Three BNP leaders were allegedly picked up by law enforcers from Jashore-Magura highway when they were going to campaign for the BNP candidate of Jashore-3 constituency this morning.
The three leaders are Golam Reza Dulu, BNP vice-president of district unit; Nurunnabi, BNP president of Sadar upazila unit; and Kamal Hossain Babu, Jubo Dal president of Fatehpur upazila.
The BNP candidate for Jashore-3 constituency, Anindya Islam Amit, and the three other BNP leaders were on their way for campaigning.
Their vehicle was intercepted with a truck after it passed Panchbaria area on the highway, Amit told The Daily Star.
Law enforcers got off the truck around 10:45am and detained the three leaders, Amit said.
He claimed that members of both Rapid Action Battalion and Police were among the team members.
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The lists of dengue infections and deaths are only getting longer, and nobody can tell if, or when, the situation will get better. The prices of daily essentials continue to skyrocket, with the price of eggs, the go-to protein for the poor, now equal to that of a kilogram of broiler chicken. Meanwhile, more than 50 people were killed in the floods in Chattogram and the Chittagong Hill Tracts area in recent weeks.
In all of this, it is the common people (or in the context of the upcoming national election, the voters) who are the worst sufferers. But the politicians seem to be blissfully oblivious to the plight of their electorate. There is no denying that the country is headed towards its next parliamentary election with the two major political parties harbouring opposite stances regarding the election itself. Of course, a free, fair, and inclusive election is necessary for a better society and stronger democracy. But when people are suffering the most, when they are dying because of poor governance, how can the political parties focus on only the physical exercise of the election and how it will play out in about four months? Shouldn't their focus be on how best to serve the people now? Shouldn't they be concerned about the welfare of the poorest of society? Shouldn't our politicians be working to win the hearts and minds of the people, instead of engaging in political power play with their archrivals?
Ideally, and historically, people get into politics for the welfare of their people. But it appears from recent political machinations that the people have been conveniently forgotten or even sidelined in the game of politics. When one political party says that the country's people are with it, and the other party claims that it represents the people, I can't help but wonder who it is that is actually representing me, or has my interests at heart.
Bangladeshi politics is going through a critical phase. The fact is that politicians have lost control over politics in general, which appears to have been hijacked by corporate interests – given the representation of businessmen and former bureaucrats in the parliament. Currently, around 62 percent of lawmakers are from the business sector. The government's dependency on the administration has increased. And none but the politicians have brought this upon themselves, in their pursuit of shortcuts and expediency. When career politicians become weak, so does politics. And when the people are sidelined, politics – so far as it is concerned with maintaining democracy – becomes more fragile.
It is in this context that the exhortations of the diplomatic corps in Dhaka – India, China, the US, and the EU – about the supremacy of the people and how they hope that the people's wishes will be reflected in the outcome of the election, are both ironic and intriguing.
The two previous elections changed the nature of Bangladeshi people's participation in national politics. The 2014 election, which BNP had boycotted and which saw 153 lawmakers being elected uncontested, remains a rare example of a lopsided election. In the 2018 election, many people were denied the right to cast their votes, and allegations emerged of ballot-stuffing on the eve of elections, so much so that it was even mentioned by Awami League's alliance members. When politicians found that they could get elected even without votes, voters ceased to become a factor to consider when trying to win elections. In the past, candidates did have to woo voters, and win their hearts and minds to get their votes. But now, when a mere nomination all but guarantees victory for a candidate, the exercise of putting in effort to win voters has become all but cosmetic.
On the other hand, while the opposition can do little so far as actual measures are concerned – whether that relates to dengue or prices – it is their responsibility to hold the government accountable. It falls on the opposition to keep these issues alive so that the government cannot ignore them. One way to do that is in parliament, which has unfortunately lost its purpose since the official opposition is, by and large, an informal extension of the ruling party alliance. Meanwhile, the main opposition camp on the streets, BNP, is too obsessed with its one-point demand for a resignation of the ruling government than with the plight of the voters.
So now, whenever I hear calls for this or that "in the name of the people," and when political parties launch campaigns for the supposed sake of the people, it seems to me that those politicians are merely cementing their political careers using the name of the people. Is anyone actually thinking about the families of those 50 people who died in the floods? Or about the children who are going to bed hungry in Bangladesh even now? That one has to pose such questions in a column is perhaps an even bigger tragedy.
