Since independence these ills continued at an alarming rate, and peaked during the last BNP-led four party alliances (FPA) government.

In the period since 2001, two familiar words, politicians and plunderers, have become synonymous with the political governance of Bangladesh. Rightly or wrongly, there is no human endeavor in which the participants are as incessantly accused of being thieves, cheats, thugs, liars, manipulators, exploiters, bribe-takers, money-makers, black- money holders, loan defaulters and so on, as in the "business of politics."

The phrase "business of politics" is deliberately used to reflect that nearly 80% of the lawmakers in the last parliament were businessmen, most of whom were barely qualified to understand the implications of the basic laws in the constitutions, let alone initiate any bills on their own in the Parliament.

What really motivates people to join politics in Bangladesh? Professor Yunus articulated the motives, reflecting the experience of the overwhelming majority of the common citizens.

In his interview with the AFP, he said: "Nothing gets done unless you pay bribe. It's a part of life. It's about power, power to make money. There is no ideological thing, simply who gets the bigger booty."

Did Professor Yunus fabricate these observations? Why not ask the people wherever you meet them? But on January 19, both AL and BNP leaders concomitantly launched broadsides against Yunus, challenging his observations and dismissing them as expressions of arrogance.

His indictment of the already disparaged politicians of the country was so stinging that both Abdul Jalil (AL) and Mannan Bhuiyan (BNP) came out with rabble-rousing reactions.

The essence of their defense is that there are still dedicated and selfless politicians who work for people's interest. They pleaded that such an all-encompassing judgment is an unfair indictment of the honest politicians.

It is true that there are still a few dedicated and self-sacrificing politicians. But these precious few may also be considered guilty of being corrupt simply because of association with their corrupt friends and colleagues.

Professor Yunus thus grouped them in one basket. What's wrong with that, if "one is judged by the company one keeps?"

For example, the ministries of both former ministers, Nazmul Huda and Manan Bhuiyan, topped the list in corruption in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Both ministers raised cris de coeur against TIB officials, to no avail.

Nazmul was tranquillized and subdued by a subsequent parliamentary standing committee's charges of corruption (DS: January 7, 2004) against him on import of CNG-run auto-rickshaws, and allocation of land for CNG filling stations.

In a democracy, the role of the electoral process is twofold: To select the benign politicians (serving public interest), and to discipline the malignant politicians (rent seekers or wheelers and dealers) if they are elected.

The malignant politicians are entrenched in the business of serving the interest of family, friends, and party functionaries.

The notion that free market always produces the best outcome relies on the assumption that market participants have all available information. But what happens when the information is imperfect, that is, when asymmetric information exists, where one side of an activity has more information than the other side?

The literature on asymmetric information is divided into adverse selection, which embodies the upshot of misinformation (that is, hidden information), and moral hazard, which represents the hidden (previously undisclosed) motives consummated after the selection was made.

In selecting candidates (agents) in a democratic process, electors (principals) want qualified and competent candidates who would work for public interest.

If the inducements are large it will inveigle a large number of candidates, some with inadequate qualification and aptitude for the job, thus bringing into play the dilemma of adverse selection.

This year, 4146 nomination papers, the highest ever, were submitted for 300 seats for the now defunct January 22 election. What really induced so many people to try to become lawmakers if politics is not the sure road to riches, as was evident from the 2001-2005 periods?

The notion of adverse selection as a political quandary has been observed at least since Plato, who once observed: "The city where those who rule are least eager to do so will be the best governed."

Politicians in every society are considered dubious, because the individuals most attracted to politics might not be the most desirable rulers. Indeed, one might infer that it is perhaps those most likely to abuse any authority given to them who are most likely to be drawn to the political realm.

Moral hazard arises when the principals cannot influence the agent's actions that may affect the outcome. A political analogue is that once elected, and elevated to a powerful position, politicians face a myriad of lures and enticements.

The most innocuous may be to use their authority to advance their own personal agenda, rather than the platform on which they were elected. A more baleful possibility is that politicians use their office and influence covertly for personal gain, or to benefit their families, friends, and business associates, as in Bangladesh.

To the extent that corruption fostered by moral hazard looms as a political problem, it is likely to be systematically related to two important parameters of the delegation relationship.

First, the greater the discretionary power the politicians are granted, the more reckless they become in misusing their power for personal gain.

This may explain why, as Susan Rose-Ackerman argues: "Political corruption is such a depressingly importunate feature of the world's poorest countries, regardless of the promises that may surround new officeholders.

For those who wish to 'better themselves' financially there is simply no alternative to rent-seeking political participation."

Second, the longer incumbents stay in office, the more serious the moral hazard problem may become. That is because becoming corrupt is a bit like losing one's virginity; there is no going back, the inertia of rent seeking continues unabated.

Unfortunately, honest politicians in the system may become corrupt over time, but corrupt ones rarely become honest. This is probably the best argument in favour of term limits for lawmakers, which, otherwise, may have undesirable consequences for electoral accountability.

The voters of Bangladesh are in adverse selection trap, and escaping this trap has become an insuperable challenge for the following reasons:

• Most voters are generally non-political and easy to deceive.
• People who are groomed to become politicians while being students are the ones who often lack the ability to succeed elsewhere.
• The voters are given a limited number of desirable alternatives.
• A vast majority of our lawmakers are political neophytes, listed as businessmen, who often use money and official power to dupe voters.

What recourse is there to minimize the dilemma of adverse selection and moral hazard in politics? There is virtually no alternative to a responsible, free, media and transparency, as the foremost resort.

Politicization of any form, in any branch of the government, must be made taboo. Political candidates must put out their qualifications, skills and lifetime records of all activities for the Election Commission's scrutiny and media analysis, and all political parties must espouse this practice effusively if our democracy is to survive, and a benign government to come into public service.

Dr. Abdullah A Dewan is Professor of Economics at Eastern Michigan University.