End of a religious state?

CONCERNS and fears are high in Egypt ahead of June 30 where masses are expected to march to the presidential palace, demanding the withdrawal of confidence from President Mohamed Mursi, as well as early presidential elections. These fears are particularly high among Islamist movements and pro-regime militias as well as revolutionary groups and major opposition forces who have announced their support for the "Tamarod" (Rebel) campaign which has collected millions of anti-Mursi petitions to date.

This atmosphere of fear, anxiety and anticipation is a result of many questions: Will the expected mass demonstrations be entirely peaceful like they were during the 2011 uprising? Or will they be another useless wave of protests that only delays everyday life for a few days not more? Or will the country drown in seas of blood as a result of street brawls between supporters and opponents of the regime?

Other legitimate questions are also now surfacing without answers: How did a large sector of Egyptians grow to hate the Muslim Brotherhood in such a short period of time? Why hate the Brotherhood only and not the Salafi (ultraconservative) movements whom they also ideologically disagree with? Why not hate the "Strong Egypt" Party that is led by an ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood? Why not hate many other Islamist movements?

Another important question is: Will Mursi's administration fall on June 30 or will the Muslim Brotherhood make compromises to calm civil opposition forces (such as sacking Prime Minister Hisham Kandil's government, freezing the activity of the Shura Council (upper house of parliament), changing the general prosecutor, amending the election law to make it more transparent and representatives of the voters, etc.)?

Meanwhile, very frightening rumours are circulating, including that unprecedented violence will erupt in light of the absence of police and army forces—leading to a bloody scenario similar to that of Lebanon or Algeria—or that Churches and Mosques have been collecting arms to engage in a full-on fight for and against the regime—God forbids.

Egypt's modern history witnessed several successful movements to overthrow oppressive regimes. The first example is the 1919 revolution where a campaign to collect authorisations granted Saad Zaghloud popular legitimacy to assume executive power and negotiate with the British occupation, leading eventually to the ratification of the1923 constitution.

The second example was another petition campaign that granted Mohamed ElBaradei some popular legitimacy to consider nominating himself as president against toppled President Hosni Mubarak—which gave people hope for change that sparked the January 25 revolution.

What's interesting about Tamarod is that the number of petitions (for a no-confidence vote against Mursi) that it has so far collected highly exceeds any number of petitions collected against Mubarak—which can only mean that popular rejection for the Brotherhood regime is a lot more powerful than the people's rejection for Hosni Mubarak's administration.

Former presidential candidate and leading member of the National Salvation Front (Egypt's main opposition alliance) Hamdeen Sabahi has stressed on the importance of the June 30 demonstrations for completing the goals of the revolution which was abandoned by the Brotherhood regime. He expressed his confidence that millions of Egyptians will participate in the protests to take back their revolution from those who have hijacked it and reproduced the old regime.

A large portion of Egyptians hold the Brotherhood responsible for failing to manage the country after the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and consider it the obstacle that has delayed Egypt's transition to democracy and failed to deliver the revolutionary demands: bread, freedom and social justice.

Of course these failures include their constant breaking of their promises, the economic crises that all Egyptians pay for, the tension they have created with Ethiopia as well as the lawlessness in Sinai. However, perhaps all these examples do not even compare to how the Muslim Brotherhood regime has divided Egyptians into two fighting camps while they continued to rule despite all the damage they have caused.

Political and legal expert Noor Farahat said, "The legitimacy that President Mohamed Mursi's supporters refer to in arguing that he must continue to rule is not granted by imposing power through deception, but through meeting the demands of the people and ensuring them that he truly represents them."

He added that while the road to legitimacy is elections, votes do not give the ruler the ultimate authorisation to disregard the people's will, which, he argues, has already happened through:

* Ratifying a disfigured constitution -- voted on by only 20% of eligible voters -- which divided the people into two camps;
* Squandering the lives of police and army forces on Egypt's borders;
* Leaving Sinai under the mercy of terrorists and outlaws;
* Adopting economic projects that harm national interest like the Sukuk (bonds) draft law.
* The Brotherhoodisation of state institutions;
* Sabotaging culture veins; and
* Undermining the constitutional legitimacy by attacking the judiciary and imposing a prosecutor general despite a court order to remove him.

Egypt's economic status, according to many experts, has almost hit the point of no return, where it's expected that soon an entire economic collapse will occur due to the debts and budget deficit.

A former leading member of the Brotherhood, Tharwat al-Kharbawy, said, "The Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt will fall three days into the protests which are scheduled to begin on June 30. The regime will not be able to resist and removing it will not take the revolutionaries so much time."

Kharbawy added to the Watan newspaper that the Brotherhood is a very weak institution unlike what its campaigners propagate, and will not be able to resist because their being is more important to them than ruling the country. He predicts them to step back and withdraw all their forces when or if they are faced by mass protests and return to their hiding places -- like they did under the Mubarak regime.

The writer is Managing Editor, Al-Ahram Newspaper.
E-mail: [email protected]