Currently, there has been a behind-the-scenes battle between those who favoured speaking in terms of realities and those who felt it would be politically unwise to invite a new controversy regarding Tata's investment proposal at a time when the Dhaka sky is overshadowed by political clouds. In the public domain, however, the scenario is different. People are vocal about the omissions in the proposal.

Indeed, the authorities have made a habit of shifting the truth in case of the said proposal to define their objectives, or shifting the objectives when facts have changed. Over the past two years since Tata submitted their initial investment proposal in October 2004, facts were either suppressed or manipulated.

Official disclosures on the matter were few and far between. Consequently, It was generally believed that the proposal (if there existed any firm offer at all) was kept in a black box, that too in a hide out, so that a common man could not reach there.

Let us thank the media. They have kept the people informed about many aspects of the proposal from time to time. Nonetheless, it is amazing that both the Asian Development Bank's representative stationed in Dhaka and the US ambassador in Bangladesh are apparently aware of the benefits that would accrue as a result of Tata's investment in Bangladesh.

However, it is now apparent that Tata's objective was to ensure windfall profit for them from their investment. And why not? That's the religion of any companybe it Tata or Bata. But, what happened to our beloved government? Except for reiterating a most commonly used phrase“win-win”nothing has been divulged regarding the specific benefits that may come Bangladesh's way out of the respective projects included in the proposed investment.

However, based on the presumed availability of cheap natural gas from Bangladesh, the company merrily planned the production of 1 million tons of fertilizer, 1,000 megawatts of electricity, and about 2.4 million tons of sponge iron based steel. They also agreed to export a major portion of all products produced under this so-called investment to India. For this, Tata perhaps demanded the availability of around 3.25 Tcf of gas for at least 20 years.

This meant that Bangladesh had to give them a cut of about 50% of the proved reserves of gas in the country. Bangladeshis, it was whispered, would receive a portion of the output. Had those products not been export-oriented, the scenario would perhaps have been different. Having found that their objectives faced genuine obstacles due to partial divulgence (by media) of their secret plan, Tata's price for the gas and the size of the investment shot up. These were clear manipulations.

The government's first negotiating committee headed by Petrobangla in 2004 was flabbergasted. It could not reach a consensus. The media reported a breakdown in discussion. Tata gave a statement that it was not the end of the world. They carefully opened their magic box, perhaps in consultation with the BOI.

This time the investment package was raised to $3 billion in two stages, initially $2 billion and then $2.5 billion. A new componentcoal production from an already producing coal field (Barapukuria) -- was included. Thus, the objective was changed once again. Interestingly, a revamped price range was also offeredfrom $1.5/Mcf to $4/Mcf, with $1.5/Mcf for the first six years. The habit of shifting the truth continued.

After a couple of years down a difficult lane, many questions were raised. GOB's lone mouthpiece was making all kinds of remarks, mostly half-truths. People of Bangladesh were gradually becoming more suspicious every time Tata and BOI came up with new formulations. Nobody believed them. The media in Bangladesh truthfully continued to reflect the views and opinions of the common man in Bangladesh. But the proposal was about to fail.

Failure is terrible and terribly contagious as well. It wreaks havoc on both friend and foe. High on their own agenda, Tata and BOI blithely ignored one of the real causes of diverging from the public opinion on the subject, and thought that an occasional verbal morsel thrown towards the offer as the “proposal of the century” would create more trust and credibility. But it did not.

In a sense, by twisting the logic of its own moral horizon, Tata presumed that the size of the so-called investment at $3 billion would cut the ice. They not only ignored the reserve of gas but also the most vital issue of energy security of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that the government of Bangladesh would give its consent to:

• Dedicate unconditionally 2.14 Tcf of gas for 20 years to start with;
• A peculiar price range for gas @$1.5 to $4 per Mcf;
• Allow export of fertilizer, steel, and coal to India as output of the proposed investment;
• Allow a 20 km corridor on the India-Bangladesh border;
• Ignore international market price of gas that ranges between $5 to $8 per Mcf;
• Ignore the consideration that Bangladesh will sustain huge losses both in the price of gas and in case of a disaster that might take place due to open-cut mining at Barapukuria;
• Ignore that Bangladesh should stake its $10.7 billion worth of gas (@ $5/Mcf) for a petty investment of $3 billion with so many unknown conditions;
• Ignore Bangladesh's energy security through allocation of a large amount of gas for indirect export under Tata's investment proposal.

