Back to the Brink

The Indo-Pakistan relations have recently dipped to a new low. A fresh tension has been brewing up between the sub continent's arch rivals since the hijacking of an Indian airliner by a mysterious quartet who after traversing the air space of at least half a dozen countries took it to Taliban-held Kandahar with 160 passengers and crew on board. In absence of any one or any agency taking the responsibility of that daredevil action the needle of suspicion in India instinctively pointed towards Pakistan although the latter, from the beginning of the crisis, did everything to dispel India's misgivings of her by playing a good samaritan to the hostages. Pakistan supplied fuel to the distressed aircraft, offered medical treatment to the patient and allowed Islamabad to be used as a base for UN humanitarian team apart from generally condemning the incident. Yet India persisted to obliquely refer to Pakistan's complicity in whole hijacking drama.

Later after the rescue of the hostages in exchange of three Kashmiri militants held in Indian custody, the Indian suspicion took the shape of outright allegations against Pakistan who also now joined the brawl. The mutual acrimony and allegations have now been brought to a crescendo and they take an ominous turn with none other than Prime Minister of India appealing to the international community, particularly the United States to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Earlier Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief Executive hardened his stance on Kashmir and ruled the possibility of a nuclear war on its count. The war of words raged in full fury.

Such strain and tension in relationship are nothing unusual between India and Pakistan who fought three wars with each other since 1947 and had constantly been at loggers head over disputed Indian state of Kashmir. Their armies were fielded more than once to be eyeball to eyeball at each other. Only recently they fought a high altitude war across the line of control in Kargil from where Pakistan had to scale down under American pressure. For the war in Kargil Pakistan was accused of betrayal after Lahore Declaration only months' earlier while the Mujahideens, believed to be sponsored by Pakistan, grudgingly climbed down the Kargil mountains after their stunning initial success.

Pakistan's Kargil muddle-up notwithstanding the Indo-Pakistan relation was not totally down to dump. It was still restorable so long Nawaz Sharif distanced himself from the Mujahideens who fought in Kargil and India was prepared to do business with his government. In fact, the subtle moves were underway to put back on rail the stated Foreign Secretaries level dialogue. But those prospects were rendered null and void with the seizing of power by General Pervez Musharraf who was widely perceived in India as mastermind behind Kargil shake-up. Not only the way the present crisis has been building up will be difficult to defuse, Indian mindset will remain obsessed with the General's 'commando image' vis-a-vis India.

With Musharraf the days of India-bashing and lambasting what Pakistan calls 'Indian hegemony' are back. The Lahore process obviously stands undermined as the new Pakistani leadership has drifted away from a relatively relaxed mode of Indo-Pakistan relationship that briefly existed during the tenure of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. In an interview to BBC the chief executive of Pakistan has given short thrift to Lahore process and related agreements. Musharraf made it clear that Pakistan wanted a Kashmir-first solution of bilateral problems and saw little merit in 'two plus six' Foreign Secretary level charade that actually 'sidelined' Kashmir. India finds Pakistan's new term of discourse not only unacceptable but also belligerent.

Under the circumstances a new process of engagement had to be negotiated between India and Pakistan. Because it was in the mutual interests of the two nuclear powers of the region to be in some kind of understanding with each other to guard against many imponderables of the nuclearisation itself. But the way the events unfolded after Musharraf's accession to power culminating in the hijacking drama has made that engagement difficult. In a prevailing flux India's blanket accusation only aggravated the already tenuous relationship between the two countries. However, now after the public appearance in Pakistan of Moulana Masud Azher, one of the militants released by India in hijack drama, and his anti-India pronouncements put the onus of dispensing justice squarely on Pakistan. It will be closely watched by international community how Pakistan maintains her innocence with regard to hijacking and absolve its alleged complicity. At least one country - the United States has asked Pakistan to apprehend and bring the hijackers to book, if they are in Pakistan.

But branding a neighbour terrorist is perhaps fraught with danger. More so when the neighbouring country is equipped with nuclear arsenal. No nuclear power can afford to keep its nuclear rival in isolation. Understandably there are few takers of India's perception of Pakistan as a terrorist country. The Western countries are rather discreet on the matter and reluctant to be swayed away by India's terror-phobia. During the Kargil conflict they lent diplomatic support to India in vacating aggression by Pakistan-sponsored militants. Now in an anticlimax they seem to have cold-shouldered India's request to make Pakistan a pariah state.

India has been trying the stratagem for sometimes past by portraying herself as an innocent victim of international terrorism from across the line of control in Kashmir and repeatedly pointed her accusing finger to Pakistan. India's Kargil war with Pakistan also accentuated a crucial change in South block's attitude towards the US and NATO countries: a search for good will and trust and her disassociation from confrontationism. In a clear departure from her traditional policies with regards to the West India started wooing it since the Kargil war. The trend could be evident during the course of shooting down of the Atlantique and debate over India's nuclear doctrine. India's new policy thrust is evidently intended to bring the West in her favour to face Pakistan's protracted 'proxy war' in Kashmir. But inspite of India's warming up with the West the latter's response is lukewarm at the best. Atleast the United States does not seem prepared to offset the region's strategic balance by unduly tilting to one side.

Moreover the attempt to demonise Pakistan by calling it terrorist state brings to the fore some of the fundamental issues and raises some ugly questions as to the origin of terrorism in Kashmir. It is true that since 1989 an indigenous uprising by the Kashmiris for what they called 'Huryat' (freedom) was later aided by outsiders of many motives and hues but no insurgency could be sustained in Kashmir without the support of the Kashmiris themselves. During militancy in Kashmir for more than a decade there might have been new induction in the ranks of militants, some changes in the leadership shifting some control to the outsiders and a revision in the strategy of the insurgency but it remains essentially a homegrown 'intifada' of the disaffected Kashmiris - a truth persistently played down by India.

Surprisingly, after the Mujahideen's setback in Kargil war when the L of C is kept under increased vigilance and the valley of Jammu and Kashmir is practically sealed, a stepped-up insurgency has rocked the state as never before. As the guns fell quiet in Kargil the army and paramilitary camps were attacked in a series of intrepid operations in Kashmir. The similar operations have now become almost a daily affair in the state. The Kargil victory might have come handy in India for a national resurgence but the core problem in Kashmir - whether the state will continue to remain a part of Indian union or snap its tenuous link - remains as alive as before.

A jittered authority quickly put the blame for increased violence in Kashmir on ubiquitous infiltrators from across the border. At the same time the desperate security forces in Kashmir, now totalling seven lacs, unleash their own terror to quell the insurgency. The villages are razed to the ground in response to any militant attack in their vicinity. Can the flame of revolt in Kashmir be put down just by declaring some country terrorist? A solution may lie in a dispassionate evaluation of the situation that has now obtained in Kashmir and addressing the issues fundamental to the crisis.