Benazir's assassination: Implications and lessons

I had grave reservations about the manner in which Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan two months ago after a reported power-sharing "deal" with President-General Musharraf. That deal had revived bad memories about an earlier deal struck between her father and another general, with fateful consequences for the future of Pakistan and the region.
Nevertheless, I admired her gutsy return to Pakistan after the first assassination attempt on her in Karachi shortly after her return from exile by a suicide bomber that resulted in massive collateral casualties. Benazir Bhutto knew fully well the personal risk she was taking when she returned from Dubai, and she had admitted that she was fearful for her own life and safety, but declared that there was all the more reason for her to return to hold high the banner of democracy -- in that defiant act of courage, she redeemed herself of all her past blemishes, whether real or merely perceived, and regained for herself the center stage as democracy's leading champion in Pakistan.
Benazir Bhutto was targeted by the militant-Islamists because she was a multi-dimensional symbol of everything that the latter opposed -- she was a woman leader, with secular western education, a champion of democracy who had become a rallying point for all forces of tolerance and pluralism, she had allied with and was openly seen to be backed by Washington, and that she had declared publicly that she would join hands with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and rout fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The initial attempt on her life, although that failed, was a clear warning shot across the bows that she was viewed as a serious threat by the Taliban and that she had to be physically removed from the scene. The aim of the militant-Islamists was obvious -- intimidate her and other moderate leadership across Pakistan, and Pakistani civil society as a whole, into retreating into a shell once again. The initial reaction, of widespread rage and violence across Pakistan, in the hours following her brutal murder, is testimony to the contrary.
However, the cynic in me also naggingly suggests that one cannot rule out entirely the possibility that forces inimical to democracy and mutually accommodative pluralism may also be involved in fanning the flames of violence, setting the mise en scene for the military to step in once again. The target of post-Bhutto assassination has been, predominantly, the symbols of government (and party) linked with General Musharraf, who is also viewed by the Taliban through the same jaundiced lens through which they looked at Benazir Bhutto, and considered (as she was) an American stooge.
This might prima facie appear as somewhat convoluted, and self-contradictory, but is it?. My reading and understanding of our region's history (and I include Bangladesh) tells me that the shift to the right and the creeping annexation of middle grounds by the radical forces of obscurantism and militant Islam, have taken place inexorably under the watch of successive military regimes. The Taliban and other assorted militant-Islamist forces have progressively expanded their influence and political clout during earlier military regimes in Pakistan, and most brazenly so during General Musharraf's 8-year watch.
When General Musharraf assumed power (illegally, in my analysis written in an op-ed in this paper on April 18, 2000 titled "Quo Vadis, Pakistan?"), he had done so with the promise that he was going to wipe out corruption, bring corrupt politicians to book, and restore clean democracy all within two years (does that litany sound familiar?).
He convicted the prime minister he deposed, and instituted corruption cases against the other former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, and drove them both into exile (thus establishing the "minus-two formula" as a model for emulation by others). I had questioned some of those premises and assertions at that time. Let me recall some of the words I wrote then here:
"In the South Asian tradition, such leaders do not simply fade away, and today's villains can well bounce back as tomorrow's heroes. Remember Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who was written off in 1977? It took her less than a year to return with triumph to centre stage.
The Military Establishment in Pakistan has transformed into a law unto itself, right from the very birth of Pakistan in 1947. Pakistan's political institutions have been so weakened by the rapacity of the military that, contrary to what the military claim as an excuse for their latest coup, 10 years were not enough for the democratic process to establish sustainable roots and take off on a mature course. Democracy is a process, and every country must evolve it to suit its own genius and needs. Institution building needs time, and a great deal of investment in education and public awareness programs, for developing intrinsic resilience … The paramountcy of the army in Pakistan is directly antithetical to the growth and development of the democratic process in that country … Every successive conflict, or confrontation in an arms race, or missile race, or the nuclear race, with India has dragged the country's economy further down, leaving progressively less and less for the country's economic development and societal needs.
The military has always ignored the basic truth that if the economy was in shambles, it was largely so because of pandering to the jingoism of the extreme right and the military, pouring the bulk of the nation's resources into an arms and missile race, and finally the nuclear race as well …
Much has been written in the Pakistan and international media about the sighs of relief and joy, which greeted the coup in Pakistan. Of the wide unpopularity of the prime minister. The undisputed fact remains that Nawaz Sharif was an elected prime minister, the first one in Pakistan's history to have been elected with a convincing mandate. He was the head of government, and in that capacity, he had the prerogative of hiring or firing the service chiefs. But as has happened so often in Pakistan, the tail wagged the dog. The military coup was illegal. Merely having indulged in it so often in the past and quoting precedence does not give it legal status or justify it. If military coups could have been the panacea to the problems of a country or its peoples, its virtues would have supplanted democratic or other institutions of governance in many parts of the world.
The instruments of fanaticism which Pakistan helped create in Afghanistan are now, like the proverbial chicken, all coming home to roost. Rumblings of how little General Musharraf has progressed on his many promises, all old wine in new bottles, are beginning to be muttered. The general is riding a tiger, and therein lies the danger, for this will leave him with no option but to cling on desperately to it and prolong his ride for as long as he can."
Touting himself as a champion against the Taliban, General Musharraf succeeded in endearing himself in the myopic vision of the West (read America here), and milked the latter for all she was worth while prolonging his stay for another seven years since I wrote my earlier piece. But how much has all the aid poured into Pakistan succeeded in containing, or routing, the forces of militant Islam? On the contrary, it brought those forces to the very heart of Pakistan's capital, as the Red Mosque episode so strikingly proclaimed to the world. And now the blow-back of Talibanisation to Pakistan from its rout in 1991 in Afghanistan, has reversed direction. After establishing what appears to be well-established and well consolidated beach-heads within Pakistan, it is in the process of re-invading Afghanistan.
So what is President Musharraf, and Pakistan, going to do now? The temptation on the part of the lately (and very reluctantly) civilianised president would, I suspect be very strong to re-impose a state of emergency, perhaps even invoke a return to martial law. That has been the traditional, knee-jerk response of military leaders espousing their exceptionalism in our part of the world. That would be the worst service that they can do for Pakistan, or for the cause of democracy.
Let us have no illusions here: this is now a battle, perhaps the final critical one, between the forces of civil society and democracy held hostage, and militant obscurantism and military jingoism striking back. Just as militancy (of any sort) tends to feed on itself to grow, the democratic process too can only grow and expand if it too is allowed to feed on itself, so to speak.
The process, admittedly is not without flaws, and will usher in through its traversing course many unsavoury characters as players. But in the end, as the histories of other more mature and better established democracies elsewhere so palpably and clearly demonstrate, the system redeems itself, by empowering the people whom it serves. It matures in direct proportion to the maturing of its civil society. No amount of artificially contrived and brutally enforced political engineering can short-circuit this evolutionary process.
Let Bangladeshis take heed of what is happening in Pakistan -- and take the lessons to heart.
The author is former Bangladeshi Ambassador to the US. He is currently Adjunct Professor, teaching government and politics at the University of Maryland, George Washington University and the Virginia International University in the United States.