The BOI still shuttles between one inappropriate phrase to another, unable to visualize the damage it is likely to cause in the process. The mysterious part of the game is that neither GOB nor BOI officially provided a clear picture about the Tata proposal. Nor did they inform the public of the changes over the years, or for that matter, sought any feedback or clarification from the people about the complex proposal.

The agony is that a free and a fair discussion on the proposal from Tata could provide a historic opportunity to find answers in the spirit of collective wisdom. Instead, we all witnessed the debris of unanswered questions. BOI and Tata perhaps still believe that they can succeed on the strength of their explanations rather than the people's support. They should realize that today's headlines are often tomorrow's boomerangs. They should now realize that they have lost the battle.

By now even the hard core of the government must be dismayed and shaken by the severity and universality of the criticisms levied against Tata and BOI. It has been observed that they at times moved with haste to prove that they were responsive to public opinion and accordingly they decided that something has to be done.

By June 30, based on the revised proposal of Tata, the BOI got swayed totally. On paper, at least, the joint BOI/Tata piecemeal approach centred around the price of gas, which indeed was not the case. However, in the wave of emotional overreaction, little attention was paid to how much financial loss the country would incur and who would pay for it. There were disputes about the objectives, but there was no realistic effort to resolve them.

The political panic regarding Tata's proposal reached its apogee in mid-2006. The government, the industrialists and the academic witnesses were in agreement that the nation had serious energy problems. But the question was what to do about it.

The critical issue of setting aside at the outset almost one-third of the proved reserve of gas(6.2 Tcf as per Nagorik Committee Report, November 2002) for 20 years was a farce. Even the latest Wood Mackenzie's Gas Sector Master Plan (GSMP, January, 2006 ) report clearly indicated that the combined present proven (P1) plus Probable (P2) reserve of less than 14 Tcf of gas would deplete by 2015 for domestic consumption alone (the issue of Tata's demand has not been catered to). How can the government allow any indirect export of gas or coal that endangers national energy security? It may be mentioned in this connection that the National Energy Policy 1995 has not even been updated and approved by the government.

Despite the fact that nobody was listening, not even a bit was done to define the country's energy problem. Government agencies and energy industry experts were not jointly developing facts and proper analysis to show the people what our options are.

It is also a pity that there are no guidelines telling us the worst and the best that can happen to us in a deal and what it could cost. The nation now faces the fundamental issue of how to balance energy supply and demand most effectively in the period beyond 2007. The problem is not that of locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen. The problem is to find the barn to see if we have a horse in it.

The impending energy crisis in Bangladesh appears to have the name and telephone number of the natural gas reserve on it. Consumption of gas has jumped much more rapidly in recent years and the country is becoming more dependent on the IOC's supply from their gas fields. By next year, when Bibiyana gas field comes into operation, the ratio of Petrobangla's gas supply and foreign company supply would become disproportionate, much more in favour of the IOCs. That is the danger. The government must therefore have a clear prescription on gas use and a depletion policy for the coming years.

Indeed, dissatisfaction of the people of Bangladesh with the so-called big investment of Tata is mounting. They are also disappointed by the role played by the Bangladeshi government. If this continues, the government would be dismayed and shaken by the severity and universality of the criticism levied against them .

The sooner we realize this, the sooner we will act. During the next one decade, we will have to continue to depend more upon indigenous natural gas and imported oil to satisfy the commercial energy need of Bangladesh, while alternate sources are being developed.

Consequently, we have to make commonsense decisions on our limited natural gas and coal, based on the facts of technological progress rather than on the fictions of unwarranted adventures such as Tata's investment proposal which cannot draw any benefit to the people of Bangladesh.

The author is a Former Joint Secretary.