Mohammad Al-Masum Molla is chief reporter at The Daily Star.
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The Jatiya Oikyafront candidates in the six constituencies of Khulna are heavily depending on female activists for their campaigns as most of the men are either on the run or under cover fearing police.
Male leaders and activists are seldom seen campaigning. They remain silent or in hiding to avoid police harassment, locals said, adding that using female activists in the campaigns is a strategy of the alliance.
Jamaat leaders have been nominated by the Jatiya Oikyafront in two constituencies of Khulna.
More than half the constituents in Khulna are women and it makes sense to deploy female activists, BNP leaders said.
Meanwhile, the Awami League campaign has gathered significant momentum. Alongside the nominees, AL leaders and activists are campaigning. Women leaders and activists are also seeking votes going door to door.
In the BNP tent, Principal Tarikul Islam, joint-secretary of city BNP, said, “Male activists are engaged in hanging posters and outdoor activities. So, we wanted to involve women in the campaigns more.”
“It should not be considered as our strategy. It is the reality,” said the BNP leader.
Azizul Bari Helal, the BNP nominee in Khulna-4 (Rupsha, Terakhada, Digholia), said AL activists were attacking BNP leaders and activists campaigning for him and they were also facing police harassment.
He alleged that female AL activists were visiting the homes of women who got benefit under VGF and VGD programmes.
BNP activist Zorina Khatun said, “Our male members are on the run to avoid police harassment. They cannot run their businesses and are even forced to shut their business establishments. We are campaigning to get out of this anarchy.”
The 23-year-old along with similarly aged Tanzila sheikh were distributing leaflets of Rokibul Islam Bokul, the BNP candidate for Khulna-3 (Khalishpur, Daulatpur and Khanjahan Ali), at Boikali in the morning after dropping off their children at school.
Clad in burqas, their faces were covered and they were wearing gloves. Several other women were accompanying them.
“Bokul is my brother of the neighbourhood. So, I am distributing leaflets for him,” she said.
Tanzila alleged that the AL did not give the BNP and other political parties any space for political activities. “Is the country only for the AL?” she asked.
On Friday night, these correspondents visited WAPDA Slum in Rupsha Stand Road and talked to 10 women voters who said female activists were visiting their home every day.
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The government has turned down Khaleda Zia's family's application to allow her to be taken abroad for urgent treatment, which her lawyer and her party leaders have termed as a political vendetta. The government's reasoning, as explained by Law Minister Anisul Huq, was that the application, on which the government has suspended the jail sentence of Khaleda Zia and released her from jail on two conditions, has been disposed of and has become a "past and closed transaction." The minister also said that the decision to suspend her sentence was made under Section 401(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
This refusal to allow treatment abroad could not have come at a worse time, as the former prime minister's continuous illness has reached a critical stage, with life-threatening conditions. Besides, political distrust and division in the country over the coming election, too, have become highly charged. Against this context, it is hard to discard the notion that politics played no part in this decision from the government.
It is still unclear what rekindled the hope of her family and party that the BNP chief's treatment abroad could be possible, despite the fact that several attempts in the past have been flatly rejected by the government, citing the same law and argument which the law minister has referred to in his latest legal opinion. Reportedly, Khaleda Zia told her partymen not to agree to participating in the next parliamentary election under the current government in exchange for her medical care abroad.
It, therefore, begs this question: was the life of a politician, of such stature, really made a bargaining chip by either of the parties? The question became even more pertinent when the law minister, responding to reporters' queries on September 24, said that the government did not receive any application from her family seeking permission to take her abroad.
It followed the government's decision to extend Khaleda Zia's conditional release from prison for six more months, based on a separate application filed on September 4. As a result of the law minister's suggestive remarks that the family had not sought permission for her treatment abroad, Khaleda's younger brother Shamim Iskander made another application on September 25 seeking the required approval.
Should we believe that the issue of seeking permission afresh was brought about simply to humiliate the political opponent by reminding them of how "powerless" they are? Questions may also arise about whether the arguments of considering the petition "disposed of" and "a past and closed transaction" are tenable.
