Australia's anti-Muslim laws
AUSTRALIA'S latest round of proposed counterterrorism measures includes a “prove that you're not a terrorist” provision that risks further alienating the country's Muslims and thereby makes finding long-term solutions to home-grown extremism more difficult.
Imagine the court room: “This is Uncle Ahmed” the defendant is telling the judge, showing the family photo album. The Muslim defendant is trying to prove a legitimate reason for his last visit to Syria, trying to avoid years in gaol.
Under Australia's proposed counterterrorism laws a person visiting an area designated by the foreign minister as an area of terrorist activity must demonstrate a legitimate reason. Publicly stated reasons are visiting relatives or humanitarian work.
The defendant's actual wrongdoing or right-doing has no bearing. Being there is the crime.
Counter-terrorism agencies claim these laws address the problem created by the 150 Australians currently in Syria and Iraq linked to extremist groups. The fear is some may return with terrorist intentions.
Although the potential for domestic attacks exists, in disproportionately impacting Australian Muslims these laws may backfire. These are anti-Muslim provisions.
It is reasonable to assume that a non-Muslim visiting the same area will not arouse suspicion. While a Muslim on humanitarian assignment in Iraq will risk government investigation, for example, their non-Muslim colleague will not. The risk will be greater where the activity's “legitimacy” is untested.
Such provisions may close diverse opportunities for Muslim Australians including freelance journalism, business and visiting as an academic. It may encourage discontinuing relations with overseas family and friends.
Much of this reduced opportunity will surely present itself as self-restriction: “choosing” not to pursue options that risk government interference. It will be invisible but resented. This will be regardless of how the laws are used.
Significant potential for misuse also exists. To stifle dissent the foreign minister might declare Gaza a terrorist zone but not Israel. If the goal was not to pursue political objectives then declarations would be the parliament's responsibility.
The legal profession raised concerns these laws reverse the onus of proof to “guilty until proven innocent.” In response, the foreign minister assured -- seemingly on the hop -- that agencies need to show there was no legitimate reason.
This approach is even more problematic. How to prove a negative? For what period will agencies fumble about in Muslim Australian lives on the basis of a trip? Will surveillance include family, friends and associates? Will it be allowable for a week or a decade?
Such activity may spill into other tasks. If, in the course of travel-related investigation an agency indentifies an individual -- the traveller, family member or friend -- who might make a useful employee, it might prove overly tempting to pursue coercive recruitment rather than end the exercise. After all, nobody will know.
The greater problem is that Australia's counterterrorism agencies failed to respond well to the post 9/11 world. Since 2001 it's been obvious that the road to long-term security involves community building. The counterterrorism agencies, which have expanded at least threefold in budgets and staffing, have overwhelmingly favoured top-down law enforcement measures which undermine trust.
After spending billions of dollars with appeals for greater powers about annually, the Australian public are told the terrorist risk is greater than before. At what point do we shift focus onto the quality of the agencies? It's hardly a success story.
Added to this is the failure to properly engage with Australia's Muslim communities. Although figures on religion are unavailable, the largest agency ASIO as at 2013 had 94.2% of employees from an English-speaking background. The national figure is 85%. These institutions remain overwhelmingly white.
As counterterrorism chiefs are aware, considering repeated appeals for Muslim recruits, it leaves agencies, in knowledge and ability to engage with Muslim communities, diminished.
Along with the Australian military which is also overly white, that counterterrorism agencies have been unable to redress this imbalance may suggest the prevalence of an unpalatable old-fashioned white ethos.
Evidence might include a few years ago when the then ASIO head argued publicly that Muslims may wish to join because Muslims also die in terrorist attacks, distastefully implying that while non-Muslims may wish to protect everybody, Muslims might be motivated to protect their own.
Counterterrorism agencies need to rid themselves of that kind of “us and them” framework.
The “consultations” concerning these laws have been similarly mishandled. Arriving with well-baked initiatives is not consultation. Muslim organisations have boycotted meetings while expressing valid concerns that although they'd like to consult they wish to be listened to.
One leader, Grand Mufti Professor Ibrahim Abu Mohamed, said that had Muslims not actively worked to prevent it, “There could have been 1,500 [Australian extremists in Syria-Iraq], not 150.” Equally, had counterterrorism agencies adopted greater focus on inclusiveness both in-house and in society it could've been 15.
These laws will be referred to a parliamentary committee for further consideration. Let's hope sense prevails. More powers for Australia's counterterrorism agencies, in great need of reform to meet modern Australia's demands, will only lead efforts to end extremism further astray. And Muslim Australians deserve better than B-grade citizenship.
The writer is an English instructor and feature writer.
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