Committed to PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Vol. 5 Num 631 Wed. March 08, 2006  
   
Editorial


Editorial
Financing of terrorist outfits
Need for focused monitoring
With the arrest of five out of the seven members of the Majlish-e-Shura, top leadership command of JMB, the terrorist organisation is certainly left beleaguered, but to think that it's completely defanged or demobilised would be a mistake.

Not only are Salahuddin and Khaled Saifullah at large, the networks of lesser lights and the following, even though thrown off-gear by a large number of arrests, exist in some form or the other. The fundamental dynamics couldn't have changed overnight; so they may try to regroup with a so-called Dawati Kaj ('answering to call of duty') commitment or passion that some of the interrogated detainees confessed to having as though intoxicated recruits on a mission. They might spring bombing surprises occasionally to pronounce their presence.

All this is rather possible because there are, it is widely suspected, huge quantities of illegal arms and ammunition, including grenades and bomb-making materials probably tucked away into hideouts. At least the big arms hauls from time to time have pointed to the magnitude of weapons trafficking into the country.

Set against this backdrop, what we find central to combating terrorist threats is the ability to seal the routes of financing of the extremist outfits in the country. Needless to say, without wherewithal, no extremist organisation, even with an ideological pretence, can survive, far less operate.

It must, therefore, be deemed appropriate and timely, as we note from a Financial Express report, that the Bangladesh Bank has launched a special drive to detect and act against suspicious transactions 'having links with 'terrorist outfits'. Three probe teams have been assigned by the central bank's Anti-Money Laundering Department to investigate allegations of 'suspicious transactions' against three branches of commercial banks -- one in Dhaka city, the other at Brahmanbaria and still another in Sylhet. They are tasked to report back to the central bank with their findings which are likely to shed light on a somewhat least traversed area.

Illegal money or its transfer has a way of surfacing through intrusions into bank deposits or transactions, because there is a limit to keeping what is called 'mattress money' in secretive individual, even group, closets. 'Hundi', of course, is an unofficial channel of money transfer, but then at some point, such money will be reflected on the bank accounts. Now, the NGO money is invariably channelled through banks, so that their transactions must be transparent reading like an open book.

The issue here is the banks of their own volition should be on constant lookout for sudden big deposits by and transactions between clients they are not familiar with. If, in the past, any bank had hesitated in submitting suspicious transaction reports (STRS) to the central bank for fear that it might affect relations with clients, it should now dispense with the thought and go by the rule in view of the common concern over money going into dreadfully wrong hands.