It is often said that the law will take its own course. But examples are plenty to prove that the incident at hand was simply political rhetoric. If someone compares the fate of the 78-year-old former prime minister with that of some other politicians, such as Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal leader ASM Abdur Rab, the irony becomes evident. The JSD leader was allowed to go to then West Germany for treatment while he was serving his prison term awarded by a martial law court. Another politician, Haji Mohammad Selim – who belongs to the ruling party – was not barred from travelling to Bangkok for his treatment despite being convicted and ordered to surrender, and having had a record of fleeing the country during the tenure of the caretaker government between 2006 and 2008.
Law Minister Anisul Huq said, "Once an application is disposed of under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), there is no scope to reconsider it under the law." Many other jurists, however, do not agree with his interpretation of the law as there is nothing that bars the government or limits its authority to reconsider its decision. Every law is subject to interpretation, and there are variations in interpretations. Among these variations – except the court's interpretation – some are known as literal, and some are mischievous or intended to create mischief.
Amid the contested claims by the government and by BNP, it would be better to read Section 401 of the CrPC and draw one's own conclusion. Under the title "Power to suspend or remit sentences," the law states in Section 401(1), "When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the Government may at any time without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced."
Additionally, Section 401(6) says, "The Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with." As the literal meaning of the rule is far from convincing, it would be wiser for the government to reconsider its decision, which may help improve the current political environment in the country.
Kamal Ahmed is an independent journalist. His X handle is @ahmedka1
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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The former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia on Tuesday embarked on a long-anticipated journey abroad for medical treatment. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) chairperson—whose imprisonment, health deterioration, and subsequent treatment had become a politically charged issue for years during the Awami League regime—has gained tremendous sympathy for the hardship she has endured. As a result, her journey to London, which reunited her with her eldest son Tarique Rahman after seven long years, has become something of a watershed moment in Bangladesh's recent political history.
The BNP, who had been politically stifled by the Awami League, understandably looked to capitalise on this moment. However, the way BNP activists descended upon much of North Dhaka on Tuesday night to bid their chairperson farewell, choking Dhaka's most vital artery—the Airport Road—with sheer numbers is an approach that lacked creativity and freshness. It stank of an all too familiar tendency of political parties in our country to construct cults of personality, something much of Bangladesh has violently rejected in the recent past and has been trying desperately to move past.
For an outside observer, it must be baffling that the BNP, having witnessed what the actions of the last 15 years did to the Awami League in three short weeks this summer, never even considered the fact that if they didn't play fast and loose with people's precious time like Sheikh Hasina used to, it would set a nice contrast in the minds of voters and the young generation.
For the BNP, this last Tuesday was an opportunity. If they could only get Khaleda Zia on the plane without majorly disrupting life in the world's densest city, have some strategically placed public relations agents on popular media discuss this refreshing approach and focus on the former two-time prime minister's steadfast commitment to not compromise with an undemocratic foe and the culmination of a years-long familial separation, the BNP may well have been cruising on the journey to wiping the memories of the horrendous five-year period when the BNP was last in power.
In truth, every day since August 5, 2024, has been a day of opportunity the BNP has missed. The Awami League's ouster, the mountain of legal troubles facing Awami League politicians, and the general rejection of Awami League influence across all facets of life in the country have certainly been a victory for the BNP. Yet, to solidify this victory, the presumptive prime political force in Bangladesh has to distance themselves from the one that has just been booted.
The BNP faithful might say that this is an unnecessary exercise. The BNP has forever been the furthest possible thing from the Awami League, due to the decades-long animosity between the rivals. Yet, in the minds of those who remember 2001-2006 and those who don't remember that time but have been told stories of corruption, misrule, and the perennial threat of bombings that haunted those days, BNP is part of the same political culture that birthed the authoritarian juggernaut that the Awami League became.
In fact, history supports this perception. The BNP and the Awami League were the two major stakeholders of the post-Ershad democratic restructuring, and they had subsequently split the honours in the four elections since, whose credibility has been largely accepted. While the Awami League has emerged victorious—by a long margin at that—in the cursed contest of inflicting misery on the people of Bangladesh, the BNP too has been a participant.
