Civil society in Bangladesh: Rhetoric and reality

In the wake of Ershad's fall there was growing clamour for civil society, which gradually became louder in those days. Perhaps the bitter memory of protracted military rule, with its concomitant curtailment of basic rights, provided an incentive to civil society messiahs to articulate their demand. Yet, expressions like "civil norm" in our administration, "more civility" in the governance, and a vow for the firm founding of a "civil society" as voiced in some of the civil-military discourses rang an optimistic note for the nation's progress.
In other words, there were signs that even after long years of military and quasi-military rule in our country a craving for building up an enduring civil order existed.
However, there was also a gross misperception that persisted in this regard. The notion of a civil society had been taken to be something opposed to the military, and the whole range of efforts to achieve it seemed directed against an imaginary military society. It was the society, which was not only blamed for usurping state power but also condemned for not bestowing on the politicians their rights, to be exercised unhindered in statecraft. But is that all about civil society in a country?
On the contrary, civil society is much wider a concept in social and political thought, finding its origin in as old a source as Greek city states, where the genesis is of democracy is also to be found. In some sense, both are akin, indeed, to each other. During the 18th century, when both were revived and revitalised in Europe, they continued to mean simply the state, seen as encompassing, like the Greek Polis, the whole realm of the political. At least, civil society also meant a civilised society that ordered its relations according to the system of law rather than the whim of a despot.
Hegel, to whom we owe the modern meaning of the concept, preferred, however, to see civil society as the sphere of ethical life inter-posed between the family and the state. To Tocqueville, it is only the "political society" for any human living, where there is primacy of political forces.
The concept has, however, been radicalised in the twentieth century when, during its early half, Antonio Gramsci identified civil society to be that part of the state which is not concerned with coercion or formal rule. It is, in fact, the sphere of cultural politics, and Gramsci's concept of civil society found favour with those who wanted to oppose the ruling structure of the society, not by direct political confrontation by waging a cultural war, as the "Solidarity" people did in Poland to bring about change of the government.
Nevertheless, the western world, where the notion of a civil society finds currency, is still grappling to acquire the best standard set by 18th century theorists of the concept: that is, to effect the supremacy of the civilian authority in statecraft which needs to be an exclusive turf for the politicians.
With the progress of civilisation it was a universal human urge to live in an ambience conditioned by rule of law, norms of civility, and exercise of fundamental rights. In a civilised society all physical forces are supposed to be subordinate to ethical and moral values. Reason and rationality guiding the destiny of mankind is one of the ultimates in human civilisation.
So, the civil society is more of a civilisational objective to be achieved by a people, and not just given on a platter by anyone or from any quarter. Even in the western democracies, where civil societies are in vogue, the process of their achievement has been far from easy, and often turbulent. In Europe, the Renaissance, the great enlightenment, a series of discoveries as well as the proliferation of nation-states all of which, provided its intellectual and civilisational base preceded the establishment of civil society.
The nineteenth century Bengal Renaissance, accompanied by an unprecedented intellectual awakening, largely explains the civil character of Indian polity even to this day. It could, thus, be found that to agitate for bringing down a military regime to be replaced by a civil government is one thing, and to be able to build up, bit-by-bit, a stable, enduring civil society is another. A civil government may not necessarily produce a civil society.
Notwithstanding the lack of an historical incentive or civilisational support, the people of Bangladesh have been known for their penchant for the rule of law ever since the British in this part of the subcontinent introduced a legal system. They are on record to have successfully developed, nourished and sustained institutions like political parties, parliament and legislation -- some of the essential ingredients of civil rule. A vibrant local government grew, and an independent judiciary was upheld.
As a matter of fact, democracy, an inescapable prerequisite for a successful civil society, took root in undivided Bengal, which was one of the few presidencies enjoying fundamental rights in British India. Even during the initial stage of Pakistan, the experimentation for the establishment of civil society continued. But that experimentation suffered a shattering blow when, for the first time, Martial Law was proclaimed in Pakistan by Ayub Khan in 1958, one of the first in the post-second world war period.
The Bengalis, however, gave a glorious account of themselves in resisting Ayub's military dictatorship, and mainstream political leadership in erstwhile East Pakistan remained defiant to his rule. General Yahya's Martial Law culminated in the genocide of 1971, against which Bengalis stood like a rock till they achieved independence. Our war of independence was, in essence, to assert among other things, our resolve to establish a civil order. The flame of that desire still burns.
The intriguing questions, however, remain. Why couldn't we establish a society we cherished? Where were the impediments? Why, instead, the military could so easily grab state power and rule for so many years? Where did our civilian leadership falter? Soul-searching enquiries need to be made into these disturbing questions in our country.
As has been indicated earlier, the establishment of a civil society is an enormous intellectual and emotional commitment. Despite a promising beginning we, as a nation, have so far miserably failed in this regard. Even our brave generations of politicians, who defiantly stood not only against a redoubtable Ayub Khan but also against his "Language of weapon" and led the nation to freedom couldn't deliver it.
It was a pity that the heroes of the anti-Ayub uprising, as well as veterans of our independence war, panicked and gave in at the sight of a few rumbling tanks with their gun-chambers empty in 1975. Again, in 1982, another brand of politicians succumbed to a wind-bag general.
The military has often been blamed for intervention in politics. It is an irony, however, that seldom has anyone blamed the politicians for abetting or even inviting the military to intervene so that they could derive some share of the spoils. Few condemn the judicial patriarchs who give a measure of legitimacy to military takeover by adoring the titular position at the apex. People tend to overlook the administrative abuse, which is seldom possible without the active collusion of the civil bureaucrats.
The making of a civil society is not just an empty slogan. Knowledge, vision, and a perspective will have to be combined for this, with moral power on the part of various political institutions and agencies to exercise control over any social force and professional groups, including the military, challenging their authority. Their political control of and supremacy over all others will have to be convincing and acceptable.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.