Advisers acted differently

Mainul Husein, law adviser to the past army-backed caretaker administration, was exceptionally frank in acknowledging the military's leading role in the government affairs while other advisers including the chief adviser studiously avoided saying the M-word.
The then US ambassador Patricia A Butenis wrote it in a cable, recently released by WikiLeaks, after holding separate meetings with Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed, Mainul and other advisers.
"The chief adviser was smooth and business-like in making the government's case for far-reaching reforms. During the 45-minute meeting, there was not even an indirect reference to the military role in his government's creation and operation," Butenis wrote in another cable on January 29, 2007.
She wrote the cable sent to Washington after the meeting with the then chief adviser the same day.
A day before meeting the chief adviser, Butenis met Mainul and wrote a cable on the meeting on January 31.
In some other cables, the US embassy, however, reveals how the military was consolidating its role in the affairs of the caretaker government installed on January 12, 2007, a day after the declaration of the state of emergency.
The US diplomat, Geeta Pasi in March 2007 in a cable said the National Coordination Committee (NCC) structure, flowing down to the district level, resembled, to an extent, the military administrative set-up of the martial law governments that ruled the country in the late 1970s and most of the 1980s.
The Cabinet Division on March 8, 2007 formed the NCC with the army's then ninth division general officer commanding (GOC) Major General Masud Uddin Chowdhury as its chief coordinator to assist in its ongoing sweep against corruption and serious crimes.
The government had also formed metropolitan/zonal committees for seven "areas" conforming to the existing division of the country into the army's command areas and "Task Forces" for each of the 64 districts with powers to conduct searches and detain suspects without warrants, said the cable wrote by Pasi.
"This tactful militarization of the administration may be indicative of the military's resolve to play a vital role in running the country without declaring martial law," Pasi commented.
Around three months after the army backed caretaker government's tenure, the then US ambassador Butenis in a cable wrote while constitutionally acting "in support of the civilian government," the military retained significant influence on key political decisions.
In the cable created on April 26, 2007, she wrote retired military officers held positions among the advisers, the Anti-corruption Commission (ACC) and the Election Commission (EC).
"The military actively recruited both Chief Advisor Fakhruddin and most, if not all, of the Council of Advisors. Active and retired military officers were involved in negotiations to 'persuade' Khaleda Zia to leave Bangladesh," Butenis wrote.
On April 5, 2007, the US ambassador wrote: "The military is playing an increasingly overt role as a key decision-maker behind the Caretaker Government."
"The military plans for a new National Security Council with senior military representation are pending final approval by the Council of Advisors," wrote Butenis.
The cable said the military also attempts to form a "king's party" dovetailed with continued speculation that the military sought a "government of national unity" to transition between the Caretaker Government and eventual parliamentary elections.
"Moeen's reference to a 'new brand of democracy' also suggests plans for fundamental constitutional changes to the structure of the government in Bangladesh to create new checks and balances. Presumably, a military backed national unity government is believed necessary to bring about these changes," Butenis wrote in the April 5 cable.
About the much talked about move to form a national security council during the past caretaker government rule, US ambassador James F Moriarty in a cable on January 29, 2009 wrote the army and its supporters saw the creation of the security council as the key to addressing their concerns.
"Understandably, the political parties, the civil society resisted the idea because they perceived it to be an attempt to create a 'super cabinet' with veto power over government decisions," Moriarty wrote, adding, "They also remembered former military dictator Hussain Muhammad Ershad's attempt to establish an NSC during his tenure."
"Additionally, many skeptics drew parallels to Pakistan's or Turkey's National Security Councils, which they saw as simple instrument for perpetuating Army rule," Moriarty wrote in the cable.
The cable said leaders of both major parties resisted the formation of an NSC and this initiative sputtered. "Recognizing the need for some type of institutional change the AL [led government] has mooted a possible National Security Council, whose composition, membership, and charter remain undefined," Moriarty wrote.