Are submarines Neptune's nightmare?

THE ancient Greek deity Poseidon, or his Roman analogue, Neptune, once ruled the waves with a mere trident as their only weapon. True, being gods, they were able to put it to manifold uses, including wreaking disasters like horrific earthquakes to punish those who incurred their wrath.

Times have since changed. Bereft of divine attributes, those who wish to exercise such control, or come even close to that, now need far more sophisticated weaponry. Nations have replaced those gods and their yearning for command over waters. For a while in history such interests and initiatives lay with the countries of the western hemisphere. That era, too, is bygone. Asia is now coming to the fore.

Its seas will soon be awash with numerous war-waging platforms operating beneath. These will be in the form of the latest versions of submarines. As Asia grows in economic and political significance, it does so militarily also. Prosperity creates interests that need protecting. It includes fruits of development. What better way is there to do this is there than procuring the latest weaponry?

This is where submarines fit in. They run quiet, deep, and travel far. Their sonar signals may do marine biology damage, and even harm the fish, flora and fauna. No matter. To these countries they buttress their sense of security. That is what they tend to accord priority. So the procurements robustly continue.

Unsurprisingly, China is in the lead. It has growing assets to protect. This year a defence budget of $70 billion, the second largest in the world after that of the United States, was announced. A lion's (or, perhaps more appropriately, a whale's) share is to go to the navy, rendering it the fastest growing arm of the Chinese military. It is not hard to fathom why.

The Chinese strategy is expected to shift from "active defence" to "pre-emptive response" by 2020. That implies the capability to fight massive wars in blue water, providing effective support for land operations. This will require many submarines. Already China has them in numbers greater than any other Asian country. These include 10 nuclear-powered vessels, and nearly 60 diesel-electric ones. It is reportedly building a fleet of five nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying subs, each capable of launching 12 such missiles. A new submarine base is said to be under construction in Hainan in the South China Sea.

It is an easy guess which country is next: India. India's submarine capability is being rapidly developed, with eyes on China, and glances towards Pakistan. The plan is to develop the ability called "triad" in strategic parlance. This is the capacity to launch nuclear missiles from the air as well as land, which India already has, and now, sea.

To reach that end an Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program was created. Under it, India commissioned this July its first indigenously built, though with considerable Russian assistance, nuclear submarine, also capable of launching 12 missiles. Delhi also gave it the fearsome name of Arihant, meaning "destroyer of enemies."

This is unlikely to have a calming effect on Beijing or Islamabad. Six more Scorpene-class submarines are also being built under license. India's blue-water navy is designed to reflect its distant interests, in say the Malacca Straits, where it sees itself as not only a "user state" but also a "funnel state."

Pakistan is struggling to stay relevant. Also, to keeping its powder dry on the ocean floor. Its current fleet comprises French-built platforms; four aging Daphne-class units, two Agosta-70 boats, and two modern Agosta-90 B subs, the second of the latter is under construction and fitted with an air-independent propulsion system that will allow it to remain submerged longer, though nowhere near the capability of a nuclear submarine. There are also four Italian-designed midget submarines being built.

Earlier this year Admiral Noman Bashir said that "sub-surface defence capabilities" would be strengthened. He was perhaps referring to three Type-214 submarines being ordered from Germany. Pakistan badly requires the capability of having some of its subs carry a part of its nuclear arsenal. This is necessary for better concealment and more effective deterrence. But it is likely to remain an unfulfilled aspiration for the near future.

For Bangladesh, access to the oceans via the Bay of Bengal is of utmost strategic importance. The spat with Yangon in November 2008 over a rig placed by Myanmar for exploration purposes in territorial waters claimed by Bangladesh was a "wake-up call" for Dhaka. The media has reported the Bangladesh navy as having an ambitious ten-year plan to upgrade itself into a "three-dimensional" force, which, understandably, would include the purchase of a submarine by 2019, a project, which is said to have "approval in principle" of the government. This is only logical. The Myanmar navy has grown enormously since 1988, mostly with Chinese help. It now seeks blue water capability. Addition of submarines is, therefore, only a matter of time.

Other South-East Asians are not lagging behind. The largest of them all, Indonesia, is also vying for the largest fleet, planning to buy 12 before 2024, strengthening its current insufficient number of two German made Cakra-class vessels. Singapore was very much in the news lately for its procurement of two Archer-class submarines from Sweden, upgraded, refurbished, modernised, and tropicalised. These will enable it to retire some old Challenger-class boats.

Malaysia has also acquired its first Scorpene submarine from France, with a second due later this year. Besides, South Korea is constructing under license from Germany three Type-214 platforms with options on six more. Somewhat wary, Australia brought out a "Defence White Paper" recently, looking to double the number of its submarines from 6 to 12 by 2030.

So, in a few decades, many steel-fish with missile-teeth will be prowling the Asian waters. Analysts like Raja Mohan see this phenomenon as an Asian penchant for classical notions of power as symbolised by earlier naval strategists like Admiral Mahan, just when the West is gripped with post-modern fascination for norms and institutions!

However, Asian submarines need not become Neptune's nightmare. There are at least three main reasons why not. First, because a sub-launched missile is less accurate, it is not to be used as a "first strike" weapon but only for retaliatory actions, which renders it stabilising. Second, the procurements do not alter existing balance of power. And third, coordinated measures can enhance security, such as vis-à-vis rogue non-state actors. What can be useful is a "Big Tent" conference of all stake-holders to exchange information, and calibrate actions. All this will put to test Asia's wisdom and maturity. It is yet another challenge that Asia will need to work together to overcome.

Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is former Adviser on Foreign Affairs to the previous Caretaker Government.