It is known to all that prime mover of an efficient Armed Forces is the quality and capability of the commanders. Success of the commanders' rests broadly on the uninterrupted functioning of the chain of command as it is stratified into various levels of authority. History is replete with examples that whenever the authority based on a number of echelons was either breached or interfered with-- there was trauma, at times bordering upheaval. Experience in this regard at home since 1975 provides testimony in favour of the assertion made above.
Our command structure above the service headquarters is not framed on traditional line. It is known that if the command aspect of proverbial C3 (Command, Control and Communication) malfunctions, the military mission is doomed to failure. Command decisions stem from detail analysis and judgement of pulls and pushes of the situations. Therefore, reversing or amending of these decisions are likely to unsettle a situation that may even lead to hiccups, if not tremors. Tempering with the chain of command have caused abysmal discipline in our Army in the past. Since the present government has stated to give fillip to military's image, the aspect of command may be looked into as a priority so that mistakes committed in the past are not repeated.
The chain of command of our Army up to formation level is based on the orthodox yet efficient line, which has witnessed many trials and tribulations. The current outline of command channel of the Armed Forces is: AFD (Armed Forces Division) - Service HQs- field formations- field units.
The chain of command from Army Headquarters (AHQ) downwards is unambiguous. Decisions with regard to the promotions and appointments of the officers of the rank of colonel and above are taken by a board composed of all serving generals and is headed by the Chief of Army Staff (CAS). It is a fact that the formation commanders know the officers under their command in fair details and CAS is expected to know most of the officers of the rank of colonel and above in considerable detail. So, there could be hardly anybody more competent than the Chief to approve promotion and posting of officers that are recommended after a thorough discussion in the presence of all generals.
Unfortunately, during the last several decades, there had been repeated interference by government either at its own behest or on being manipulated by vested lobby. So, during the most part of the period under evaluation, there was great deal of murmur or quiet resentment within the Armed Forces, which need to be addressed so that justice and fair play cannot be questioned. Apart from promotion, procurement programme of the three services face similar interruptions and that affect military competence considerably.
Presently, all the three service headquarters are obliged to route their decisions on promotions, appointments, procurement policies regarding operations and training through Armed Forces Division (AFD) of the Prime Minister's Secretariat and Ministry of Defence is referred to only for matters relating to land acquisition, finance, amendment and enactment of regulations, retirement and discipline. This is a dual control arrangement and this delays decision-making to a great extent while timely decision-making is vital to service efficiency. A complex situation emerges from this arrangement. AFD of prime minister's Secretariat is headed by an officer of rank of Lieutenant General who currently shoulder's the responsibility of preparing the minutes/brief for the Prime Minister (who is also the Defence Minister) for enabling her to take decisions on the issues that the service Headquarters forward to AFD. The prime Minister is constrained to depend on AFD's briefing as she is not likely to be abreast with the modus operandi followed at service Headquarters.
While Services Headquarters decision stems from a thorough deliberations by the service Chiefs along with concerned principal Staff officers who is not below the rank of Major General or equivalent in the Navy and Air forces. Principal Staff Officers of the services are assisted by a host of officers of various ranks at different levels. PSO of the AFD offers his observations on the service HQs' proposals, assisted by a few directors, whose highest rank is Brigadier. Therefore, it may be prudent to assert that generally latter is unlikely to be accurate in its observation when it suggests a major departure from what is indicated by the service headquarters unless entailed by regulations.
This modus operandi during the last few years has caused inordinate delay in decision-making. All these have created a complex situation in the relationship between the AFD and the Service headquarters. The situation could have turned worse if the PSO of the AFD gave way to the enticements of the vested interest to make him think that the PSO is more powerful than the service chiefs. The experience of the past few years in this regard is filled with bitterness and frustration. Some informed sources observed that most of the service Chiefs feel that PSO of the AFD at times behave like a chief of the chiefs. Under these arrangements the PSO of the AFD can do any undesirable act and get away with it because of his closeness with the PM. He can even create a situation of mistrust, disbelief and apprehension, which may distance the prime Minister from the service Chiefs. Although the AFD existed under a different name when former president Ziaur Rahman was at the helm, this was a lacklustre organization. Ziaur Rahman and even another former President Ershad hardly depended on the PSO for decision-making as they themselves came from the service and were ware of the knitty gritty of the service functioning.
It is understandable that democratically elected Prime Minster is unlikely to be aware of the service functioning in great details and should therefore seek information pertaining to the services in comprehensive details from a reliable source. One should not forget that a service chief functions till such time he enjoys the confidence of the prime Minister. Therefore, one should think that the Prime Minister is not likely to repose her trust on the chiefs. Why then has such a powerful office between the Service Headquarter and Ministry of Defence? It is a fact that the Ministry of Defence has been grossly neglected over the last few decades. The mail reason behind this was that Military Juntas ruled our country during the parts of the 70's and 80's and who hardly depended on this ministry for support. The secretaries, however deft or astute they were, did not put in any endeavours for the fear of drawing the wrath of the military presidents and thus had let the powers slide out of their hands. Their indifference consequently weaved a few comedies of errors that caused trauma within the services and at the national level as well.
It is about time that some serious down to earth thinking is done to create a congenial atmosphere to pave a way for evolving a work culture that generates mutual confidence and gave time for decision-making. My suggestions in this regard are:
* Ministry of Defence should be the only authorised channel for the Armed Forces to reach the Defence Minister; Chiefs should not be required to go through the Ministry but will keep the secretary abreast with the issues discussed with the Defence Minister for the Ministry to follow up.
* Defence Ministry should have number of senior Armed Forces Officers as Additional, Joint and Deputy Secretaries to help the civilian Secretary to prepare executive summary for the Defence Minister.
* AFD may be reorganized to be renamed as Joint Chiefs Secretariat (JCS) to coordinate with the three services on matters of common interest and route their recommendation to the Defence Minister when it is dealing with routine issues. On sensitive issues, chairing Chief of JCS himself will take up the matters with the Defence Minister.
Armed Forces of democratic countries like India/UK and host of others are working with enviable efficiency without the existence of a midway office between the Defence Minister and Service HQ. To develop esprit-de-corps among the three Services and to iron out co-ordination difficulties, a co-ordinating body should exists in the form of Joint Chief of Staff Council and this should be subordinated to the Service Chiefs. Service Chiefs should enjoy undiminishing support and co-operation of the Defence Minister who should remove all irritants in the process of efficient functioning.

The author is ex-Director General, BIISS.