Preventing a dangerous arms race
AMONG the many dubious ideas that former United States President Ronald Reagan embraced, two were particularly dangerous. The first was that "a limited nuclear war" with the Soviet Union could be fought and won. The second held that the US could reliably secure itself against nuclear weapons by building a Star Wars-style ballistic missile defence (BMD).
BMD would detect the launching of nuclear-tipped missiles by using satellites and radars, and intercept and destroy them. This would render the enemy's nuclear deterrent ineffectual.
If the US took the lead in BMD, it would acquire supreme, unmatched power, including the "freedom to attack" an adversary with nuclear weapons, and "freedom from attack" by his weapons.
Peace-minded scientists sharply criticised these ideas. They showed that a "limited nuclear war," deploying only 100 of the world's then-existing arsenal of 70,000-plus nuclear weapons, would create a cloud of soot and smoke which would block sunlight for years.
This would cause a prolonged "nuclear winter." Global food production and forestry would be devastated, creating climate havoc and large-scale hunger. This critique was fused into the great global peace movement of the 1980s.
Reagan eventually abandoned "limited nuclear war" and negotiated with the former USSR the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987), the world's only agreement to dismantle a whole class of weapons -- 2,700 missiles, with a 500 - 5,500 km range, and their nuclear warheads.
However, Reagan never gave up on BMD. Spending $120 billion, the US developed rudimentary capability to engage missiles in all phases of their flight: soon after take-off (boost phase), at the height of their trajectory (mid-course), and as they descend (terminal phase).
However, Reagan's successors desisted for long from actual BMD deployment, deferring to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972 with the USSR, which prohibits deployment.
Things changed with George W. Bush's election as president. In 2001, he announced plans to deploy a BMD shield against about 100 - 120 missiles. In 2002, the US withdrew from the ABM treaty and gave its Missile Defence Agency (MDA) a free hand to develop BMD and space-based weapons, including lasers, kinetic-energy weapons, etc.
The world was horrified. But BJP-ruled India welcomed the announcement -- ahead of America's own allies. India had for decades opposed Star Wars and the militarisation of space.
The US's BMD is triggering new rivalries. The MDA has built two bases, in Alaska and California, for missile interceptors, costing $26 billion. It's planning to spend $250 billion. It's also building a smaller missile defence system in collaboration with Japan.
The US has just announced a BMD program in central Europe, with radars in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland. Washington claims this will guard against strikes from "rogue" nations like Iran.
But Russia believes the shield is meant to undermine its nuclear deterrent, and has threatened to target it.
The ABM treaty recognised that BMD deployment would introduce uncertainty about the workability of nuclear deterrence, on which all nuclear weapons states (NWS) ostensibly base their security.
Deterrence assumes that NWSs won't attack each other because they know their adversary can retaliate and inflict "unacceptable damage" upon them. This creates "balance-of-terror"-based security.
Nuclear deterrence is a flawed doctrine because it makes unrealistic assumptions about transparency, rules out accidents or miscalculations, and demands rational, cool-headed conduct from fallible, panic-prone decision-makers. It cannot generate sustainable security, although it can provide limited short-term stability.
However, BMD makes nonsense even of this limited stability by creating false illusions -- and new insecurities and dangers.
Globally, BMD will trigger-off a qualitatively new arms race and militarise space. Ethically, the human race has no business to militarise space. Strategically, militarisation will prove utterly disastrous.
With today's technology, BMD cannot provide a remotely reliable defence against missiles. It's near impossible to hit a bullet travelling at 24,000 km/h with another bullet travelling at the same speed with certainty. Even cloud cover can cripple BMD.
Existing interceptors have had too many failures. Although the MDA claims that 29 of its 37 interceptor tests have been "successful," experts from the well-regarded US-based Union of Concerned Scientists say most of the tests involve some "rigging," like giving interceptors advance warning.
Further, any number of inexpensive countermeasures can neutralise BMD, including cheap decoys like balloons. It cannot discriminate between real and fake targets.
Similarly, real warheads can be enclosed in radar-reflecting balloons. Besides, infra-red jamming measures can be used. These can be mastered by the 30-odd countries with missile programs. Finally, an adversary can "overwhelm" BMD with a large number of missiles.
Yet, Russia, China, Japan and India have also entered the BMD game, besides the US.
On December 6, India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) fired an interceptor to destroy a Prithvi missile launched five minutes earlier. In November 2006, the DRDO had used a modified Prithvi to intercept another Prithvi.
The DRDO boasts that it can develop a fully indigenous BMD shield in three years.
These claims must be taken with a pinch of salt -- and not just because Israeli radars were used in the latest test.
The DRDO's record inspires no confidence. All its major projects, including the Main Battle Tank, Light Combat Aircraft, and Advanced Technology Vessel (nuclear-powered submarine) have failed in some measure or other -- sinking thousands of crores. Its missile program, too, has run into serious difficulties.
However, it's even more important to recognise that BMD is strategically dubious, destabilising, and harmful to regional security. Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee admitted as much in October when he ruled out joining the US-led BMD program. The DRDO is working at odds with this.
India must not waste scarce resources on BMD. Nor should Pakistan get lured into this sordid business. We already spend too much on the military in relation to health, education and social security. The result is our falling Human Development Index ranks. BMD will further distort South Asian priorities -- without producing security.
The world must put an end to these fancy -- and dangerous -- programs before they get the better of it.
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