Lessons from Peshawar
IT'S humanly impossible not to be revolted by the barbaric killing of 134 children in Peshawar by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This galvanised unprecedented solidarity in South Asia and even impelled Narendra Modi to talk to Nawaz Sharif, offering help.
However, India seems to be slipping back into the old hostile mould. It protested against the bail for Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) “mastermind” of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Second, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval demanded that post-Peshawar measures against TTP be extended to LeT. Third, India refused to grant visas to Pakistani delegates to a Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD) seminar.
Lakhvi was granted bail by a court. The Pakistan government said it would appeal against the order and further detained Lakhvi. A similar legal process prevails in India, under which scores of people charged with or convicted of serious offences are granted bail.
They include Bharatiya Janata Party leaders Amit Shah and Maya Kodnani, and policemen named in Ishrat Jahan and Sohrabuddin's “encounter” killings. The remedy against bad bail orders is legal appeal, not political condemnation.
LeT is a nasty terrorist group, whose head Hafiz Saeed absurdly blamed India for the Peshawar attack. But TTP actually owned responsibility for it. The two cannot be equated at this juncture, as Doval did. Denial of visas for the PIPFPD seminar was deplorable. PIPFPD has promoted fruitful cross-border citizen-to-citizen dialogue over 20 years.
India's actions are a retrogression to Modi's pre-Peshawar policy. Foreign secretary-level talks were called off in August because Pakistan High Commissioner Abdul Basit didn't cancel his meeting with Hurriyat leaders. India suddenly took offence at what has long been a routine.
In October, Modi chided Pakistan as “the enemy” which has been taught a “befitting lesson” through border firing. In December, concerts by the highly-acclaimed Sachal Jazz Ensemble were cancelled. So were performances by Pakistani qawwals at the Delhi Press Club -- under official pressure. A delegation of Pakistani MPs visited Delhi, but didn't get to meet the Lok Sabha Speaker.
What of the recent ceasefire violations? The Modi government deludes itself that it can prevent these through a military response which can threaten Pakistan with unaffordable costs. The strategic balance simply doesn't permit such deterrence.
Both sides routinely violate the 2003 ceasefire agreement -- Pakistan probably more frequently, to “internationalise” Kashmir. They stoop to beheading each other's soldiers.
Therefore, all solutions to India-Pakistan problems must be peaceful. These do work, despite hiccups -- like the Indus Waters Accord (1960). By contrast, when left to military leaders, problems (e.g. Siachen or Sir Creek) become intractable.
The Peshawar shock could hopefully become a turning point in Pakistan's policy towards terrorism, which permits jehadis to collude with the army and secret agencies and attack not just India, but also Pakistan's Shias, Ahmadis and Christians.
Pakistan's policymakers have learnt no lessons from these attacks, or from the fact that Osama bin Laden could find refuge in Pakistan. They continue to shield jehadi groups. The government hasn't sought an extension of the detention of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi chief Malik Ishaq, involved in anti-Shia pogroms (since detained under a different law).
Peshawar stands out because its victims were primarily children of army personnel, and the attack came amidst of a strong anti-TTP military campaign. This might strengthen the army's will to fight the Taliban.
Islamabad has, for the first time, repudiated the distinction between “good” and “bad” Taliban. Army chief Raheel Sharif visited Kabul to demand the extradition of TTP's Mullah Fazlullah. The government has hanged some convicts. But a militarist, “kill-them-all,” response won't do.
There must be a resolute, systematic campaign to break the nexus between Pakistan's state and the extremists' jehadi apparatus. This campaign must be based on understanding extremism's root-causes, and should radically transform public discourse.
This means acknowledging that the Taliban aren't “outsiders” or “misguided” people -- anymore than the Hindutva goons who terrorise non-Hindus and want to rid India of them. Both are equally fanatical and dangerous.
Like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the Taliban has a clear agenda -- an Islamist Pakistan that practises Sharia law, without pluralism or tolerance. This must be opposed without ifs and buts.
India can contribute positively to de-Talibanisation if it resumes the bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. India must actively engage with liberal and tolerant voices in Pakistan's civil society, which uncompromisingly oppose Islamism and want a modern, tolerant, pluralist and democratic state.
This entails rejecting the cynical advice that India should directly talk to the Pakistan military, just as the US does. India's government is civilian and must deal exclusively with Pakistan's civilian leadership -- and strengthen its peace constituency.
Peshawar has created a unique moment in Pakistan, when de-Talibanisation can be put on the agenda. India can make this a unique moment for peace in all of South Asia by earnestly proposing cooperation -- in fighting terrorism, promoting trade, and stabilising Afghanistan.
If the Modi government is not to squander this valuable opportunity, it must stop regarding Pakistan as an enemy, but see it as a potentially friendly neighbour. Above all, it must crack the whip on Hindutva extremists.
The writer is an eminent Indian columnist.
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