There is little doubt that the BNP is poised to benefit greatly from the aftermath of August 5, 2024, but if the BNP wants to be seen by history in a light that is a shade separate from that which cloaks the Awami League, they must shake things up.
The political culture that seeks to elevate one politician, or a political family, to a position any greater than a regular citizen of the country is a political culture that must end. It was refreshing to hear that some in the BNP leadership had called for more sense on Tuesday night, but that call went unheard. For millions in Dhaka, it was like being haunted by a nightmare, when yet again, a politician's flight abroad took priority over the journey of every ambulance, emergency vehicle, public bus, or a simple homebound employee after a long day.
All BNP achieved on Tuesday night was reassuring themselves that they too could call on the numbers that the Awami League boasted in its heyday. But people already know that the BNP is the biggest party in the country now. What people don't know is if the BNP has the capacity to show the bare minimum respect to its potential constituents, which AL never showed in all its years of power.
This lack of respect, this disregard for public welfare over years and years, is what makes a popular, elected government fester into one that needs to turn its guns on the public to stay in power.
The BNP, on Tuesday night, made a clear show of its lack of respect for the people whose support they hope will carry them into power. In the next election, the support of the blindly faithful may just carry the party over the line into the parliament (or the presidency, depending on constitutional reforms), but if their attitude towards the public does not change, they too run the risk of eventually festering into some form of the disease that kills before it's violently cured.
Azmin Azran is digital features coordinator at The Daily Star.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
Between 1991, when democracy was restored in Bangladesh, and 2009, the Awami League and the BNP were each twice elected to office, through free, fair and inclusive elections. Unfortunately, the tenures of either party did not conspicuously serve to promote the practice of democracy and appeared to be more preoccupied with consolidating power and perpetuating a winner-take-all political culture.
In the backdrop of a bipartisan political system, the BNP has emerged as the largest political party in the country. In the absence of the AL in the political arena, in the aftermath of the post-July-August uprising, the prospect of the BNP forming the next government through a free and fair election appear propitious. Public attention is naturally focused on whether they will return as improved practitioners of democracy. In the aftermath of the uprising, remarks made by top BNP leaders on the state, governance, and practice of democracy project a renovated image of the party and has been widely appreciated by the public. However, the spectacle of the party's field-level workers moving to fill the power vacuum created by the exit of the AL from the field and appropriating the vacated opportunities for rent-seeking have aroused some concern that old habits die hard. Punitive actions by the BNP leadership against malfeasant party members do not appear to have done enough to discourage such predatory actions. Popular discontent against such misbehaviour suggests that the BNP leadership needs to act more decisively to discipline their party cadres if they are to persuade the public of their reformed identity.
In contrast, the forces which came together to overthrow the AL regime represent a fresh presence in politics and have generated their own political dynamic where a younger generation has begun to assert itself. The students have earned respect and legitimacy through their vanguard role in the July-August uprising, particularly among the younger people. They have been justifiably concerned that the old political order should not be perpetuated and demand that substantive reforms take place to ensure that a new, more just, and equitable order emerges. They have welcomed the reforms initiated by Prof Yunus but aspire to be more actively engaged in carrying forward the reform process. To do so, a segment of the students have launched a political party, the National Citizen Party (NCP). This is a welcome step.
Bangladesh has long needed a third party to challenge the duopoly exercised by the AL and the BNP for the last four decades, which has tribalised national politics. Prof Yunus made a rather mistimed and misconceived effort to establish such a third party in 2007. Its early demise did not rule out the need for a political force which would challenge the hegemony of the two parties. Jamaat is indeed another such force of political consequence. But its politics so far have been targeted to a specific ideological rather than a national constituency. It may now have wider aspirations to reach out to a broader spectrum of voters and promises to be a significant force in the forthcoming national election.
The emergence of the NCP as a prospective challenger to our dynastic politics has the attraction of novelty and the virtue of not carrying any baggage from past involvements in governance. To capitalise on such assets, the NCP would be advised to project itself as the party of the future, rather than re-fighting historical battles. Some of the student leaders have so far invested much rhetoric over rewriting the constitution and proclaiming a second (?) republic. As it transpires, their five-point declaration on displacing the four fundamental principles that have underwritten the Bangladesh constitution appears to be a largely semantic exercise, which says nothing that is not already inherent to the original fundamental principles of the constitution. Such provisions as "pluralism" are integral to the ideas of democracy and secularism. The provision of "equality" and "social justice" are essential components of the idea of socialism. Such a move to engage in constitutional dialectics appears to be driven more by a desire to re-interpret history than to redefine the fundamental values guiding the national mission.
