referring to Yahya's upcoming visit to East Pakistan, Kissinger suggested three possible outcomes: 1) Yahya could decide not to take Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's challenge lying down and retaliate, perhaps to the extent of arresting Rahman and other leaders, and attempting to clamp a military lid on East Pakistan. 2) A static waiting game could develop, with neither the army nor the civilians prepared to take a bold initiative to break the deadlock, each hoping the other will break first. 3) There might be more tactical political moves by Yahya, Rahman, or Bhutto designed to probe for areas of accommodation and buy
more time without giving up anything.