Why US hasn't cut Egypt aid

An Egyptian man talks to a cop from inside of Cairo's Al-Fath mosque where Islamist supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi holed up yesterday. Photo: AFP

A army officer points his gun to crowd as he helps an Islamist man to leave the mosque. Security froces yesterday cleared the mosque where Morsi supporters gathered after being evicted from two protest camps on Wednesday. Photo: AFP

The slaughter of hundreds in Egypt this week was horrifying. The response of the United States to that slaughter seemed puny and impotent.
Around the world critics suggested the United States was either effectively condoning the violence or sending a strong message that it wouldn't penalize the Egyptian military for this or future harshness. It didn't help that after his statement the president slipped off for a round of golf.
The unnecessarily callous optics of the golf game aside, the unsettling reality is that America's options were puny and likely to have very little effect. Indeed, the White House wisely avoided falling into the trap of "feel good measures:" bold gestures that may resonate but ultimately won't work.
Some argue the United States should suspend the delivery of some or all the $1.3 billion in annual aid it sends to the Egyptian government. But this would only further reduce the limited influence US have over the Egyptian military.
It is important to remember that after Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's overthrow, governments from the Persian Gulf in a matter of days offered the new Egyptian government 10 times the amount the United States gives each year. Not only did this shift the balance of influence away from the United States, but it also raises the possibility that they might well have replaced any funds US withdrew, blunting the impact of any actions.
It is also important to remember that the situation in Egypt is not black and white. While there is no excuse for the kind of massacres that took place this week, the Muslim Brotherhood also has a share of responsibility for the situation on the ground. The Morsi government regularly abused its authority, trampled on basic human rights and was so widely reviled in Egypt that its overthrow was welcomed by tens of millions of citizens.
Had the United States been tougher back then and had it worked more with the international community to tie total aid flows to prevent Morsi era irregularities, it could have helped forestall the current situation.
This last overall point contains the secret to effective US leverage over Egypt and many countries these days. The United States cannot have much impact acting alone.
This is the hard choice for America: Embrace the risks and costs of real engagement or accept those associated with a much more passive role. This doesn't mean US have to be foolish. The world doesn't need more Iraqs.