The preoccupation of the students in engaging in such a historical discourse has left limited opportunity for them to spell out how they aspire to create a society committed to eradicate boishomyo or inequality. It has also distracted them from what should have been their primary responsibility in the post-August 5 period, providing backup to the Yunus-led interim government (IG) in restoring stability to the ravaged socio-economic landscape of Bangladesh. They could have, through organising students groups, served as a reinforcement to the weakened law enforcement agencies. They could have shown an active commitment towards challenging boishomyo by drawing attention to the problems of vulnerable groups, and could have been more proactive in protecting such groups against acts of oppression and exploitation. Such initiatives would have given the students both visibility and credibility as a new force committed to change—not just through words but actions. Such a hands-on role in civic activism would have helped to define their political identity and widened their support base beyond their student's constituency.
One of the enduring messages of politics is to fight the right war at the right time. As a consequence of their incapacity over the last several months to project a more clearly articulated vision for the future, the student movement has lost some of its lustre. The NCP's capacity to reach out to the mass of students who participated in the July-August uprising is eroding as various sections of the student's movement have remained reluctant to follow them into the NCP. It should be recognised that students are not a homogenous class with shared political views. Their immediate goal is to study, pass exams, and enter the job market, so political engagement remains a passing commitment.
To retain its student base and broaden its outreach, the NCP needs to recapture the dynamism of the July-August movement. To do this, they need to establish their political autonomy and project their promise of delivering a fresh agenda before the people. In practice, the NCP has already unnecessarily engaged themselves in the same historical dialectics which frustrated the emergence of a more workable two-party democratic system.
The NCP is already politically identifying itself on such issues as the urgency of elections (not high) and antagonism towards India, where its position is closer to the JI. The emerging political contradiction today pits the NCP and the JI against the BNP, which daily demands an early election, which it expects to win comfortably in the absence of AL as a major challenge. In contrast, the NCP needs more time to build their party, so they argue that reforms should be initiated and implemented before elections are convened, a position supported by the JI but strongly resisted by the BNP, who views this position as a delaying tactic for elections.
As the NCP moves ahead to prepare for elections, whenever they may be, it is facing up to one of the realities of Bangladeshi politics which have sadly not been resolved by any of the reform commissions. It needs to build up a sizeable war chest to contest elections. The party should, however, aim to build an election fund for itself that is above board and transparent, creating an example that other political parties can follow.
The preoccupation of the students in engaging in such a historical discourse has left limited opportunity for them to spell out how they aspire to create a society committed to eradicate boishomyo or inequality. It has also distracted them from what should have been their primary responsibility in the post-August 5 period, providing backup to the Yunus-led interim government (IG) in restoring stability to the ravaged socio-economic landscape of Bangladesh.
Reforms versus elections
Yunus is himself a strong believer in the need for reforms, but his promise to hold free and fair elections remains his most tangible commitment to the people of Bangladesh since it remains his most realisable objective. He has indicated that elections may take place between December 2025 and June 2026. This target is still to be firmed up and a roadmap clearly laid out to take the country towards elections. But there appear to be pitfalls ahead which could complicate the design of a clear guidepost.
Yunus sensibly argues that holding free and fair elections may serve little purpose if the inherited state of political malgovernance is perpetuated. Such a position, which is possibly widely shared, particularly among the students, indicates a lack of confidence in the credibility of the promises made by various political parties, but more specifically the BNP, that they are committed to structural reforms.
Yunus and the students demand substantive institutional reforms, which can bring about real change. To this end, he has set up a number of commissions populated by well-known and respected intellectuals and retired bureaucrats to recommend institutional reforms in such areas as the constitution, judiciary, public administration, police, an anti-corruption commission, an election commission, media, women's affairs, local government, health, and a task force as well as a White Paper on the economy. Many commendable reform proposals have emanated from these bodies. Surprisingly, the students/youth have been underrepresented in these commissions. Nor has there been adequate representation of women and religious or ethnic minority groups in the commissions.
