Only democracy can work for Pakistan

During the Pakistani president's most recent visit to Washington and London, both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair effusively praised President Pervez Musharraf's courage in "standing firm against terrorism," his "vision for Enlightened Moderation in the Islamic World," and "his good stewardship of the Pakistan economy."

Yet Pakistani scholar Parvez Hoodbhoy has posed an enigmatic question: can Pakistan work? Such a question may be asked of countries standing on the brink of "failure" -- defined as a state unable to provide human security, justice, and basic necessities of life to its people. But can Pakistan be categorised as falling into such a group even if the most expansive definition of a "failed state" is taken into account?

Not if one is to give credence to the recent speech given by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, and of his assertion of Pakistan's consistent economic growth at more than six percent per annum for the last several years, and of improved socio-economic indicators. But then Stephen Cohen, the highly credentialed and perhaps the leading American analyst on South Asia, has quoted Pakistanis who acknowledged Pakistan's failure as a state in the past, most notably in 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh.

Cohen considered Pakistan as "a case study of negatives -- a state seemingly incapable of establishing a normal political system, supporting radical Islamic Taliban and mounting Jihadi operations into India while its own economic and political systems were collapsing and internal religious and ethnic based violence were rising dramatically."

Hussain Haqqani sees Pakistan's weakness being embedded in disproportionate focus on ideology, military capability, and external alliance since the country's inception in 1947. Pakistan's progress has been faltering, not only in its inability to build up institutions supportive of democracy, but also in other areas compared to its nemesis India. Pakistan's economy is the smallest among the nuclear powers. Pakistan suffers from massive urban unemployment, rural underemployment, illiteracy, and low per capita income. But perhaps Pakistan's greatest weakness stems from its inability to acquire a clear identity as a nation-state bereft of transnational Islamic ideology.

Stephen Cohen finds the "history and future of Pakistan being rooted in this duality, a complex relationship between Pakistan the state and Pakistan the nation -- mission bound to serve as a beacon for oppressed and backward Muslim communities elsewhere in the world." It is debatable whether Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, described by Parvez Hoodbhoy as "an impeccably dressed westernised Muslim with Victorian manners and secular outlook," had thought of Pakistan as a cradle for oppressed Muslims in global terms.

This role of Muslim leadership, if any country can appropriate such a role at all, can perhaps be claimed by Saudi Arabia as the guardian of the holiest places of Islam. But then Saudi Arabia itself is in the throes of anarchic confusion, forced to walk along the edge of internecine conflict between purist Islamists and a westernised elite, compounded by American-phobic suspicion of its trusted ally in the aftermath of 9/11 tragedy. Indeed the Islamic world is in disarray in the face of American triumphalism. In reality, the Islamic world, unable to define a uniform Islamic image, has been in decline for ages, the last nail in the coffin having been driven in by the end of the Ottoman rule.

In the case of Pakistan, its stress on Islamic ideology was a direct result of its pathological fear of so-called Hindu India which led to the country being ruled by an establishment described by Stephen Cohen as a "moderate oligarchy" consisting of the military, civil service, judiciary, and landed aristocracy.

This oligarchy believes in implacable opposition to Indian pre-eminence, fight for the "liberation" of Kashmir, maintenance of nuclear weapons as a deterrence to Indian "designs" and as a status symbol, implicit belief in social Darwinism and consequent contempt for land reforms, closest possible relationship with the US despite anti-US sentiment among the general public, and use of Islam as the national unifier and as a force to deter Pashtoon, Sindhi, and Baluch sub-nationalism.

In this conglomeration of oligarchic forces, the army from the beginning pronounced its dominance over the others. But since the army alone could not rule Pakistan it needed collusive cooperation of other self-interested parties. In this endeavour, US help proved providential. During the Cold War days the western countries' priority was to contain communism and not to propagate democratic values.

John Foster Dulles way back in 1946 saw the need for a "rededication to our religious faith" and demonstration of western political system as "a curative thing" to protect and defend "our cherished freedom" through the containment of communism as of utmost importance. So several defence arrangements were created. Paradoxically, however, while western members of NATO (except Turkey) and ANZUS were expected to practice democracy, non-western members of SEATO and CENTO were allowed to be deviants. One wonders why.

