Fair enough. The government will likely consider many pros and cons before making up its mind. It is important, however, that this decision-making include the matter of the welfare of our troops, in case they are shipped out to Iraq. While not often mentioned amidst the understandable glory of keeping the peace, the fact is that Bangladeshi troops on multilateral missions have been, shall we say, put in harm's way unnecessarily.

A decade and a half ago, our infantry, fresh on the ground, was sent as a screen to the Saudi border with Kuwait to await an onslaught of Saddam's rapacious Republican Guard which had just ravaged the tiny Gulf sheikhdom. The Bangladeshi brigade, along with its Pakistani counterparts, was supposed to hold the line until the Anglo-Americans arrived. Fortunately, the line held and the rest is history.

A few years later, under Anglo-French United Nations commanders of dubious competence, our officers and men were beseiged in Bosnia's Bihac enclave as the Europeans debated whether to allow "those Bangladeshis" the use of their own heavy weapons to defend themselves. For weeks, the Russians and their allies would not let warm clothes, food, and medicines into the Bihac outpost, while our supposed UN partners merely looked on.

A similar story repeated itself in West Africa. Our troops, benignly neglected by our multilateral partners, have been sometimes taken hostage by rival factions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. They have been provided with shoddy equipment which ultimately resulted in the Christmas Day death of 15 officers as they flew out in a faulty plane. And now we are even more engaged in West Africa with deployments planned for Ivory Coast and elsewhere.

Granted that some of the misfortune of our globally deployed troops is due to the inherent delicacy of multilateral operations done on short notice. Yet some of the blame must also be shouldered by our multilateral partners who sometimes place more value on European lives than those of non-Europeans. Part of the blame also goes to a confusing command system that places operational command in the hands of distant commanders acting on unwritten instructions from Geneva or New York and having little authority to defend troops they have never seen.

Lest there be a greater tragedy than Bihac or Benin, the defence ministry must be proactive. Prior to any deployment in multilateral operations, our armed forces must have clear guidelines to protect themselves. First and foremost, the field command of any Bangladeshi unit serving in such an operation must be kept with a Bangladeshi officer; no man in Geneva, Lagos, or Timbuktu cares more for a unit's troops than the commanding officer of those soldiers.

Secondly, before deploying our units to keep the peace we must make sure that they are not sitting ducks. In other words, any deployment agreement must ensure that if Bangladeshi troops are attacked, they can retaliate swiftly and sharply. Being ambassadors of peace is one thing; becoming fodder for every roving militia is another.

Finally, our troops abroad must be provided with all the combat equipment and logistical support that a modern army justly deserves in the field. Just because they are on "peacekeeping" missions does not mean that they are in any less danger. On the contrary, an organisation trained in the art of warfare is all the more imperiled when in the uncharted waters of nebulous peacemaking in unfamiliar lands amongst unknown populations. If Bangladeshi troops have to be sent to keep foreigners from slaughtering each other, then by God give them the tanks and howitzers they need. And give them the freedom to use them.

Peacekeeping is an honourable mission, for as the ancient scriptures say "blessed are the peacemakers." Let us make sure that such blessings do not come at the cost of the lives of the nation's finest.

The author writes from Kansas City, Miissouri, USA.