It is one thing to write up reforms on paper and quite another to secure political consensus on reforms as well as to operationalise them. The IG has constituted a so-called Consensus Commission, made up of the chairs of the six commissions, headed by Yunus, and coordinated by the chair of the Commission on Constitutional Reforms, which has been empowered to draw up a concise agenda of reforms distilled from the reports of the various commissions. This agenda is to then be presented to and discussed with the political parties to establish a consensus behind the reforms.
Such a route to reform appears unusual because it does not involve either Yunus or his interim government in participating in or guiding the political task of consensus-building. As a result, the reform agenda is not identified with Yunus or his government and is the outcome of the diverse views of six different groups of experts who have themselves not been mandated to establish coherence in their particular vision for reform. It is the Consensus Commission which has now been invested by Yunus with the political challenge of building consensual support for the reforms among a heterogenous group of politicians with widely disparate electoral support and political agendas.
The initial modus operandi of the Consensus Commission has yielded a spreadsheet which puts together their proposed reform agenda in a synoptic form of 167 itemised questions on specific reforms, which are expected to be answered by each party through a quiz format limited to responses through tick-marking one of three possible options: "agree," "disagree," or "partially disagree." There is also a box attached to each question for parties to attach comments, if any, relating to the proposed reform.
Beyond indicating their preferences on each reform proposal, the political parties are also expected to tick-mark their preferred options for implementing the reforms whether by executive order of the IG, an elected constitutional assembly, or to be left to an elected parliament. This complex set of governance challenges are also spelt out in synoptic form in the spreadsheet. As anyone who has conducted such US-style examinations knows, such a process may not be able to capture the nuances and complexities which underlie each question. Nor does the spreadsheet provide scope for discussing the process through which each reform will need to be enacted and eventually implemented. Converting a "yes" response to a single-line reform proposal into a policy or legislative programme is thus likely to be a much more challenging process than preparing a commission report.
Most of the political parties, including the BNP, JI and NCP, have responded to this scholastic interrogation. It is not clear how the Consensus Commission will evaluate their answers or how they will weigh responses from the many parties with negligible electoral support and the few that command nationwide electoral support. Nor is it clear as to how the IG will relate to the consensus-building of the commission since Yunus and the IG are currently the only available institutional body with the power to move towards enacting reforms based on the evaluation of the questionnaire and consultation with the political parties.
While some reforms, classified as "low-hanging fruits," can be picked for immediate implementation by the IG, the process of actually operationalising even these reforms to a point where they yield results on the ground is likely to take time. Reforms, if they are to be carried out, will thus largely depend on the commitment and political perspective of whichever party or coalition wins the forthcoming elections and their capacity to implement the reforms. In such an undefined universe for enacting and implementing reforms by the Yunus government, the debate over reforms versus elections is somewhat theoretical and reflects contesting political strategies rather than policy differences.
Moves by the IG, under pressure from the NCP and their allies, to ban the AL or keep them out of the elections is likely to be open to contestation, both legally and politically, within the country. Nor may it find favour at the international level, particularly within the UN system. The UN has called for an inclusive election. India, in particular, is likely to make an inclusive election into an issue of both bilateral and international concern. It should be kept in mind that the exclusion of a major party such as the BNP from contesting the national elections of 2014 and 2024 and the fraudulence of the 2018 election put the legitimacy of the AL-led regime at the national and global levels under challenge throughout the last decade.
The elephant in the room
Within this still-evolving scenario, the elephant in the room remains the Awami League. The NCP wants to ban the AL. The BNP rather ambiguously argues that AL's fate should be decided by the people or the courts, whatever this means. The BNP is inhibited from taking a categorical position on this issue at this time. It would ideally like to claim that it fought a freely contested election fairly defeating all comers, particularly the AL. The party reckons a banned AL would remain a permanent source of agitation on the streets, better positioned to challenge a victorious BNP government, more so than an electorally defeated party. However, the path towards drawing the AL into the electoral arena, with its leadership in exile and other leaders and activists largely in hiding or incarcerated, remains uncertain.
