The Palestinian state: 'Road map' for nowhere!

In a surprise disclosure on March 14 when a war in Iraq had become almost a certainty President Bush conveyed his willingness to spell out the 'road map' for the Palestinian statehood as soon as President Yasser Arafat formally announced the appointment of his deputy, Mahmood Abbas, a moderate, as prime minister of Palestine. This is how the US now leading a quartet (the others forming it are the UN, the EU and Russia) that designed the road map as well as Israel wanted Arafat, the beleaguered President of the Palestinian Authority to perform his last ritual and then to be abandoned before the new peace journey is undertaken in conflict-torn Middle East. Then onward, there are enough indications from the both that they would have nothing to do with Arafat and instead deal with moderate Mahmood Abbas, better known as Abu Mazen.

The mood is in sharp contrast to what it was in 1993 when Yasser Arafat was in great demand by the peace brokers who virtually pitch forked him from Tunis where, after a series of PLO's setback, its redoubtable leader was licking his wounds. Arafat jettisoned his revolutionary path to give peace a chance. In hindsight, it can however be concluded to day that it was Arafat's fauxpas to be tricked into a vague Oslo peace process which like today's 'road map' was full of imponderables and could not possibly succeed with the US, a committed ally of Israel, playing the role of honest broker. As the Oslo process unravelled, Arafat painfully realised that even the peace was to be bargained from a position of strength and also that how bereft he was of that in absence of all the compliments that constitute power.

However, in the meantime Arafat was fully utilised by the peace brokers in procuring PLO's crucial recognition to Israel and breaking the momentum of the long years of intifada which precisely compelled the Israelis to come to negotiating table through which they wanted to be relieved of the increasing cost of occupation and the ignominy that accompanied it. Notwithstanding his failures on several fronts Arafat remained faithful to the Palestinian cause and stubbornly defended it throughout the Oslo peace process causing annoyance for the western peace brokers who expected him only to sign on the dotted lines creating a kind of spotty 'Bantustan' in the name of Palestinian state without Jerusalem, refugees' right to return, border, sovereignty or security. Arafat's fate was sealed when he, ignoring the pressure brought to bear on him by none other than President Clinton walked out of Camp David II in July, 2000.

The rest is history with the eruption of second intifada, Israel's reconquest of the occupied West Bank, naked Israeli repression of the Palestinians, neutralising Arafat's power to act while the Bush Administration lent its unqualified support to Israel's 'right to defend'. Yet the revival of Middle East peace process in a different garb has generated a good deal of curiosity about the motives of the peace brokers. The observers of the West Asian affairs view Bush's announcement of a 'road map' as the US' desperate attempt to offset the adverse effect of the US' President's blatantly pro-Israeli policies with a view to seeking the Arab Leaders' support on the eve of just-concluded war against Iraq. Bush's announcement was also timed to assuage the European Union which considered the longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestinians a potential threat to international peace and security.

As scripted earlier the 'road map' is already out with the approval of Prime Minister Mahmood Abbas and his government by Palestinian Parliament. On the face of it, the 'road map' is the most concerted effort to end Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1993 Oslo accords. Spread over next two or three years it has distinct phases -- the first of which is to get the two peoples back to where they were before the second and current intifada that erupted is September, 2000.

Thereafter the 'road map' envisages new Palestinian election to be followed in the next stage by the setting up of a Palestinian state "with attributes of sovereignty", at first behind provisional borders covering as yet undefined areas. The state will then hold permanent agreement talks with Israel, hoping to resolve the familiar thorny issues of Jerusalem, settlements, borders and refugees to reach a fully fledged treaty in 2003. During the Oslo peace process when both the sides reached only the fringe of this explosive area, the final status agreement -- the peace process itself exploded only on the question of Jerusalem -- let alone the questions of other issues which were yet to be debated. Even this time there are already reservations on both sides who are awaiting the right time to vent out their grievances. The road map while focussing on its positive attributes obfuscates insurmountable rood blocks that lie on the way.

In the first place there is the crisis of intent over the US' search for an alternative Palestinian leadership to do business with. There is deliberate attempt to isolate Yasser Arafat from any negotiation over the road map. The US' constant demonisation of Arafat and attempt to deny him a role in the new deal by themselves make the road map a suspect.

In early nineties when Israel was exasperated with the intensity of the first intifada, the hawks in Arafat's PLO as well as other extremist Palestinian groups were exuding confidence as to the success of the intifada and opposed any western-brokered peace process, it was Arafat's leadership which made an effort at peace possible although it cost him some of his own popularity. That by itself was a great compromise on Arafat's part. Both the US and Israel are now well aware that Arafat cannot make compromises on the issue of Palestinian cause which he himself crafted and nourished. It was precisely the reason the Camp David II collapsed. They, therefore, do not want to waste time with Arafat and instead like to try a new Palestinian leader and possibly new set of interlocutors. They have obviously pinned their hope on a 'moderate' 'Abu Mazen' whom they may be able to mellow down to extract maximum concessions during final status negotiation.

But howsoever much the US and Israel try to bypass Arafat to put the 'road map' through, any deal based on it will lack legitimacy without the consent of Arafat who is still not only the elected President of Palestinian Authority but also the founding father of Palestinian movement and the symbol of its cause. It is true that Arafat has not always been above the boards in his official functions amidst tremendous limitations imposed on him and his strong arm tactics within the PLO as well as policies pursued by him might have been staple for criticism in several quarters. But few can deny that he and his functioning style were singularly responsible for the Palestinians getting their plights on the international agenda in the seventies and afterwards.

The Palestinians seldom forget that. Notwithstanding a fresh setback for the Palestinians in the aftermath of the 'shock of awe' of the second Gulf war and all attempted separation between Arafat and Palestinian cause it looks difficult for the 'quartet' to make them agree to a sham Palestinian state and thus bury the hatchet in the Middle East. The spirit for freedom is indeed indomitable. Once on full display, it can portend yet another phase of conflict in the Middle East which can be still more bloody, ugly and devastating.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.