Bangladesh Politics in the Y2K Generation
Will there be a new breed of politicians in the Y2K generation? Imagination can get foot loose but let us not expect a completely different kind of politicians in the near future. The quintessential lawyer-politicians will yield the remaining of their ground to the new business groups, and such activists who can organize hartals or who can counter them. The influence of the moneyed class in Bangladesh politics, irrespective of the denominations, is palpable, and the Y2K politicians will even be more sautéed in money.
WHEN Sheikh Hasina was visiting Washington, D.C. soon after she had become the Prime Minister in 1996, a young lady of Bangladeshi descent, I am told, asked her a portentous question at a public meeting: "Do you know that if you live by the sword, you also die by the sword? You came to power riding the crest of hartal and protest, don't you fear that you could also face such a tide of political unrest?" I was not at that gathering, and I cannot vouch for the exact wording of that prophetic question to Sheikh Hasina. But that apprehension may hold the key to the future politics of the Y2K generation that is long out of the crib and kicking in Bangladesh. Except the hype that goes with it, there is no way to precisely calculate the political future of the millennial generation although one could make projections of the likely events. I saw an abundance of such spinning in the last few weeks.
The human inventiveness in politics, in practice and imagination, is limited - during the last 2000 plus years, people have toyed only with a few forms of government while physics, and chemistry, electronics and communication technologies have made astronomical advances. Aristotle offered only two qualitative measurements for government - good and bad, and quantitatively, the Greek philosopher classified them as a government by one (good monarchy or a dictatorship), a few (aristocracy or an oligarchy) and by many (democracy or anarchy). Neither Plato nor Aristotle liked democracy. Because, in their understanding, democracy tries to make a donkey an elephant by (the majority) calling a donkey an elephant! Both of those philosophers preferred governance by a "few good men". Things have changed since then - we prefer democracy not because it is the perfect form of government, but it is the most desirable one since it is more (hopefully!) corrigible than the leadership of one or a few.
In the last (virtual) three decades of the last millennium, Bangladesh has in turn tested governance by one (single charismatic leader), a few (martial law government), and many (parliamentary government) - we have been shifting political gears as nervously as the excited but inexperienced automobile driver. We have seen a chaotic Bangladesh at the dawn of its separation from Pakistan; still a parliamentary form of government was in place until its sudden transformation into an authoritarian regime in 1975. But that was followed by the bloody coups and counter coups unparallel in South Asia although we could still claim to be better off than Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Indonesia, to name a few among the apocalyptic spots around the world. We saw martial law, and then the military turned into civilian regimes, one of which was vociferously rejected in 1991 for an about turn to the Westminster form of government. That's an epigrammatic but not an unfair summation of Bangladesh politics - may I add that the Y2K generation will surely carry the baggage of the past. The calendarical change to a new century/millennium does not dramatically alter the political inheritance.
The impasse between the opposition and the ruling party is not likely to break - one side is not ready to yield to the other. In fact, the BNP-led alliance has greeted the new millennium with more strikes, and the governing party is planning to go ahead with the local elections in the teeth of the opposition resistance. The government and the opposition fronts are out to "teach" each other a lesson! I fear that the hangover from those opposition-boycotted local polls, if they are held in the coming weeks, will last much longer than the hangover from the 31st December night. That's the troubling prospect in the weeks and months to come, which few could ignore. Not even the most dedicated followers of Sheikh Hasina expect tranquillity in the coming months of the millennium. Neither the Awami League nor the BNP-led alliance is thinking beyond their immediate future - as a matter of habit, few ordinary politicians think beyond the next election. But no more a single leader will be treated with hypnotic reverence, and no single party will be considered the "natural inheritor" of power in Bangladesh. The old hyperbole of "pro-liberation" versus "anti-liberation", will hardly inspire many beyond the ardent partisans. Sadly, that split could continue as before unless we stop using history as a single cookie-cutting mould to divide the civil society into "us" against "them".
Bangladesh emerged as the effective two-large-parties system as a result of the 1991 and 1996 elections - a rare achievement except in a handful of democratic countries. But that opportunity has been missed for which the Awami League, more than the BNP, shoulders the burden. By launching an unprecedented campaign and fomenting a bureaucratic rebellion against an elected government for the alleged by-election fraud, the Awami League set up a bad precedent in 1995-96 that is now exploding on its face in 2000. The BNP-led antagonists are parading the streets and mobilizing forces to oust Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina the same way she had forced Khaleda Zia to step down from office. Arguably, the Awami League could again do the same if the BNP-led coalition returns to power. So even the most optimistic BNP leaders may not have much to rejoice. This future cascade of tit for tat is not difficult to imagine! Irrespective of the possible winners and losers in the months or even years to come, the institutional weakness of politics is most likely to deepen. That should worry those who think about the long-term domestic and strategic configuration for Bangladesh, and the Y2K generation should shudder at such a destabilizing prospect.