How far the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) will be able to convict and sentence a significant number of AL leaders, apart from SH, through a credible judicial process remains to be seen. Many of these AL leaders, whether as ministers or MPs, may also be expected to be held accountable for various acts of corruption. This would also need to be done through a judicial process which may determine their eligibility for contesting elections.
Moving from jail cells and remand to the courtroom and passing sentence in Bangladesh is a time-consuming process if it is to be done within the rule of law. So AL's capacity to eventually contest elections remains a grey area. If such issues are resolved in time and the AL is permitted to contest, with the right to campaign on the streets for their nominated candidates, take out processions, and organise public meeting, this is likely to introduce a highly incendiary element into the electoral campaign.
Moves by the IG, under pressure from the NCP and their allies, to ban the AL or keep them out of the elections is likely to be open to contestation, both legally and politically, within the country. Nor may it find favour at the international level, particularly within the UN system. The UN has called for an inclusive election. India, in particular, is likely to make an inclusive election into an issue of both bilateral and international concern. It should be kept in mind that the exclusion of a major party such as the BNP from contesting the national elections of 2014 and 2024 and the fraudulence of the 2018 election put the legitimacy of the AL-led regime at the national and global levels under challenge throughout the last decade. The exclusion of a major political party such as the AL, however discredited it may be, is hardly likely to keep the forthcoming elections immune from challenge.
Bangladesh is today led by Muhammad Yunus, a universally respected person of unquestioned integrity. FILE PHOTO: PID
Prof Yunus recently said that the next election in Bangladesh would be the most free and fair. In this context, we can recall that in 1991, the Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed caretaker government, of which I was privileged to be a member, received much applause both at home and abroad for holding a free, fair, peaceful, and fully inclusive election. In that election, the ousted military dictator HM Ershad's Jatiya Party won 35 seats in parliament. Ershad himself won in five constituencies while he was under house arrest in Gulshan. A veteran Indian journalist, Nikhil Chakravarty, editor of the weekly Mainstream, who was a member of a team of election observers, termed the Shahabuddin election as the freest and fairest election he had witnessed in his lifetime.
The pathway to national elections, whether in December 2025 or in 2026, is not likely to be so smooth. Whenever the election campaign hits the streets, we will get a sense of how far the attempt by the IG to build a consensus to ensure a more peaceful political process has built up any traction. The contested social and political landscape is already manifesting itself through the growing visibility of attempts by extremist forces to use the more congenial environment provided by the IG to more openly express themselves. This has created an increasing sense of insecurity for women in public spaces and an enhanced sense of vulnerability for indigenous and religious minorities. Threats of violence voiced by extremist groups and expatriate influencers using social media indicate that the freedom to practise a particular brand of politics or voice uncomfortable opinions can no longer be taken for granted. If such acts of violence are to remain a relevant factor in the practice of democracy, even under the Yunus-led government, the emergence of a reformed democratic order based on public reasoning is going to remain elusive.
In this fast-evolving political environment, the IG may find that its most challenging agenda remains to prevent a further deterioration in the condition of the economy and to bring about some visible improvements within their tenure. While some improvements in the economy have been registered under the IG, the recent decision by the Trump administration to expose Bangladesh's principal exports to a regime of high tariffs has added a further element of uncertainty for the IG's management of the economy. The law and order situation remains a matter of continuing concern. Failure to effectively manage the economy and the law and order situation could erode the credibility and authority of the IG, which remains crucial to ensure a transition to a free and fair election with a peaceful transfer of power to an elected government.
Fortunately, prospects for change are not without hope. Bangladesh is today led by Muhammad Yunus, a universally respected person of unquestioned integrity. Attempts across the border to paint him as an intolerant fundamentalist with a hunger for power lack credibility and hence appear tendentious in intent. His presence as the head of the IG has provided the country with a rare moment where governance and policy decisions are largely made not for personal benefits, but for the greater good. Some of these decisions may be unwise, governance may be deficient in some areas, but the commitment of the regime remains sincere. If such a regime cannot lead the way towards substantive change, then Bangladesh may indeed face another era of disappointment and discontent.
Prof Rehman Sobhan, one of Bangladesh's most distinguished economists and a celebrated public intellectual, is founder and chairman of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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