Regardless of membership of defence alliances, the third world countries received western assistance in combating communism that could be more effectively fought by military-dominated autocracies than by democracies. Consequently the West encouraged military rule and in some cases kleptocracy in many third world countries as long as communism was denied political space in these underdeveloped societies. Pakistan was no exception.

When the intensity of the Cold War was on the wane, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a God-sent blessing for General Zia-ul-Huq who based the Pakistani educational and legal system on Islamic law and formalised the state ideology as an official policy of Islamisation.

Through his Islamisation efforts, observes Haqqani, Zia made Pakistan an important ideological and organisational centre of the global Islamist movement, including its role in the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, by allowing Afghan mujahedeens to operate from bases in Pakistan and sponsoring the Taliban putsch for power in Afghanistan by dislodging the Soviet backed regimes. Little did the Americans realise at that time that they were being instrumental in constructing a Frankenstein who at a later date would be responsible for the 9/11 carnage in the US mainland.

Even now the Bush administration is helping the Pakistani military as the dominant partner of the "moderate oligarchy" to rule Pakistan through marginalisation of comparatively secular political parties -- Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League and Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. Though the political dominance and institutional integrity of the Pakistani army, observes Stephen Cohen, has been able to marginalise radical Islamic parties so far, one should not lose sight of the fact that in the process of sidelining Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, President Musharraf has helped Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, an alliance of six Islamic parties, to gain 11 percent of the popular votes, 53 seats in the Federal National Assembly, and governance of NWFP and Baluchistan.

The West should ponder if continued support to the Musharraf regime (its necessity being explained as an essential part of the war on terror) would not at some future date be translated into adversarial actions against western interests. Some western scholars hold the view that though the danger of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan may not pose any danger in the short run, poverty, unemployment, and perceived injustice to the Muslims in general may in the long run generate actions that would not be in the interest of the West.

Besides, future recruits of the Al-Qaedists may not have to come from the marginalised sections of Pakistani society. The case of Daniel Pearl murderer Omar Saeed Sheikh, born into prosperous Pakistani-British family and having been a student at the London School of Economics and the 9/11 hijackers are cases in point. A June 2003 public opinion survey found 45 percent Pakistanis had at least "some confidence" in Osama bin Laden's ability to "do the right thing about world affairs." In testimony early this year to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a senior State Department official characterised Pakistan as "probably the most anti-American country in the world right now."

If democracy deficit has been identified as one of the main causes fuelling terrorism because the West is perceived by the citizens of those countries as propping up the failed autocratic governments in the affected countries, then the West should avoid pursuing double standards in its propagation of democratic values.

The US need for Pakistani cooperation in the war on terror notwithstanding, President Musharraf's decision to hold on to the post of Army Chief (though rubber stamped by the Parliament) and US silence on this important issue of disfiguration of democratic institutions may not be looked upon kindly by future generation of Pakistanis. Leon Haader (of the Cato Institute) who sees President Musharraf's joining the war on terror as not reflective of structural change in Pakistani policy holds the view of "Pakistan with its dictatorship, failed economy, and insecure nuclear weapons as a reluctant supporter of US goals at best and a potential long term problem at worst."

The point being driven at is that the West, particularly the US and Europe, should not have a myopic view of Pakistan where the army is apparently beating up the Al-Qaedists with some success, but should encourage secular pluralism instead of continued support to a military-reactionary combine. The emergence of a powerful Islamic fundamentalist group in Pakistan though discounted by Stephen Cohen for the present cannot be totally ruled out.

Cohen bases his argument on the premise that "regardless of what may be desirable the army will continue to set the limits of what is possible in Pakistan." If that were the case, then the guardians of global security and propagators of democratic values would be well advised to put a check on the "moderate oligarchy" and encourage Pakistan to follow the course of democratic pluralism. In the ultimate analysis, filtered judgement by many is always preferable to dictated conclusion by the few. For only democracy can make Pakistan work in the long run.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.