Let us not ignore that Bangladesh politics is passing through a fed up phase; and let us not forget that most Bangladeshis want to get out of the perceived paralysis of the law enforcement agencies. Both of those proclivities are the results from what they experienced in recent years. But the people also want to extricate themselves from the cycle of lawlessness. For the future, the importance of good governance will be the issue number 1 - more pragmatic Bangladeshis of the new generation would prefer a scaled down partisanship in the affairs of the state. Still, the intensity of the division along party lines will not drop out of sight, in fact, it may even get worse before it gets better. Rampant corruption, often politically backed, is pounding the last nails on the failed apparatus for governance. It's not just a question of toning up the administrative machinery, but overhauling it, lock, stock and barrel. The Bangladeshis are caught in the mind boggling environmental pollution, but their politics is even more dangerously contaminated by over-politicization. Worse still are the conceptually loose vocabularies and personal insults, which shred even the semblance of mutual respect and understanding between the leaders and groups. Lot has already been written on this.
Bangladesh will face more concerted challenges from the minority rights activists, there will be more pressure from the international NGOs, and those tremors will be felt across the political spectrum. Bangladeshis are rapidly acquiring the information technology that can digitize, retrieve and circulate political emotions around the globe to gather support for those causes - such forces will open new frontiers to the old religious and ethnic conflicts. To accommodate such pressure, the larger parties and the national leaders need a change of heart, flexibility and accommodation. It's not just a question of the BNP and its presumably right wing and anti-Indian political partners who will be confronted by the minority activists - even the ruling Awami League is facing the tough choice of accepting the minority demands to abrogate the so called enemy properties law that came in the wake of the 1965 India-Pakistan war. Even if the law is changed, there are free floating doubts if the minorities will ever get back the properties. They might form their own parties; already there are voices from the minority groups and the smaller parties for proportional representation. Once that happens, the single dominant party system would lose its flair, and the Bangladeshi political landscape will change forever. But the minority activism may also result into an anti-minority backlash.
Modern politics is largely a reactive phenomenon - what happens in New Delhi will affect Bangladesh politics, no matter which party will be in power in Dhaka. Indeed, the future configuration in West Bengal and the insurgencies of the northeastern states will also colour the Bangladeshi political scene. The BJP has remained somewhat restrained in the coalition partnerships, but, once it wins an absolute majority, its dogged pursuit for the Hindutva will be felt squarely throughout the entire region, including Bangladesh. It is no longer a loony thought! Some of the parties will conveniently feed the public on an anti-Indian bearing. Dhaka is unable to match New Delhi militarily but the unraveling Hindu nationalism will make India the strident political issue, not just in the hands of the BNP and the Jamaat. Bangladesh will not be a doctrinaire Islamic state, but the Muslim identity of Bangladesh will become a strong political force, and the major parties would vie with each other for the centre-right posture. The recent political realignments are a testimony to that likelihood in politics.
Will there be a new breed of politicians in the Y2K generation? Imagination can get foot loose but let us not expect a completely different kind of politicians in the near future. The quintessential lawyer-politicians will yield the remaining of their ground to the new business groups, and such activists who can organize hartals or who can counter them. The influence of the moneyed class in Bangladesh politics, irrespective of the denominations, is palpable, and the Y2K politicians will even be more sautéed in money. The influx of the retired civilian and military bureaucrats turned politicians has not improved the quality of political leadership, nor will it make much of a difference for the better in the future. Over the years, the student organizations have lost their old spirit of selfless standard-bearers; they also lost their credibility as the recruitment ground for future political leadership. If the recent trend is a road map to the future, Bangladesh will be more in the grip of the goons better known as the mastans, the most alarming spin off of the last few years of the past millennium. I see a chasm between what the Y2K generation might generally expect and what its politicians might offer. The calendarization of years, centuries and millennium does not necessarily match with the qualitative turning points of history and politics. The Y2K generation is yet to set the fresh tone of politics in the new century.
The writer teaches Political Science at the Rowan University, Glassboro, New Jersey, USA.
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