Fallout from an attack on Iran
There are those in Congress and beyond who advocate for a pre-emptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. The arguments put forward are nothing new. A nuclear-armed Shiite-led Iran that is committed to the destruction of Israel is an unthinkable scenario for western powers. Despite what the hardliners will have us believe, merely attacking the Iranian nuclear infrastructure will not put an end to the programme. Unlike Iraq's now defunct nuclear facility that was taken out by an Israeli air strike in '81, Iran's facilities are widely dispersed. An attack will at best set back the Iranians a few years.
We are still in the "best guess" scenario as to when Iran will be in a position to produce its first bomb. The disastrous Iraq campaign was based on intelligence that portrayed Iraq as being very close to achieving nuclear capability. It led United States into Iraq and found no weapons of mass destruction to speak of. This brings us to the question whether this time round the US should take the same route. Rather, would it not be more judicious to get some real, hard evidence that Iran is on the road to produce the bomb? As pointed out by Colin H. Kahl, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Programme at Georgetown University in a recent article: "According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defence intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon."
Indeed, they are not the only people of authority who disagree with the "hawks" that Iran poses an imminent threat to world peace. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security, went on record to state that there is a "low probability" of Iran developing a bomb within the next year even in the remote chance that they had the capacity to do so. Apart from Natanz and Qom sites, there are no other known or suspected nuclear enrichment plants in Iran. Hence, for the country to produce further weapons-grade uranium would have to go through these plants that are under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision, and therefore would not go undetected.
Secondly, any covert or overt military action on the nuclear programme would be considered an act of war by the Iranian leadership. It is safe to assume the "retaliation" would come on several fronts. Iran's naval capabilities are dubious. Its ability to lay thousands of mines is not. Even the temporary closure of the Straits of Hormuz will have economic repercussions in terms of volatility in international oil markets. Hezbollah, which has received Iranian largesse in the past and continues to receive in the present will feel compelled to take up the cause.
A re-ignited Lebanon and a return to civil war cannot to be ruled out. And a spilling over of the conflict onto Israel could become a real possibility. In fact, embroiling Israel into a campaign in Lebanon will be to Iran's great advantage. An American attack on Iran will certainly fuel anti-US feelings across the region. Several Arab nations have Sunni-minority royalty ruling over Shiite majority populations and containing a multi-nation "Shiite Spring" may prove difficult. The Shia-led Iraq government for one would find it immensely difficult to contain its populace from taking up the fight against US forces and interests in and out of the country.
How does the West respond to these retaliations on several fronts? Going into Iran with a multinational "coalition of the willing" may prove infinitely more difficult in today's global economic climate. Europe is in no state to take part in any major military action that will certainly be long-term in nature. Using Iraq as a staging front for an Iran invasion will be a hard sell. That leaves the naval front. Iranians operate 6 modern Russian Kilo-class diesel electric submarines. Iran also operates a significant number of midget submarines and more than a 1,000 small, highly manoeuvrable attack vessels equipped with everything from rocket launchers, anti-ship missiles, torpedoes and more importantly, mine-laying capabilities.
There is little doubt that the US would prevail from a strictly military perspective. But then the question really is at what cost? And precisely what would the US have gained through such a course of action? The central argument for a conflict with Iran inevitably revolves around Israel's security. An Iran under attack will certainly not increase Israel's security, rather endanger it. Make no mistake, unlike the Gulf war in the early '90s, Israel will find itself on the frontlines. Despite the iron dome missile defence system, some of Hezbollah's Iranian-made long range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 or the Syrian-supplied "Scud" missiles are bound to get through. Israel will respond. And when it does, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East will undergo a radical transformation. Years of painstaking relationships built up with Arab regimes will be put under severe stress. Today, there are Islamist parties heading major powerhouses in the region including Egypt. Traditional Sunni-Shia distrust and hatred could very well be put aside in the face of what people may perceive to be US aggression and meddling in the region.
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